Coaches’ dehumanisation in sport: exploring antecedents and relationships with wellbeing. by SLATER, MICHAEL,JOHN
Durham E-Theses
Coaches' dehumanisation in sport: exploring
antecedents and relationships with wellbeing.
SLATER, MICHAEL,JOHN
How to cite:
SLATER, MICHAEL,JOHN (2020) Coaches' dehumanisation in sport: exploring antecedents and
relationships with wellbeing., Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/13501/
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or
charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details.
Academic Support Office, Durham University, University Office, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP
e-mail: e-theses.admin@dur.ac.uk Tel: +44 0191 334 6107
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk
2
Material abstract 
Coaches’ dehumanisation in sport: exploring antecedents and 
relationships with wellbeing. 
 
Michael John Slater 
 
Overview: Dehumanisation is the denial of humanness, in which humanness is considered 
as attributes that characterise what it means to be human. To the author’s knowledge, this 
study was the first to specifically explore dehumanisation in a sporting context. The 
context used was team-selection decisions, widely conceptualised as a stressor for coaches. 
This study sought to explore whether dehumanisation was employed by coaches when 
making team selection decisions, what personal or contextual factors may predict this, and 
to examine whether dehumanisation may be protective for mental well-being.  
Methodology: A combination of sampling methods were used alongside gatekeepers to 
recruit participants. Coaches completed a two part questionnaire, one before (n=193) and 
one after a team selection decision (n=104). Questionnaires contained demographic 
information, and measures of dehumanisation, Personal Sense of Power (PSP), Emotional 
Intelligence (EI), Resilience, Relatedness and Mental well-being. 
Results: Coaches’ change in use of dehumanisation from pre to post selection was found 
to be negligible. This indicated that personal factors instead of contextual factors were of 
greater prominence when predicting coaches’ engagement with dehumanisation. 
Specifically, coaches’ levels of PSP, EI Relatedness and Resilience negatively predicted 
use of all three forms of dehumanisation. Moreover, it was found that all three forms of 
dehumanisation were negatively related to mental well-being, suggesting that engagement 
with dehumanisation is unlikely to be functional for coaches in relieving stress. 
Conclusion: Findings suggest that dehumanisation does not significantly change following 
a team selection decision, yet personal factors do influence coaches’ engagement with 
dehumanisation. Thus, the key implication of this study is that coach education 
programmes seek to integrate training of EI, Resilience and Relatedness, due to the 
negatively correlations with dehumanisation, and dehumanisation’s negatively relationship 
with mental well-being. It is recommended future research focuses on practical 
manifestations of, and sport-specific measures for, dehumanisation. 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
Part 1 - Overview and Rationalisation of Research Area 
Sport can be defined as activities that are structured, goal-oriented, competitive, ludic and 
culturally situated (Giulianotti, 2005) and the reasons for studying sport are grounded in 
the psychological, social, physiological and economic benefits for those that take part. 
Benefits to the individual of participating in sport as a form of physical activity include a 
positive association with wellbeing (Fox, 1999; Downward & Rascuite, 2011), reduced 
risk of negative health states such as coronary heart disease and diabetes (Fentem, 1994) 
and the potential to alleviate symptoms of depression (Craft & Perna, 2004). Participating 
in sport also enables the learning of social and moral skills, how to cope with social 
differences, how to manage the experience of winning and losing, and how to develop 
healthy habits (Jacobs et al., 2016).  
Furthermore, sport has numerous societal benefits. Economically, sport and sport-
related activity in England is estimated to support over 400,000 full-time equivalent jobs, 
with the value of sport in terms of volunteering estimated to be £2.7 billion (Sport 
England, 2013). Moreover, taking part in regular sport can save between £1,750 and 
£6,900 in healthcare costs per person (Sport England, 2019a). Socially, returns on 
investment in sports programmes for at-risk youth are estimated at £7.35 of social benefit 
for every £1 spent - achieved through financial savings to the police, the criminal justice 
system and the community (Sport England, 2019b). Unfortunately, achieving these 
benefits is not as straightforward as listing them. Given sport’s inherent interpersonal 
nature, there are a number of sociological and psychological processes that can either 
facilitate or prevent these benefits from occurring.  
One key figure in the sporting experiences of those who engage is the sports coach. 
Indeed, Jacobs et al. (2016) contend that the coach is the catalyst for promoting the 
positive effects of sport participation. The coaching climate is one factor that influences 
people’s sports experiences (Smith & Smoll, 1996). The coaching climate refers to the 
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psychosocial environment a coach creates for the athletes they work with, specifically; this 
refers to the characteristics of interactions between coach and athlete (Cronin & Allen, 
2015). As such, from youth sport participation to competing at world championships, 
coaches strongly influence the nature and quality of the sport experience for athletes. This 
is through the goal priorities they promote, the attitudes and values they transmit, and the 
nature of their interactions with athletes (Smith et al., 2007; Pensgaard & Roberts, 2002).  
Yet, Jones and Wallace (2005) argue that “coaching is a tough job” (p. 120) as it is 
not something which is merely delivered, but is instead a dynamic social activity that 
engages both the coach and athlete (Cushion et al., 2006). Given this inherently social 
nature, coaching practice not only includes explicit practices (e.g. language, roles, 
documents) but also the implicit practices (e.g. relationships, tacit conversations, 
underlying assumptions), with the latter largely impossible to articulate, yet crucial to 
coaching’s effectiveness (Wenger, 1998). Bowes and Jones (2006) note that given 
coaching is comprised of endless dilemmas and decision making, requiring constant 
planning, observation, evaluation and reaction, its nature defies predominant rationalistic 
explanations. This is compounded by a coaching environment characterised by ambiguity 
and obscurity (Bowes & Jones, 2006). Every coach or athlete brings personal interests to 
the coaching setting, and each is empowered to follow them to some extent according to 
personal rationality (Jones & Wallace, 2005). The coaching process is therefore 
characterised by a deep-rooted element of ambiguity over what everyone involved is trying 
to do, why they are trying to do it and whether they can achieve it (Jones & Wallace, 
2005). This complexity and multidimensionality by which coaching can be characterised, 
coupled with the influence the coach has on the sport experience for the athlete, underpins 
the argument as to why researching sport coaching as a process, and sports coaches as a 
population, is a worthwhile area of study.  
By researching coaching and coaches as a population, it is hoped that clarity will be 
developed on how best to support coaches to be effective. Coaching effectiveness (in sport) 
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has been defined by Côté and Gilbert (2009) as “the consistent application of integrated 
professional, interpersonal, and intrapersonal knowledge to improve athletes’ competence, 
confidence, connection and character in specific coaching contexts” (p. 316). However, 
this definition can be contested as it adopts a unidirectional assessment of coaching 
outcomes, whilst simultaneously neglecting any impact upon the coach’s wellbeing. Given 
that on-going research suggest rates of mental illness in coaches exceed that reported in 
general population samples, at up to 44% of coaches (Edge Hill University, 2018), the 
under-exploration in the literature of factors that influence coaches’ wellbeing is a real 
concern. There is not yet evidence to establish a causal relationship between the stress of 
sports coaching and mental illness, yet characteristics of the role (e.g., the aforementioned 
ambiguity and uncertainty) have been linked with negative mental health outcomes in other 
employment contexts (e.g., Pollard, 2001). Unhealthy coaches, much like unhealthy 
athletes, cannot perform to the best of their abilities. Therefore supporting coach wellbeing 
should be considered an important component of supporting effective coaching.  
The long-term negative outcomes of reduced wellbeing is supported by research 
from organisational psychology, as work by Wright and Bonett (2007) reported that 
individuals with low levels of psychological wellbeing were more likely to leave their 
employers as a result of low job satisfaction. Similarly, the Department for Work and 
Pensions (2006) stated that healthy and fit employees are essential to ensuring a company 
remains efficient and profitable. Therefore, the definition of coaching effectiveness to be 
used in this study is one which involves a consideration for the coach’s psychological and 
social wellbeing too, with coaching effectiveness defined as “the consistent application of 
integrated professional, interpersonal, and intrapersonal knowledge to improve athletes’ 
competence, confidence, connection and character in specific coaching contexts whilst not 
negatively impacting the coach’s psychological wellbeing.” As Giges et al. (2004) note, 
“coaches are performers, educators, administrators, leaders, planners, motivators, 
negotiators, managers and listeners, but they are also people” (p. 431) and it is this last 
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characteristic that must be considered of equal importance to the rest when considering 
how to define coaching effectiveness. 
In sum, therefore, sport is an important context for research when considering the 
benefits it offers to an individual’s physical and mental wellbeing, the economy and 
society more broadly. Coaches are a vital part of the sporting experience, and under-
studied with respect to factors that influence their own performance and wellbeing. The 
scale at which sport and sports coaching takes place further justifies research on sports 
coaches as a population. The most recent coaching workforce analysis, carried out by Sport 
England in 2016, reported that 3.1 million adults in England have coached sport or 
physical activity in the past 12 months and that there are 7.6 million coach-led 
participation experiences per week (UK Coaching, 2017). This highlights the size of the 
impact studying sports coaches may have, further warranting research on sports coaches as 
a population. Finally, there are of course overlaps between coaching in sport and processes 
involved in management, leadership, and the development of others in additional elite 
performance domains (e.g. business, the military). Findings from the present study are 
likely to have applications to these contexts also. Given the above, this study will present 
an in-depth exploration of coaches’ wellbeing around one critical job role component: team 
selection decisions. The next section will explain how team selection decisions can be 
considered a stressful context for coaches.  
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Part 2 - The context: Team selection decisions as a source of stress 
 
“Selection is the most difficult … matchday minus one when I name the team is the only 
day of the week that I dread.” 
Phil Neville, England Women’s Football Team Head Coach. 
(Sky Sports, 2019) 
  
In elite sport, team selection decisions sit in the public consciousness whilst also providing 
a constant source of fan debate, discussion and scrutiny of professional coaches. The 
responsibility, or rather the ‘headache’ and ‘dilemma’, of such selection decisions lies with 
the coach and is experienced beyond just the high-profile coaches (Neely et al., 2016; 
Capstick & Trudel, 2010). Within this section, first, the concept of stress will be explored, 
providing examples of potential stressors coaches experience and associated outcomes. 
Second, I will present an argument for conceptualising team selection decisions as 
stressors for coaches, in addition to the importance of studying them.  
 
Stress 
Lazarus (1993) defines stressors as “environmental demands (i.e. stimuli) encountered by 
an individual” (p. 329) with “an individual’s negative psychological, physical and 
behavioural responses” (p. 329) considered as ‘strain.’ The distinction here is that stressors 
refer to events, situations or conditions, whereas strain refers to a person’s reaction. The 
overall process incorporating stressors, strains, appraisals and coping responses can be 
described by the term ‘stress’ (Fletcher & Scott, 2010). Stress has been explored in various 
professional contexts, which Norris et al. (2017) list as including; law enforcement 
(Kaiseler et al., 2014), nursing (Woodhead et al., 2016), public services (Liu et al., 2015) 
and teaching (McCarthy et al., 2015). Research on stress within a coaching context has 
emphasised the dualistic nature of stress exchanges, finding that the coach can be a stressor 
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for athletes (Thelwell et al., 2017), athletes are influenced by coaches’ stress experiences 
(Thelwell et al., 2017) and that coaches’ stress experiences are influenced by athletes 
(Nicholls and Perry, 2016). 
Full time coaches make up only 12% of the coaching population, with 74% of the 
workforce being comprised of volunteers (UK Coaching, 2017). However, regardless of 
employment status, there is literature to suggest that coaches experience multiple stressors 
when fulfilling the role. Research focused on elite coaches has reported conflict, pressure, 
athlete concerns, isolation and organisational management to be sources of stress (Olusoga 
et al., 2009) in addition to poor performance, poor training and officials (Thelwell et al., 
2010). Similarly, work involving part-time and voluntary coaches has reported stressors to 
include managing other coaches, decision making, building relationships, funding, 
managing athletes’ expectations and organisational duties (Potts et al., 2019). As such, it 
can be argued with confidence that coaches across all levels experience stressors in some 
form. 
 
Team selection decisions as a stressor 
One key stressor that coaches experience is that of team selection decisions (Didymus, 
2017; Thelwell et al., 2008; Olusoga et al., 2009; Couturier, 2009 & Lundkvist et al., 
2012). According to Taylor and Ogilvie (1994), deselection is the elimination of an athlete 
from a competitive sport team, based on the decisions of the coach. Using this definition as 
a guide, for the purposes of this study, a team selection will be defined as the process of the 
coach/coaches picking the athletes who are going to start for a team in a specific fixture, 
deselecting other athletes as substitutes or not participating at all. Previous research on 
team selection decisions can broadly be split into three categories; work on coaches 
(selectors), athletes (selectees) and selection itself (process).  
Work on coaches has included: coaches’ views on deselecting athletes (Neely et al., 
2016), recommendations from coaches on deselecting players (Seifreid & Casey, 2012) 
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and coaches’ perceptions of the challenges when working with substitute players (Wang et 
al., 2001). Collectively, this body of work has reported that coaches use different 
approaches to deselect players depending on the age of the athletes and level of the team 
(Seifreid & Casey, 2012; Capstick & Trudel, 2010) and that there are different phases 
involved in a selection decision; evaluation and decision making, communication and post 
decision reflections (Neely et al., 2016). Research focused on the athletes within team 
selection decisions has explored: the psychological symptoms of deselected elite student 
athletes (Brand et al., 2013), exploration of young elite athletes’ deselection experiences 
(Brown & Potrac, 2009) and self-protection by athletes when involved in a team selection 
decision (Grove et al., 2004). The findings of this work state that the emotional and 
psychological disturbances experienced upon deselection are contributed to by the strength 
of one’s athletic identity (Brown & Potrac, 2009), whilst athletic identity can also decrease 
following deselection (Grove et al., 2004).  Studies exploring the selection process itself 
have investigated the communication of non-selection in youth sport (Capstick & Trudel, 
2010) and the employment of Human Resource Management (HRM) when selecting 
athletes (Bradbury & Forsyth, 2012). This work found firstly, that coaches learn primarily 
about the process of communicating decisions through experience, and secondly (Capstick 
& Trudel, 2010), that coaches supported the use of HRM during the process of selection, 
but rarely implemented HRM-style practices (Bradbury & Forsyth, 2012).  
The contention that team selection decisions are stressful for coaches has a credible 
base in the literature. For example, Didymus’ (2017) study explored fifteen Olympic and 
international sports coaches’ experiences of stressors and found that they experienced 
stressors related to the following key themes: athlete concerns, coaching responsibilities, 
expectations, finance, governance, interference, organisational management, performance, 
preparation and selection. Within the selection theme, coaches cited both ‘choosing the 
best athletes for the team’ and ‘leaving athletes out of the team’ as stressors. Moreover, 
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Olusoga et al.’s (2009) work on stress in elite sports coaching identified selection decisions 
as a stressor for coaches working with world-class athletes.  
Further support for team selection decisions being a stressor for coaches comes 
from Lundkvist et al.’s (2012) study on burnout in elite football coaches. Lundkvist et al. 
(2012) reported how one coach described that team selection was an extremely worrying 
issue for them: “It’s the part surrounding team selection or telling a player they’re not good 
enough … it takes as much energy as holding a practice session or the actual match” (p. 
406). This can be interpreted as an example of emotional labour for the coach, whereby 
employees regulate their emotional display in an attempt to meet organisationally-based 
expectations specific to their roles (Brotheridge & Lee, 2003). Lundkvist et al.’s (2012) 
work is supported by Thelwell et al.’s (2010) study exploring coaches’ experiences of 
coping with stressors in sport. Two of three coaches interviewed in Thelwell et al.’s (2010) 
research cited team selection as a stressor, although specifically one of the coaches in the 
study stated that “there are times when I have to escape … I suppose I can’t think of who I 
will pick and what the team will be … I need to think about other stuff” (p. 248). This 
primarily highlights how selection decisions can be considered a stressor for sport coaches. 
However, to the authors’ knowledge, acute experiences of, and reactions to, team selection 
decisions are yet to be explored either in isolation (i.e. not a whole season or for a 
competition) or in detail from the perspective of the coach.  
 
Outcomes of stress 
It is generally accepted that one possible outcome of chronic exposure to stress, caused by 
stressors like those listed above, is burnout (Olusoga & Kenttä, 2017; Tashman et al., 
2010). Freudenberger (1989) defined burnout as “a state of fatigue or frustration brought 
about by devotion to a cause, way of life, or relationship that failed to produce the expected 
reward” (p. 13). Burnout is characterised as a syndrome involving symptoms such as the 
psychological impairments of emotional exhaustion, depersonalisation and reduced 
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personal accomplishment (Maslach & Jackson, 1981). Work by Bentzen and colleagues 
(2016) reported 24.4% of high-performance coaches across different sports were 
characterised as high in exhaustion at the end of the season, increasing the possibility of 
burnout. Burnout often presents with reduced satisfaction and diminishing commitment, 
which in turn increases turnover intentions (Raedeke et al., 2002). The outcome of this is 
that a coach’s inability to effectively cope with stressors may lead to burnout and threaten 
long-term coach retention, thus limiting the extent to which the previously outlined 
benefits of sport can be enjoyed by the population as a whole. Moreover, as Kilo and 
Hassmén (2016) note, from an organisational viewpoint helping coaches avoid stress build-
up may pay off in reduced turnover, saving organisations from regularly recruiting and 
replacing their coaches.  
In addition to avoiding burnout’s association with coach turnover/dropout, work in 
other domains has found that occupational stress has negative outcomes beyond burnout. 
For example, mental illness, particularly depression, anxiety and work-related stress, are 
now the leading causes of sickness, absence and long-term work incapacity (Harvey et al., 
2017). This is reinforced by Goswami’s (2015) study on employees in the banking sector 
who reported occupational stress to bring about negative psychological effects such as fear, 
anger and anxiety. Similarly, research on health workers has indicated that job stress is 
negatively correlated to job performance (AbuAlRab, 2004; Motowidlo et al., 1986; Imtiaz 
& Ahmad, 2009). As such, in order to alleviate these harmful health and performance 
outcomes related to occupational stress, effective coping methods should be explored. 
 
Summary 
Given that the psychological stress experienced by sports coaches can have both 
performance and potential health costs (Fletcher & Scott, 2010), there is a moral 
imperative to carry out research exploring how best to alleviate such negative outcomes. 
Linking this to the focus of the present study, failing to cope effectively with the process of 
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a selection decision may have negative psychological impacts for the mental wellbeing of 
the coach, an example of the health costs Fletcher and Scott (2010) allude to. These are 
likely to be the acute reactions that occur during the process of a selection decision, which 
when accumulated over the course of a season, may be exacerbated. As such, given team 
selection decisions can be considered as a stressor for coaches and the extent to which 
coaches are able to cope with stressors is important for their health and performance, the 
context of team selection decisions is a worthwhile area of study.   
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Part 3 - Conceptual Frameworks: Dehumanisation and ostracism 
Understanding how team selection decisions are stressful, and how best to mitigate this, 
requires application of appropriate theoretical frameworks. Here, I make an argument for 
the application of conceptual frameworks relating to dehumanisation and ostracism; first 
defining them, second explaining them and third noting how they link to sport and the 
context of the current study. 
Ostracism is defined as “ignoring and excluding individuals or groups, by 
individuals or groups” (Williams, 2007, p. 427). The process of ostracism is dyadic, with 
one person being ostracised, the target, and at least one person doing the ostracism, the 
source (Wirth & Wesselman, 2018). Research focused on ostracism has found it to have 
multiple negative outcomes for both sides. For example, the experience of being ostracised 
has been associated with reduced self-esteem (Wirth et al., 2010) and reduced meaning in 
life (Stillman et al., 2009). Similarly, the experience of ostracising others has been found to 
be emotionally and cognitively depleting (Williams et al., 2001; Zadro et al., 2004). 
Linking this to the current study, team selection decisions may be conceptualised as a form 
of ostracism, given that athletes may have to be excluded from the group by the coach. It is 
this, I contend, that contributes to team selection decisions being stressful for coaches.  
One method to avoid, or cope with, the negative outcomes and stressful experience 
of ostracising another, which may be present following a team selection decision, is that of 
dehumanisation. Dehumanisation has broadly been defined as the denial of humanness, in 
which humanness is considered as attributes that characterise what it means to be human 
(Haslam & Loughnan, 2014). Dehumanisation can take three forms: animalistic, 
mechanistic and self. Simplistically put, animalistic involves the likening of humans to 
animals, mechanistic the likening of humans to machines and self-dehumanisation seeing 
oneself as less human. The majority of literature on dehumanisation has focused on 
negative contexts such as the harmful treatment of refugees (Esses et al., 2008), 
experiences of violence (White, 2010) and sexism (Cowan & Campbell, 1994).  
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To date, limited literature exists considering dehumanisation in everyday use, and 
whether it may have adaptive or functional outcomes. The literature that does exist 
includes that by Haque and Waytz (2012) who explored dehumanisation in medical 
settings, broadly considering dehumanisation from a negative perspective but concluding 
with an evaluation of its potentially functional properties. The authors noted that empathy 
reduction may benefit physicians when working with patients. Similarly, Lammers and 
Stapel (2011) explored how dehumanisation could be used to justify making a tough 
decision, presumably therefore reducing feelings of dissonance for the individual making 
the decision. It is on this premise of using dehumanisation to justify tough decisions that 
we propose dehumanisation may be functionally employed when making team selection 
decisions in sport. To put it crudely; coaches may be able protect themselves from the 
negative outcomes of a team selection decision (underpinned by ostracism) by engaging in 
forms of dehumanisation.  
Furthermore, these frameworks provide a useful grounding for the present research 
because there is some previous work linking a denial of humanness and sport within 
sociological research on sport, although not explicitly stated as dehumanisation. For 
example, Marxist theories of capitalism have been employed to articulate how athletes, and 
most specifically elite athletes, are considered to be parts of a machine that contribute to an 
output (e.g. Ingham, 2004; Brohm, 1978; Connor, 2009; Rigauer, 2000; Giulianotti, 2005). 
Through employing this Marxist sport structure, Brohm (1978) contends that in essence, 
sport is a mechanisation of the body whereby the body is treated as automaton and 
governed by the principle of maximising output. The competitive nature of sport implies 
that the maximum possible productivity is to be extracted from the labour-power of 
sportsmen and women, in order to reach their capacity for high performance (Brohm, 
1978). This concept of productivity is reinforced by Connor (2009) who states that in elite 
sport, an athlete forms part of a machine “and like pieces in a machine they are just another 
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widget that can be replaced when worn out” (p. 1375). Despite this predominant focus on 
elite sport, as a result of the capitalist nature of sport that focuses on maximising 
productivity, it is possible that the principles still apply to those participating in non-elite 
levels of sport. Consequently, athletes can become tied up in a network of standardised 
repressive techniques and through the practice of obsessive repetition, sport can lead to the 
alienation of the individual (Brohm, 1978). As such, athletes are denied humanness as a 
result of the over-arching ‘system’ in which sport operates. 
Additionally, there are plentiful examples of dehumanising terminology used 
within sports media. For example, Nico Portal, cycling team Team Ineos’ sporting director, 
described cyclist Chris Froome as “…just an animal, a beast” (BBC Sport, 2019) and 
Premier League Footballer, Kelechi Iheanacho, described his two former team-mates 
Raheem Sterling and Leroy Sane as “machines.” These descriptions characterise 
dehumanisation but are both used in positive contexts, which is conflicting with the 
majority of previous research on dehumanisation. This highlights another reason as to why 
dehumanisation is worthy of further consideration in this context, because it is possible that 
dehumanisation is employed positively within sport settings and thus, any findings related 
to this would be a useful addition to broader literature on dehumanisation. 
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Part 4 - Study overview: Core Proposal  
This study will explore the prevalence, nature, and associated outcomes of dehumanisation 
within the sporting context surrounding team selection decisions in particular. Specifically, 
the extent to which a coach engages with all three forms of dehumanisation (animalistic, 
mechanistic and self) overall and following a team selection decision will be measured. 
Alongside this, individual and context-level factors hypothesised to predicts a coach’s use 
of dehumanisation will be explored. 
In doing so, this study will also seek to integrate ideas from cognitive psychology, 
health psychology, social psychology and sociology. Specifically, we will use this focus on 
dehumanisation to consider how the behaviours of individuals are influenced by broader 
social structures and systems that exist in sport. The benefit of this integrated approach is 
that it will provide an understanding of the relationship between the two different 
disciplines (Balagué et al., 2017) and deliver additional information that would not 
normally be obtainable should a monodisciplinary approach be employed (Burwitz et al., 
1994). As Maguire (1991) argues, in sport, people act the way they do because of the way 
the society in which they train and compete is constructed. This suggests that both 
psychology and sociology co-exist in practice and therefore builds an argument for the 
integration of ideas from both disciplines. Thus, by employing ideas from both psychology 
and sociology, it is hoped that a clearer understanding of human behaviour, both 
individually and during interactions, will be developed. 
Moreover, by measuring factors hypothesised to predict individual differences in 
dehumanisation amongst coaches, insight will be provided into whether contextual or 
personal factors are dominant in predicting the likelihood of a coach engaging in 
dehumanisation. This has the potential to challenge the way in which previous research has 
primarily explored dehumanisation as a socially-developed phenomenon, should personal 
factors be central in predicting the extent to which a coach engages with dehumanisation. 
Collectively, the findings should enable identification of individuals or situations where 
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dehumanisation is likely, which in turn can facilitate early prevention, intervention, or 
promotion as appropriate (depending on associated wellbeing outcomes).  
To summarise, novel elements of the study include: the application of 
psychological theory on dehumanisation to sport, the integration of individual-focused 
stress and coping models with a broader sociological understanding of sporting 
environments, and adding to the nascent research exploring sporting environments and 
experiences from the perspective of the coach. This study will primarily produce applied 
recommendations for coach education programmes, whilst also shedding light on new 
areas within human behaviour. Specifically, these will include the extent to which 
dehumanisation occurs within a sporting setting and if this potentially has adaptive 
outcomes for coaches. These findings may then have potential applications within contexts 
beyond sport, specifically leadership settings and environments centred on interpersonal 
relationships.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Part 1 - Introduction to Literature Review 
Part 1 of this literature review will conceptualise team selection decisions as a source of 
coach stress. In doing so, a review of the literature surrounding coach stress and coping 
mechanisms employed by coaches will be provided. 
Following this, Part 2 will explain what dehumanisation is and provide a theoretical 
link between ostracism and dehumanisation, whilst considering previous research in both 
areas. An explanation will then be provided as to how the research on coaching, ostracism 
and dehumanisation suggests that dehumanisation may be employed as a coping 
mechanism by coaches within the context of team selection decisions.  
Part 3 of this literature review will review factors hypothesised to predict the extent 
to which coaches engage with dehumanisation.  
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Part 2 – Coping 
Coping with stress 
The literature surrounding stress and coping consists of an abundance of definitions and 
descriptions for coping, with the trait and process perspectives being the most prominent 
according to Nicholls and Polman (2007). The trait approach classifies each individual 
according to their stable coping styles (Penley et al., 2002) and assumes individuals hold a 
preferred set of coping strategies which are applied to each coping context as required 
(Carver et al., 1989). Conversely, the process or transactional approach states that coping 
with stress is a dynamic and recursive process that involves interactions between a 
person’s internal (i.e. beliefs about self, goals and values) and external (i.e. situational) 
environments (Lazarus, 1999). From this perspective, coping has been defined as 
“constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or 
internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person” 
(Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141).  
Lazarus (1999) and Lazarus and Folkman (1984) identified primary and secondary 
appraisal as crucial constructs in the stress appraisal and coping relationship. Primary 
appraisal concerns whether what is happening is perceived to be relevant to goal 
commitments, values, belief about self and situational intentions (Nicholls & Polman, 
2007). Goal commitment has been viewed as a crucial factor here (Nicholls & Polman, 
2007), as without goal commitment, Lazarus (1999) notes “there is nothing of adaptational 
importance at stake in an encounter to arouse a stress reaction” (Lazarus, 1999, p. 76). 
Secondary appraisal is the cognitive-evaluative process of the coping options available to 
the person (Nicholls & Polman, 2007). Hereby, secondary appraisal is not actual coping, 
but the instance where the individual decides what they are going to do to cope (Lazarus, 
1999).  
Furthermore, Fletcher and Fletcher (2005) developed a meta-model of stress, 
emotions and performance. The model illustrates the interactions between stressors, 
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perceptions, appraisals and coping, and the resultant positive or negative responses, feeling 
states and outcomes (Fletcher et al., 2006). The model comprises of three stages and the 
first stage identifies that all individuals’ encounter environmental demands but the 
consequences of encountering those demands depend upon an individual’s perception and 
initial cognitive appraisals of the demands in relation to their personal resources (Potts et 
al., 2019). Fletcher and Fletcher (2005) state that an individual will experience strain when 
the demands (stressors) they experience and their resources do not match. The second stage 
of the model illustrates the role of an individual’s appraisal of their emotions in relation to 
their performance, resulting in a positive or negative feeling state (Potts et al., 2019). The 
final stage is focused upon how an individual copes with the feeling states that arise, 
leading to positive or negative outcomes (Potts et al., 2019). Thus, Fletcher and Fletcher 
(2005) suggest that sub-optimal performance or wellbeing is seen to result from an 
inability to cope or the use of ineffective coping strategies.  
 
Coping in sport 
How an individual copes with a stressor is a complex phenomenon that will influence their 
wellbeing (Malik & Noreen, 2015). In Frey’s (2007) study exploring stressors experienced 
by college sport coaches, it was reported that coaches who felt they were unable to manage 
stress effectively believed it would have a negative impact on their coaching performance, 
as stress would impede their focus and decision making. In addition to impacting the coach 
themselves, Thelwell et al. (2017) found that coaches considered their stress to impact the 
athletes they work with, a view supported by McCann’s (1997) earlier work which 
suggested that when coaches experience strain, it may have a detrimental impact on 
athletes’ confidence. Thelwell et al. (2017) argued that these findings can be explained 
insofar as the athletes are likely to experience stressors due to their perception that the 
coach has a number of deficiencies and is not able to manage their responses to the 
demands being placed on them. This is reinforced by Olusoga et al.’s (2010) work, in 
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which coaches reported that as part of their own responses to stress, their standard of work 
dropped, they would fail to get the best of their athletes and that generally, the quality of 
communication between themselves and their athletes would suffer. This therefore 
demonstrates the importance of coaches knowing how to effectively cope with stressors, 
such as team selection decisions. 
 
Coping in coaches 
Research on coping within coaches has found, in support of Fletcher and Fletcher’s (2005) 
model, that an inability to cope with stress impeded coaches’ level and direction of focus, 
reduced their decision-making and contributed to emotional outbursts (Frey, 2007). 
Olusoga et al. (2010) highlighted a range of strategies (e.g. approach-focused, avoidance 
tactics, confrontation, distraction, structure and planning, social support) that were used to 
cope with stressors by a sample of world class coaches. The notion of social support being 
used to cope with stressors has been reinforced further by Judge et al. (2015), Knights and 
Ruddock-Hudson (2016) and Potts et al. (2019). Additional research on how coaches cope 
with stress found that, similarly to the research on athlete coping, coaches employed a 
variety of cognitive, emotional and behavioural strategies to cope with stressors (Frey, 
2007). Moreover, Levy et al. (2009) reported how the coping strategies that the coach in 
their study employed to manage organisational stressors included; communication, 
preparation, planning, social support and self-talk. Furthermore, a variety of problem-
focused, emotion-focused and avoidance strategies were reported to be effective in 
managing the varying organisational stressors (Levy et al., 2009). 
Building on this body of work, Thelwell et al. (2010) examined specific 
associations between stressors and the use of coping strategies in three elite-level coaches, 
reporting that problem-focused and emotion-focused strategies were the most frequently 
deployed. Thelwell et al. (2010) suggested that these results partially reflected some of the 
emotional-control (e.g. social support), cognitive (e.g. being rational and keeping things in 
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perspective) and behavioural (e.g. exercise at the gym) strategies reported by Frey (2007) 
to manage performance-related stressors as well as the problem-focused (e.g. engage in 
communication), emotion-focused (e.g. use of self-talk) and avoidance coping (e.g. 
escaping from the situation) strategies reported by Levy et al. (2009). In reference to 
coping with team selection decisions specifically, in Thelwell et al.’s (2010) study, one of 
the coaches employed avoidance coping, citing going to the gym as his method of coping 
with a team selection decision.  
These findings indicate that team selection decisions can be considered a stressor 
for sport coaches, with stressors known to have a range of negative impacts on coaches, 
such as being detrimental to coach performance and/or athlete confidence. However, this 
research is not without its limitations. The majority of these studies are descriptive and 
carried out retrospectively (e.g. Frey, 2007; Olusoga et al., 2009; Olusoga et al., 2010; 
Thelwell et al., 2017), have a limited sample and do not consider coping strategies for 
specific stressors. Retrospective studies may be considered problematic as research 
employing this methodology can lead to participants recollecting their most salient or 
intense experiences without necessarily considering the minutiae of these stress 
experiences (Thelwell et al., 2017). Moreover, asking individuals to outline their own 
stress experience requires a level of self-awareness which, given that such an ability may 
be impeded at a time of heightened stress, may limit the dependability of the responses in 
these studies (Thelwell et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, the sample of coaches used in these studies limits the generalisability 
of these findings to the wider coaching population. For example, the work of Olusoga et al. 
(2009), Olusoga et al. (2010), Thelwell et al. (2017) and Didymus et al. (2017) all 
exclusively focus on elite coaches, with a sample size no greater than fifteen. Despite there 
being clear benefits to studying this population, it is not reflective of the UK coaching 
population. This is because of active coaches coaching in the UK, 57% do so in a voluntary 
capacity, 24% in a paid capacity and 18% in both a paid and volunteer capacity (UK 
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Coaching, 2017). Potts et al. (2018) contended that a literature base exclusively focused on 
the experienced of full-time coaches has contributed to a biased evidence base inaccurately 
reflecting the UK coaching workforce. As such, this research will support Potts et al.’s 
(2018) contention that an explicit focus on male and female coaches who are working at all 
levels is required in order to fully understand the nuances of coaches experiences. This is 
especially important when intending to work towards developing stress management 
interventions that are relevant to a range of coaches and sport organisations (Potts et al., 
2018).  
Moreover, only Thelwell et al.’s (2010) study examined coping strategies linked 
with specific stressors, with the other studies providing an insight into the ways in which 
coaches generally respond and attempt to cope with stressors. However, Olusoga et al. 
(2010) state that an exploration into the specific responses and precise impacts of stressors 
would be a fruitful area for future research. This is because the specific responses may vary 
in their effectiveness for specific stressors. Therefore, exploring the most effective way of 
coping for an individual stressor would be beneficial for coaches as it may reduce the 
negative impacts of that stressor on performance or wellbeing.  
This study will suggest that one of the areas in which coaches cope with stress, 
consciously or non-consciously, is by engaging in forms of dehumanisation as a cognitive 
coping strategy. Cognitive coping strategies employed by coaches to deal with stressors 
include self-talk (Thelwell et al., 2010; Levy et al., 2009), relaxation (Thelwell et al., 
2010), maintaining a positive outlook, remaining in emotional control and acceptance 
(Levy et al., 2009). A key benefit of using cognitive coping strategies, as opposed to 
behavioural coping strategies for example, is that coaches can utilise them with their own 
thinking and thus, they can be executed quickly and as a result, may be effective in 
preventing the negative impacts of coach stress.  
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Coping and dehumanisation 
Such adaptive properties have also been reported in literature on dehumanisation. For 
example, dehumanisation has been reported to assist in making tough decisions (Lammers 
& Stapel, 2011; Haque & Waytz, 2012). There are also maladaptive properties associated 
with dehumanisation, such as dehumanisation in the form of likening people to animals 
being used to convey negative information (Haslam et al., 2011). However, to the author’s 
knowledge, dehumanisation is yet to be explored in within a sport setting. This is despite 
descriptions of dehumanisation being present in sociological research on sport. For 
example, Connor (2009) contends that in elite sport, an athlete forms part of a machine 
“and like pieces in a machine they are just another widget that can be replaced when worn 
out” (p. 1375). Furthermore, a professional footballer in Roderick and Schumaker’s (2017) 
research is quoted as saying they felt they were “just a commodity” (p. 171) within their 
profession. 
This sociological research, however, does not necessarily consider these 
dehumanising aspects of sport in a positive light. The commodification of athletes leads to 
an unquestioning adoption of behavioural codes and messages within sporting 
environments that have a large influence upon the athlete’s identity (Brown & Potrac, 
2009; Parker, 2000). On a similar note, utilising dehumanisation may be deemed 
contentious when compared to other sports coaching and sports psychology literature. 
Given research on the coach-athlete relationship emphasises closeness between a coach 
and the athletes they work with (Jowett, 2009) coupled with an emphasis on creating 
autonomy supporting environments (Adie et al., 2012), dehumanisation may be perceived 
as contentious as, by its nature, it contradicts these ideas.  
Taken together, this work highlights how dehumanisation is yet to explicitly be 
explored in sport, may be perceived as contentious given wider sports sociological, 
psychological and coaching research but yet may have adaptive properties which could 
contribute to it being an effective cognitive coping strategy for coaches when managing the 
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individual stressor of team selection decisions. The next section will explore theories of 
dehumanisation in detail. 
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Part 3 – An overview and exploration of the theoretical links between Team Selection 
Decisions in Sport, Dehumanisation and Ostracism. 
 
An overview of Dehumanisation. 
Dehumanisation has been explored in research focused on: cultural groups (Bain et al., 
2009; Martinez et al., 2012; Goff et al., 2014), experiences of violence (White, 2010; 
Kelman, 1973; Bastian et al., 2012), social connection (Waytz and Epley, 2012; Waytz et 
al., 2013), Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Moller and Deci, 2009), ingroups and 
outgroups (Haslam & Bain, 2007; Demoulin et al., 2009; Leyens et al., 2001; Čehajić et 
al., 2009; Vaes et al., 2012), conceptions of the self (Haslam et al., 2005; Legate et al., 
2013; Bastian et al., 2013), moral status (Bastian et al., 2011; Haslam et al., 2012), social 
ostracism (Bastian & Haslam, 2010; Bastian et al., 2013), power (Lammers & Stapel, 
2010; Gwinn et al., 2013), medicine (Haque and Waytz, 2012) and refugees (Esses et al., 
2008). Despite this wide body of research, to the author’s knowledge, dehumanisation has 
not yet been explored in a sporting context.  
Dehumanisation has broadly been defined as the denial of humanness, in which 
humanness is considered as attributes that characterise what it means to be human (Haslam 
& Loughnan, 2014). For example, Waytz and Epley (2011) define dehumanisation as 
representing a failure to attribute basic human qualities to others. Such qualities may 
include: civility, moral sensibility, maturity, individuality and interpersonal warmth 
(Haslam, 2006). Yet for Bandura et al. (1996), dehumanisation is a process that divests 
people of these human qualities such that they are no longer viewed as persons with 
feelings, hopes and concerns, but instead, as subhuman objects. Similarly for Kelman 
(1976), dehumanisation focuses on the denial of ‘identity’ and ‘community’. ‘Identity’ is 
whereby the person is considered as an “individual, independent and distinguishable from 
others, capable of making choices” (p. 301) and ‘community’ centres on a perception of 
the other as “part of an interconnected network of individuals who care for each other” 
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(Kelman, 1976, p. 301). Therefore, considering all of these definitions, for this study 
dehumanisation will be considered as the denial of attributes, qualities and processes that 
define what it means to be human. 
 
Operationalising dehumanisation 
Dehumanisation has been operationalised in different ways, one of which being the 
concept of ‘infrahumanisation.’ Within infrahumanisation, the essence of humanity lies in 
our ability to experience secondary emotions (e.g. nostalgia, humiliation; (Martinez et al., 
2012)). To deny others these emotions, is to infrahumanise them. Primary emotions, such 
as sadness, joy and anger, are shared with animals whereas secondary emotions, like 
happiness, rancour and bitterness are considered to be exclusive to humans (Martinez et al., 
2012). This idea draws from some of Demoulin et al.’s (2004) earlier research involving a 
series of cross-cultural studies demonstrating that people were able to establish differences 
between primary and secondary emotions, and that they considered primary emotions to be 
shared with animals and the secondary emotions to be exclusive to humans. Compared to 
primary emotions, participants within Demoulin et al.’s (2004) study considered secondary 
emotions to be less intense, more lasting, less visible, require more cognitive resources, 
provide more information on the sensitivity and moral nature of those who experience 
them, and to be a result of internal causes.  
Martinez et al. (2012) note that studies on infrahumanisation first, cannot be 
understood purely as a phenomenon of in-group favouritism and second, that 
infrahumanisation is treated as an implicit phenomenon. This is a result of the participants 
in Leyens et al.’s (2001) seminal study not being explicitly aware that attributing more 
secondary emotions to the ingroup implies perceiving them to be more human than the 
outgroup. According to Haslam (2006), infrahumanisation as proposed by Leyens et al. 
(2003) involves denying others uniquely human attributes. Within Haslam’s (2006) model, 
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the denial of uniquely human attributes leads to animalistic dehumanisation, one of two 
forms of dehumanisation, the other being mechanistic.  
To explain Haslam’s (2006) model in more detail, he suggested that human 
qualities can be divided into two dimensions; uniquely human (UH) characteristics and 
human nature (HN) characteristics. The human qualities that an individual or group are 
denied influence the form of dehumanisation that takes place. This composition of two 
senses of humanness is underpinned by Haslam et al.’s (2005) work, in which participants 
were required to rate the extent to which personality traits were UH or HN. The findings 
from the study showed HN traits as judged to be high in prevalence, universality, and 
emotionality, and to emerge early in development. In contrast, UH traits were judged to be 
low in prevalence and universality, to appear to be late in development and to be unrelated 
to emotionality. Similar findings were also reported in an earlier study by Haslam et al. 
(2004), whereby HN traits were judged to be deeply rooted, immutable, discrete, 
biologically based and consistently expressed across situations. Haslam (2006) contends 
that this well replicated evidence supports the distinction between the two proposed senses 
of humanness. Figure 1 shows the proposed links between conceptions of humanness and 
corresponding forms of dehumanisation as reported by Haslam (2006).  
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Figure 1: Proposed links between conceptions of humanness and corresponding forms of 
dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006). 
 
UH characteristics are attributes that are seen as distinguishing humans from other 
animals and involve refinement, civility, morality and higher cognition (Bastian & Haslam, 
2011). Haslam (2006) notes that there is limited research on the attributes that people see 
as UH. However, proposals centring on UH attributes have focused on cognitive 
sophistication, culture, refinement, socialisation and internalised moral sensibility (Leyens 
et al., 2001; Gosling, 2001; Demoulin et al., 2004; Schwartz & Struch, 1989). On the other 
hand, HN refers to attributes that are seen as shared and fundamental features of humanity 
(Haslam, 2006). Haslam (2006) contends that attributes of HN are the “core properties that 
people share ‘deep down’ despite their superficial variation” (p. 256). Therefore, for 
Haslam (2006), if an individual is denied UH attributes, animalistic dehumanisation 
40 
 
occurs, whereas if an individual is denied HN attributes, mechanistic dehumanisation 
occurs (Haslam, 2006). Although different conceptualisations of dehumanisation may vary 
in their specifics, the central feature of all accounts of dehumanisation is a diminished 
attribution and consideration of others’ mental states (Haque & Waytz, 2012).  
Haslam’s theoretical model will be used within this study, with animalistic 
dehumanisation being used to describe ‘infrahumanisation’ (similar to the concept applied 
by Martinez et al. (2012) and Demoulin et al. (2008)). This avoids any potential overlap 
and confusion between the two conceptions of dehumanisation and allows for clarity in the 
form of dehumanisation is taking place. Furthermore, Haslam’s model has been widely 
employed in previous dehumanisation research (e.g. Bastian et al., 2012; Bastian & 
Haslam, 2010; Martinez et al., 2012), enabling findings to be critiqued with reference to 
this existent body of literature.  
 
Stereotypes and Animalistic Dehumanisation 
Research focusing on the denial of human uniqueness has included a focus on the 
relationship between stereotypes and animalistic dehumanisation in particular. The work of 
Fiske (Fiske, 2013; Harris & Fiske, 2006) has demonstrated the strong relevance of 
stereotyping to dehumanisation, as groups that are stereotyped in a particular way are 
especially prone to being dehumanised. Harris and Fiske (2006), for example, showed that 
individuals stereotyped as lacking both warmth and competence, two dimensions of the 
stereotype content model (SCM), were most likely to fail to activate the social cognition 
regions in the brains of the perceivers. These individuals included drug addicts and 
homeless people, who tended to elicit disgust, which is the emotion linked to the low-low 
quadrant of the SCM. Moreover, in a neuroimaging study, these groups evoked less 
activation of defined mind attributed areas than social targets from other quadrants. Given 
that Harris and Fiske’s (2006) work assessed dehumanisation as an absence of mind 
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attribution, this would suggest that by the nature of these groups being denied mind 
attribution, they were dehumanised.  
However, Haslam et al. (2013) have taken the view that stereotyping groups as 
more animalistic than others may be seen as dehumanising in its own right, may not be 
completely accounted for by the SCM, and may tend to occur only for particular kinds of 
groups. As such, Haslam et al. (2013) argue that the findings on dehumanisation and 
stereotypes imply that certain groups are stereotyped as less developed or refined than 
others, which is represented by a greater closeness to animals. If this is the case, Haslam et 
al. (2013) argue, then animalistic perceptions of groups may be closely linked to ideas of 
evolutionary, individual and societal development. 
A target may also be dehumanised when it is non-consciously associated with 
animals, as well as being ascribed few uniquely human characteristics (Haslam et al., 
2013). Such non-conscious association can take the form of animalistic metaphors. Haslam 
et al. (2011) carried out the first systematic study of the psychological content of 
animalistic metaphors. In exploring forty common metaphors, Haslam et al. (2011) found 
that a varied range of traits were implied; with the most common themes being stupidity, 
lack of self-control and moral depravity. In addition to judging these implied traits, the 
participants assessed the offensiveness of the metaphor and its possible determinants. A 
strong association was reported with two metaphor properties: the taboo nature of the 
animal and the inferred dehumanising intention of the speaker. Some of the most offensive 
metaphors invoked disgusting animals (e.g. rats and pigs) whereas others invoked animals 
that suggested demeaning comparisons with humans (e.g. apes). Haslam et al.’s (2011) 
study concluded first, that different animal metaphors convey different meanings, and 
these meanings are associated with their offensiveness and second, that contextual factors 
also influence offensiveness.  
A second experimental study by the same authors showed that variations in 
metaphor offensiveness were mediated by the extent to which uniquely human attributes 
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were seen to be denied to the metaphor’s target. By implication, and as noted by Haslam et 
al. (2013), animal metaphors vary widely but most commonly tend to convey negative 
information and are offensive due to their tendency to dehumanise the target. However, 
Haslam et al. (2013) contended that although animalistic dehumanisation has generally 
been understood as a singular phenomenon, it may take two forms based on revulsion and 
degradation. Likening people to disgusting animals, illustrated by Nazi representations of 
Jews as ‘filthy’ vermin, exemplifies revulsion, whereas likening them to demeaning 
animals, illustrated by the colonial representations of Africans as apes, exemplifies 
degradation (Haslam et al., 2013). 
Generally, animalistic dehumanisation tends to be negative in its application or 
interpretation. Animalistic metaphors and stereotypes themselves however, aren’t 
exclusively negative; they depend on content and context. For example, if the content of an 
animalistic metaphor implies a view of the target as less human in a context which is 
offensive, this would be negative in its application and interpretation. Yet animalistic 
dehumanisation is generally negative because of why people use it. For example, if an 
individual wishes to elicit disgust, they may use an animalistic metaphor and choose 
offensive content and context in order to express themselves. This is different to how 
animalistic dehumanisation may be used in sporting scenarios. Again, this is due to the 
content and context in which the language is used. For example, an athlete may be 
described as “working like a dog” in relation to their effort levels, which would not be 
interpreted as negative, given that traits centring on work-ethic and effort are commonly 
seen as positive in a sporting context. As such, animalistic dehumanisation is generally 
perceived to be negative in its application because of why it is used, however, this is 
heavily influenced by the content and context in the language used. 
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Delimiting Dehumanisation: how it relates to objectification, deindividuation and 
ostracism. 
Having provided a detailed overview of Haslam’s model and prior to reviewing wider 
research on dehumanisation, in the interests of theoretical clarity, it is important to 
consider how dehumanisation differentiates from related concepts, notably; 
deindividuation, objectification and ostracism. Deindividuation occurs whereby an 
individual becomes immersed in a group or otherwise anonymised (Kelman, 1976). Haque 
and Waytz (2012) suggest that deindividuation can lead to dehumanisation in two ways; 
either through the deindividuation of the person being perceived (the dehumanised) or 
through the deindividuation of the perceiver (the dehumaniser). Haque and Waytz (2012) 
contend that deindividuation can lead people (i.e. perceivers) toward antisocial behaviour 
(Zimbardo, 1969) such as interpersonal aggression (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980) 
through diminishing feelings of personal responsibility for these actions (Bandura et al., 
1975). Likewise, deindividuation of the target being perceived facilitates antisocial 
behaviour toward this target (Jenni & Loewenstein, 1997) because the target becomes less 
identifiable. Given how Kelman (1976) notes that part of dehumanisation involves denying 
a person ‘identity’, if an individual is deindividuated, they are denied such an identity, and 
thus, may be dehumanised.  
Objectification, on the other hand, is described as a process that involves viewing 
people in ways that facilitate them for personal gain (Bartky, 1990; Frederickson & 
Roberts, 1997; Nussbaum, 1999). Nussbuam (1995; 1999) contended that objectification is 
essentially defined by the assumption of instrumentality, whereby the target is treated as a 
means to one’s ends. As Wang and Krumhuber (2017) note, within social relationships, 
people typically value and are likely to approach targets who display traits that facilitate 
interaction and bonding. These include interpersonal warmth, kindness and similarity 
(Berscheid & Reis, 1998). However, when a target is objectified, these personal attributes 
move into the background in favour of the target’s usefulness (Wang & Krumhuber, 2017). 
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During this process, the person is figuratively split into parts, with only those traits being 
seen as valuable that can serve a perceiver’s current goal (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). In a 
similar way to that in which the process applies to objects, the person then becomes a 
means to one’s ends and is reduced to the status of a tool for goal achievement (Wang & 
Krumhuber, 2017).  
Despite objectification being theoretically different from dehumanisation, there are 
a number of assumptions associated with it that make it similar to mechanistic 
dehumanisation. For instance, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) note that objectification assumes a 
denial of autonomy, inertness, fungibility and subjectivity which, I argue, are very similar 
to Haslam’s (2006) characteristics of mechanistic dehumanisation that include; inertness, 
coldness, rigidity, fungibility and superficiality. Haque and Waytz (2012) suggest that 
objectification is a form of dehumanisation, a proposal which is supported to an extent. 
However, it can be argued with greater strength that objectification occurs as ‘mechanistic 
dehumanisation’ given the theoretical similarities and the notion of humans being used as a 
‘means to an end’, which is compatible with the denial of human nature.  
On balance, both deindividuation and objectification are inherently linked to 
dehumanisation, yet slightly different. Deindividuation is the anonymization of an 
individual, which can lead to dehumanisation from the dehumanised or the dehumaniser. 
The key difference between mechanistic dehumanisation and objectification is that 
mechanistic dehumanisation does not necessarily mean you are using someone for a means 
to an end, whereas this is the central to the definition of objectification. As such, it can be 
purported with confidence that one may engage fully with mechanistic dehumanisation in 
order to objectify an individual, yet can only engage to an extent with objectification in 
order to mechanistically dehumanise an individual.  
Lastly, dehumanising could be aligned with ostracism because ostracism is defined 
as “ignoring and excluding individuals or groups, by individuals or groups” (Williams, 
2007, p. 427). Ostracism is a two-sided experience, involving at least one person being 
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ostracised, the target, and at least one person doing the ostracism, the source (Wirth & 
Wesselman, 2018). The experience of being ostracised for the target has been reported to 
cause decreased meaning in life (Stillman et al., 2009), less relational evaluation (Wirth et 
al., 2010), detriments to both explicit and implicit self-esteem (Wirth et al., 2010) and 
social pain that triggers the same neural activation as physical pain (Eisenberger et al., 
2003). Furthermore, ostracism is relatively immune to individual differences and occurs 
even when the source is a hated out-group (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). The source of 
ostracism varies in why, when, whom, how and for how long they ostracise and these 
dimensions can lead to different consequences for the source(s) (Williams, 2001). Some 
studies, such as that of Zadro and Gonsalkorale’s (2014), report how ostracism can be a 
positive and empowering experience. This is because it is effective at terminating 
unwanted relationships and can be used to increase the source’s sense of power over the 
target by dictating the type of interaction when the conflict is resolved (Zadro and 
Gonsalkorale, 2014). However, other work (e.g. Williams, 2001; Zadro, 2004; Zadro, 
Godwin & Gonsalkorale, 2013) suggests that ostracising can have negative psychological 
consequences for the source. When carried out for a prolonged period of time, ostracism 
can be both emotionally and cognitively depleting for the source (Williams et al., 2001; 
Zadro et al., 2004; Zadro, Godwin & Gonsalkorale, 2013) whilst also threatening 
belonging, self-esteem and meaningful existence needs (Williams, Shore & Grahe, 1998).  
Ostracism is a unique form of interpersonal conflict because it affects four primary 
needs (Williams, 2007). These primary needs, articulated in Williams’ (2009) model, are; 
belonging (the need for social acceptance and connection to others), control (the need for a 
sense of mastery over oneself and one’s environment), self-esteem (the need to have a 
positive feeling of self-worth) and meaningful existence (the need to have a sense of 
purpose and acknowledgement from others). For Wirth and Wesselmann (2018), the model 
is conceptually similar to Self-Determination Theory (SDT) (Ryan & Deci, 2000). SDT 
asserts that people have basic needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness (Ryan & 
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Deci, 2000). Autonomy is the need to feel that one’s behaviour is volitional and self-
endorsed, relatedness concerns the need to feel connected and cared for by others and 
competence concerns the need to feel efficacious (Legate et al., 2013). Having these needs 
satisfied promotes people’s natural propensity toward psychological growth and wellbeing, 
whereas having them thwarted contributes to ill-being and psychopathology (Ryan et al., 
2006). Comparing Williams’ (2009) model to SDT, autonomy is similar to control and 
relatedness similar to belonging (Wirth & Wesselmann, 2018).  
Legate et al. (2013) hypothesised that complying with ostracism may undermine 
the source’s psychological needs; particularly the need for autonomy given that ostracising 
is not something that most people would typically choose to do. Furthermore, Legate et al. 
(2013) proposed that ostracising should also thwart relatedness because it prevents people 
from connecting with others. Across three studies, Legate et al.’s (2013) results 
consistently demonstrated how the effect of ostracising others on affect was fully mediated 
by the thwarting of psychological needs (Legate et al., 2013). As such, these findings 
suggest that the process of ostracising threatens a source’s feelings of agency and social 
connection (Legate et al., 2013), both of which influence an individual’s sense of self. 
Such an influence on an individual’s sense of self may promote self-dehumanisation. 
 
Self-dehumanisation  
Bastian et al. (2013) hypothesised that perpetrators of unjustified ostracism are more likely 
to see their behaviour as immoral, which in turn will affect their perceptions of their own 
human qualities, resulting in self-dehumanisation. From four studies carried out by Bastian 
et al. (2013), including a recall task and ostracism manipulation, empirical evidence was 
provided to show that the sources of ostracism see themselves as less human, explained in 
part by the view that one’s behaviour was immoral. Therefore, as well as within intergroup 
and social relationships, Bastian et al.’s (2013) work suggests humanness can also be 
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ascribed/denied to the self, with self-humanisation and self-dehumanisation being the 
respective terms used. 
In establishing the ‘self-humanising’ phenomenon, Haslam et al. (2005) highlighted 
how people attribute traits representing human nature to themselves more than to the 
average person. Haslam and Bain (2007) later demonstrated that self-humanisation occurs 
in part by egocentrism and the tendency to mentally represent others in a more abstract 
way than the self. On the contrary, self-dehumanisation has been defined as “an adaptive 
response to cope with one’s own transgressions and the immoral treatment of others” 
(Bastian et al., 2013, p. 157).  
Bastian et al. (2013) contend that self-dehumanisation arises from the recognition 
that one’s actions have caused harm to others. However, for self-dehumanisation to occur, 
the harm-doer must not be able to justify their actions (Bastian et al., 2013). This is 
because harmful behaviour viewed as legitimate would not be expected to have self-
dehumanising implications as it would be viewed as warranted and therefore, moral 
(Bastian et al., 2013). Moral judgement typically underpins the process of dehumanisation 
(Bastian et al., 2013) and conceptions of morality and humanness are tightly bound 
(Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam & Koval, 2011; Brandt & Reyna, 2011). As such, 
Bastian et al. (2013) purport that recognising how one’s actions have caused unjustified 
harm to another person is likely to lead to a perception of the self as possessing fewer 
human attributes. Specifically, this occurs because the act of causing unjustified harm to 
others is immoral and acting in immoral ways diminishes the extent to which a person feels 
they possess human qualities (Bastian et al., 2013). Relating this to team selection 
decisions, on a surface level, if a coach does not select an athlete in a team and is unable to 
justify that decision, they may engage with self-dehumanisation. This is because the 
ostracising act of leaving someone out of the team, coupled with the coach’s inability to 
justify the decision, suggests the coach would view it as a transgression, and thus, 
dehumanise the self. 
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This perspective is not universally supported, however, and is challenged by 
Bastian and Haslam’s (2010) earlier work which examined whether the experience of 
being socially rejected or ostracised (i.e. the feelings of the target) can lead people to 
perceiving themselves as having lost their humanity. Regardless of if they were simply 
recalling an experience of social exclusion or being ostracised in an experimental game, 
participants rated themselves as lacking human nature traits relative to a social exclusion 
condition, which may assist in explaining the already noted  finding that ostracised 
individuals typically feel number, affectless and disconnected rather than distressed. As 
such, Bastian and Haslam (2010) argued that mechanistic dehumanisation may be 
especially relevant to ostracism, given that Haslam (2006) theorised that mechanistic 
dehumanisation has a relational component and commonly occurs in the context of 
‘asocial’ or ‘null’ interactions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) where people “disregard the 
existence of other people as social partners” (p. 19).  
Further work in this area includes Bastian and Haslam’s (2011) examination of the 
sorts of interpersonal encounters that produce the experience of being dehumanised. The 
authors reported that encounters which provoked feelings of dehumanisation included 
those in which the target felt betrayed, exploited, humiliated, invalidated and condescended 
to. Participants then rated the extent to which they would have a variety of thoughts and 
feelings, and the degree to which they would have felt dehumanised on either human 
uniqueness or human nature traits by the other person. When participants felt that they had 
been denied uniquely human qualities, they tended to imagine feeling ashamed, debased 
and a loss of status. When they felt they had been denied human nature qualities, they 
reported feelings of numbness, confusion, anger and sadness. Haslam et al. (2013) note 
how this work is valuable in showing that dehumanisation is not only pertinent in 
intergroup relations, but also highlights how people may feel that their humanness has been 
denied or has gone unrecognised within their social relationships. Although not the focus 
of this study, this work would suggest that athletes would perceive themselves as less 
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human when they are ostracised in some way, for example, by not being selected in the 
team. 
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Summary of Parts 2 and 3 
Firstly, team selection decisions have been shown to be a stressor for sports coaches. 
Amongst other stressors, coaches need to be able to effectively cope with making team 
selection decisions such that they do not have a negative impact on their own, and their 
athletes’, performance and wellbeing. If, as argued here, the act of leaving an athlete out of 
a team, either as a substitute or non-participant, can be considered as a form of ostracism 
and ostracism can be painful for the source, this may be a contributing factor as to why 
coaches find team selection decisions to be a source of stress.  
Secondly, there are multiple ways in which coaches have been reported to cope 
with stressors. However, this research intends to combine two different fields of research 
in order to explore a new way in which coaches may cope with selection decisions. Given 
the links between ostracism and dehumanisation, we suggest that coaches may engage in 
forms of dehumanisation as a method of coping with making team selection decisions. 
More accurately, dehumanisation may be employed by coaches as a form of self-protection 
from the negative effect of the stress of a team selection decision. Kelman (1976) noted 
that denying others membership in a community of interconnected individuals is a central 
aspect of treating them as less human, and as such, the initial non-selection of an athlete 
may be perceived by both coaches and their athletes as dehumanising. As dehumanisation 
may have some protective, albeit temporary, qualities, the first hypothesis of this study is 
that coaches will engage with forms of dehumanisation; animalistic, mechanistic or self, in 
order to cope with making team selection decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 1: All three forms of dehumanisation will be significantly higher following a 
selection decision than on a non-selection day.  
 
Additionally, if coaches do not engage with dehumanisation of the athletes they 
work, they may perceive the act of ostracism to be a transgression. This perception of a 
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transgression will lead to greater self-dehumanisation because self-dehumanisation is 
characterised as feeling less human a result of committing an unjustified transgression. 
This underpins the second hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Following a selection decision, the more a coach engages with 
dehumanisation of the athletes, the less they will engage in self-dehumanisation. 
 
The remaining hypotheses, as explored in Part 3, regard the extent to which 
coaches engage with forms of dehumanisation. As discussed in this section, there is likely 
to be individual variation the extent to which coaches engage with forms of 
dehumanisation, and as such, there is need to understand why this is the case. Seven 
candidate variables were proposed; a coach’s personal sense of power, their level 
emotional intelligence, level of resilience, sense of relatedness with the athletes they work 
with, the concordance of the coach/athlete gender and their previous playing experience of 
the coach. The following sections of this literature review seek to justify the inclusion of 
these seven variables and explain how they are predicted to influence the extent to which a 
coach engages with dehumanisation.  
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Part 4 - Predictors of dehumanisation 
Personal Sense of Power  
This section will explain how a coach’s personal sense of power is hypothesised to predict 
the extent to which they engage in dehumanisation. Power will be defined from a 
psychological and sociological perspective, the latter also being used to provide context as 
to how coaches may obtain power, consequently influencing their personal sense of power. 
Following this, research on power and dehumanisation, and power and objectification will 
be reviewed, with an explanation of how a coach’s personal sense of power may influence 
the extent to which they engage with dehumanisation.  
 
Understanding power 
From a psychological perspective, conceptual and operational definitions of power 
have focused on the control over valued resources; such as money, information or 
decision-making (Anderson et al., 2012; Galinksy et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003). Such 
resources can belong to both the individual/group in power themselves and the 
individuals/groups ‘under control’ (Galinsky et al., 2003). For Galinsky et al. (2003), the 
concept of control distinguishes power from status, in which status refers to a person’s 
standing in social hierarchy (Anderson et al., 2001). Taking a more applied view, research 
on sports coaching from a sociological perspective has seen power to be inherently linked 
to manipulation and strategy (Potrac & Jones, 2010). This perspective is related to the 
Machiavellian or Weberian perception of power as the ability of an actor to realise his or 
her will in a social action against the resistance of others (Potrac & Jones, 2010). Linked to 
this, theorists such as Foucault (1978) believe power is relational and always present, even 
in day-to-day interactions. As such, from a sociological perspective, power cannot be 
deemed to be not located in one place, institution or person, but constantly reinvented and 
renegotiated through social actions (Westwood, 2002). In addition to other occasions in 
daily life, these social actions may occur between a coach and the athletes they work with 
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as “in their professional lives, people are often in a position which they would have to 
make a judgement or a decision that affects other people” (Lammers & Stapel, 2009, p. 
279). 
Combining both the psychological and applied sociological perspectives, for the 
purposes of this study, power will be defined using Galinsky et al.’s (2003) definition 
which describes power as the ability to control resources, one’s own and others’. This is 
because within the social action in this context, the coach has control of the resource, 
which is the decision making process as to who is to be selected in the starting team. The 
extent to which an individual believes they have power can be measured by their personal 
sense of power, which Anderson et al. (2012, p. 316) define as “the perception of one’s 
ability to influence another person or other people.”  
How a coach obtains power, measured either through their own or others’ 
perceptions, can in part be contextualised by Bourdieu’s notion of capital (Potrac & Jones, 
2010). Capital is described by Bourdieu as being the capacity to exercise control over 
one’s own future and the future of others (Potrac & Jones, 2010), suggesting it is, in effect, 
a form of power. The many different forms of capital, including social, cultural, symbolic 
and physical, can all contribute to social hierarchy, structuring the context for both coaches 
and athletes (Cushion & Jones, 2006). Potrac and Jones (2010) suggest that the capital 
afforded to coaches gives them a sense of legitimate power within the context and that 
such power is normalised within coaching, whereby coaches behave like individuals in 
power. It can be argued that such capital, or power, is assumed through the process of 
organisational socialisation (Sage, 1989); coaches not only learn the technical elements of 
the coaching role, but also the norms and values associated with the position within a 
particular sporting culture (Potrac & Jones, 2010). Such learning, Potrac and Jones (2010) 
contend, is inclusive of the power relationships that exist between coach and athlete, and 
specifically, how these relationships should be structured and enacted. This explains how a 
coach can obtain power in a context that involves working with athletes.   
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Power and dehumanisation 
The key research underpinning the prediction that power may mediate the extent to which 
coaches engage with dehumanisation comes from Lammers and Stapel’s (2010) study 
focusing on the relationship between power and dehumanisation. Lammers and Stapel 
(2010) argued that without the ability to dehumanise, people would see their targets as 
humans like themselves, possessing similar qualities. As a result, when making decisions 
that are painful for others, people may dehumanise their targets to avoid pain and suffering 
themselves. Lammers and Stapel (2010) suggest that this dehumanisation is ‘functional’ 
and found in many mundane and daily situations.  
The results from Lammers and Stapel’s (2010) work found that dehumanisation can 
act as a justification for making a tough decision and that high power participants were 
more inclined to make a tough decision, which subsequently led to a more dehumanised 
view of the target. Lammers and Stapel’s (2010) study suggests that dehumanisation 
allows powerful people to downplay the potential suffering of others by treating them as 
objects or tools and by doing so, the emotional consequences of the powerful people’s 
actions are downplayed and become irrelevant. It is for this reason that I predict that the 
more powerful coaches perceive themselves to be, the more likely they will be to 
dehumanise the athletes work with. Given how coaches suffer emotionally when making 
team selection decisions, we predict that in order to reduce this emotional suffering and 
stress for the coaches, they may dehumanise their athletes as a form of self-protection.  
Specifically, we predict the strongest relationship to emerge between power and the 
use of mechanistic dehumanisation. The support for this argument comes from work 
focusing on power and the objectification of social targets. As discussed, objectification is 
described as a process that involves viewing people in ways that facilitate them for 
personal gain (Bartky, 1990; Frederickson & Roberts, 1997; Nussbaum, 1999). Given the 
similarities between objectification and mechanistic dehumanisation, we contend that the 
research on power and objectification can be used to support the hypothesis that high-
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power individuals are more likely to mechanistically dehumanise their targets. For 
example, Gruenfeld et al.’s (2008) work focused on the extent to which high-power 
individuals approached social targets on the basis of the target’s instrumentality. Six 
studies supported their prediction that high-power perceivers were more attracted to the 
target’s usefulness, which was defined in terms of the perceiver’s goals, than perceivers in 
low-power and baseline conditions (Gruenfeld et al., 2008). Consequently, it may be 
suggested that high-power coaches will mechanistically dehumanise the athletes they work 
with as they view them as tools that assist in achieving a goal.  
This said, Gruenfeld et al. (2008) state that “to know whether a powerful person 
will approach a target, one needs to know the power holder’s goals and the targets talents” 
(p. 125) which suggests the extent to which power affects the coach’s engagement with 
mechanistic dehumanisation is influenced by the coach’s goal(s). Elite coaches working 
with adult athletes, for example, may adopt result-focused goals and this may be manifest 
itself in reduced care for the athlete as they are viewed in more instrumental terms, thus 
leading to greater dehumanisation. On the contrary, for a grassroots coach who works with 
children, their goals may be centred on the participants’ enjoyment levels and thus, the 
athletes/children are of less ‘use’ to the coach, and therefore may be dehumanised less. 
Therefore, dependent on the coach’s goals, we argue that coaches who perceive themselves 
to have high amounts of power are more likely to mechanistically dehumanise their 
athletes.  
To summarise, when faced with a difficult decision, and dependent on their goals, it 
can be hypothesised that coaches perceiving themselves to be high in power would be 
more likely to mechanistically dehumanise their athletes in a team selection decision in 
order to protect themselves against suffering and negative emotion. However, should the 
decision not be difficult for the coach, it can be argued that the probability of them 
dehumanising their athletes is far lower. This is because the fundamental premise of 
mechanistically dehumanising the athletes is based on how it allows the coach to manage a 
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difficult decision and should the selection decision not be difficult, there is not a 
requirement for the coach to dehumanise the athletes they work with as they do not 
perceive the act to be a transgression. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Coaches’ personal sense of power will positively predict overall level of, 
and increases in following a team selection decision, athlete dehumanisation. 
  
57 
 
Emotional intelligence 
This section will start with a definition of emotional intelligence, progressing to review 
literature exploring emotional intelligence within sporting domains and broader context. 
Within this, work studying a relationship between emotional intelligence and stress will be 
discussed. This will build towards an explanation as to how emotional intelligence may 
predict the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation. 
 
Understanding Emotional Intelligence 
Definitions of emotional intelligence vary widely and have previously included constructs 
as diverse as self-awareness, motivation, optimism, assertiveness and happiness (Gohm et 
al., 2005). For the purposes of this study, emotional intelligence will refer to the individual 
responses to intrapersonal or interpersonal emotional information, and encompass the 
identification, expression, understanding and regulation of one’s own or others’ emotions 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1990; Petrides & Furnham, 2003). Essentially, emotional intelligence 
describes the ability to effectively join emotions and reasoning, using emotions to facilitate 
reasoning about emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1990). Mayor and Salovey’s (1990) model of 
emotional intelligence will be used in this paper because it is theory-based, well-articulated 
and more narrowly defined than other models (Gohm et al., 2005). The model contends 
there are four strands to emotional intelligence; the appraisal and expression of emotion, 
the use of emotion to enhance cognitive processes and decision making, knowledge about 
emotions and management of emotions. 
To ensure clear theoretical understanding, it is important to conceptually delimit 
emotions, specifically in relation to the link between emotions and moods. According to 
George (2000), emotions can be distinguished from moods by their intensity, as moods are 
pervasive and generalised feeling states that are not tied to the events or circumstances 
which may have caused the mood in the first place (Morris, 1989). Moreover, moods are 
relatively low intensity feelings which do not interrupt ongoing activities (Forgas, 1992). 
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On the contrary, emotions are high intensity feelings triggered by specific stimuli (either 
internal or external to the individual; Forgas, 1992). Emotions demand attention and have 
the capacity to interrupt cognitive processes and behaviours (Morris, 1989). The link 
between emotions and moods arrives because emotions often feed into moods such that 
once the intensity of an emotion is reduced as a result of the individual cognitively or 
behaviourally dealing with its cause, the emotion lingers on in the form of less intense 
feelings (George, 2000). 
 
Literature exploring emotional intelligence 
There is ample research exploring emotional intelligence in sport, the findings from 
which are wide ranging in their application. For example, Lane et al. (2009) explored the 
relationship between athletes’ emotional intelligence and their use of psychological skills, 
reporting that self-talk, imagery and activation in both practice and competition were 
associated with perceptions of the appraisal of others’ emotions and the ability to regulate 
emotions. Moreover, Crombie et al. (2009) found that emotional intelligence was 
positively correlated with team performance in a study involving national-level cricketers. 
Emotional intelligence has also been linked to self-determination theory; Arribas-
Galarrage (2017) explored this relationship and found emotional intelligence to be a 
mediating factor for autonomous motivation in canoeists.  
However, there is also a growing body of work exploring emotional intelligence in 
sport coaching, which is complemented by research on leadership. Emotional intelligence 
has received attention in mainstream leadership literature due to its association with 
leadership emergence, leadership style, and leadership effectiveness (Lee & Chelladurai, 
2018). For example, George (2000) contended that leaders who are high in emotional 
intelligence are more knowledgeable of, and adept at managing, emotions in the subtle 
ways required for enhanced functioning in achievement and close relationships. This is 
supported by work from Goleman (2003) who reported how leaders in a business 
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environment with high emotional intelligence are more likely to be successful and 
effective. The application of these findings to sport is reinforced by Thelwell et al.’s (2008) 
work indicating successful individuals in both sport and business environments possess 
similar forms of attributes.  
With specific regard to sport coaches, Chan and Mallett (2011) suggest that for a 
coach to help their athletes achieve optimal performance and foster adaptive coach-athlete 
relationships, he/she requires effective leadership skills. Such leadership skills may be 
contingent on understanding and adapting to the emotional needs of the athlete (Chan & 
Mallett, 2011). In addition to understanding and adapting to the emotional needs of the 
athletes, coaches must also seek to effectively understand and appraise their own emotions, 
in conjunction with one of the four strands of Salovey and Mayer’s (1997) conceptual 
model. This is important because, as Wagstaff et al. (2012a, 2012b) note, sport coaching is 
an emotion-laden context which evokes a variety of strong pleasant and unpleasant 
emotions and which requires individuals to regulate those felt emotions. The experience of 
unpleasant emotions, along with the stress and strain of coaching, can result in negative 
outcomes for coaches (Fletcher & Scott, 2010) as well as for athletes (Laborde et al., 
2016). Given the detrimental consequences of unpleasant emotions, it is important for 
coaches to identify how to cope with them effectively (Wagstaff et al., 2012b). Crucially, 
such coping may be supported by high levels of emotional intelligence.  
In addition, previous literature on emotional labour has noted that longer duration 
and higher frequency of interactions between service providers and clients entail higher 
levels of emotional labour (Grandey, 2000). These findings were applied to sport coaching 
by Lee and Chelladurai (2018), who noted that given how coaches spend significant 
amount of time with their athletes on- and off-the-field (Lee et al., 2015) and as they need 
to display a wide range of types of emotions (Fletcher & Arnold, 2015), coaches will have 
a requirement to manage the process of emotional labour to be effective in their jobs. 
Hence, emotional intelligence is important within the domain of sport coaching.  
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Emotional intelligence and stress 
In addition to work on sport, sports coaching and leadership, emotional intelligence 
has also been explored with regard to its relationship with stress. Predictions on the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and stress are likely to depend on the model of 
emotional intelligence being used, due to the range in proposed definitions (Matthews et 
al., 2004). However, the link between emotional intelligene and stress is founded on the 
notion that negative emotions and stress are the result of some dysfunctional relationship 
between aspects of the self and the environment, and that the ability to ‘read’ and manage 
emotions in the self and others is a moderator in this process (Slaski & Cartwright, 2003). 
In theory, emotionally intelligent individuals should be more tolerant of stressful 
environments because of their greater ability to adapt to circumstances (Bar-On, 1997) 
and/or because of their ability to manage negative emotions and cognitions successfully 
(Salovey et al., 1999) which, in turn, prevents them from becoming ‘immersed in’ and 
‘carried away’ by their emotional reaction (Slaski & Cartwright, 2003).  
Yet, despite there being a general pattern pointing towards emotional intelligence 
being protective against stress, research exploring this link has been inconclusive. For 
example, work exploring the relationship in student populations found that emotional 
intelligence was protective against stress for some of the participants, but not all (Gohm et 
al., 2005). Additionally, Matthews et al.’s (2006) work, also in students, found that prior to 
task performance, higher emotional intelligence was related to lower distress and worry, 
but failed to confirm the prediction that emotional intelligence should reduce the 
magnitude of task-induced stress responses. 
In addition to these findings, work on the relationship between emotional 
intelligence and stress within healthcare practitioners has been slightly more conclusive. 
For example, Pau and Croucher (2003) investigated the relationship within dental 
undergraduate students and reported that low emotional intelligence scorers reported more 
perceived stress. Moreover, Birks et al. (2009) explored the relationship within healthcare 
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students, and found emotional intelligence to moderate against stress, but to be more 
effective for smaller stressors as opposed to major stressors. Finally, Gerits et al. (2005) 
reported that fewer symptoms of burnout were reported by female nurses with higher 
emotional intelligence profiles. Taken together, these findings imply that emotional 
intelligence may go some way to protecting against stress, although not under all 
circumstances.  
 
Emotional intelligence predicting dehumanisation 
Considering emotional intelligence’s importance to coaching and its relationship 
with stress, it is worthwhile considering its association with dehumanisation. Overall, and 
based on the emotional intelligence literature discussed, it is predicted that coaches with 
higher emotional intelligence will be less likely to engage with all three forms of 
dehumanisation when making a team selection decision and on a ‘normal day’, and there 
are three key reasons for this. 
First, given that team selection decisions have been conceptualised as a stressor for 
coaches and emotional intelligence may be protective against the impacts of stressors, 
emotional intelligence may influence the extent to which coaches engage with 
dehumanisation as a coping method. This is because the protective nature of emotional 
intelligence would mean that coping methods like dehumanisation would not necessarily 
be required as a form of self-protection. Second, higher emotional intelligence may be 
characterised by strong coach-athlete relationships, meaning that to dehumanise the 
athletes a coach works with may feel unnatural, resulting in lower dehumanisation. Third, 
given that high emotional intelligence partly constitutes being adept at reading, 
understanding and managing one’s own emotions, a coach is less likely  to engage in self-
dehumanisation as self-dehumanisation has undesirable outcomes, such as feelings of guilt 
and sadness.  
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Summary 
This section has provided a detailed overview of emotional intelligence as a 
concept and explored work on emotional intelligence in a range of domains including 
sport, leadership, sport coaching and stress. In doing so, the importance of emotional 
intelligence in coaching has been discussed, as has its theorised relationship with stress. 
Building from this exploration, it is predicted that emotional intelligence will predict the 
extent to which a coach engages with dehumanisation, specifically that coaches who are 
higher in emotional intelligence are less likely to engage with all three forms of 
dehumanisation. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Emotional intelligence will be negatively related to all three forms of 
dehumanisation.  
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Resilience 
This section will define resilience, note the differences between resilience and coping, 
highlight current research on resilience within the sporting domain and progress to explain 
how resilience can predict the extent to which a coach may engage with forms of 
dehumanisation. According to Fletcher and Sarkar (2013), the study of psychological 
resilience seeks to understand why some individuals are able to withstand, or even thrive 
on, the pressure they experience in their lives. Psychological resilience, from here on just 
termed ‘resilience’, is defined as the role of mental processes and behaviour in promoting 
personal assets and protecting an individual from the potential negative effect of stressors 
(Fletcher and Sarkar, 2013).  
 
Understanding resilience  
Resilience has previously been conceptualised as both a personality trait and a process. 
Work conceptualising it as a personality trait has suggested resilience represents a 
constellation of characteristics that enable individuals to adapt to the circumstances they 
encounter (Connor & Davidson, 2003). Such characteristics have been said to include; 
resourcefulness, strength of character, flexibility of functioning in response to varying 
environmental demands (Block & Block, 1980), hope (Horton & Wallander, 2001), social 
support (Brown, 2008) and self-efficacy (Gu & Day, 2007). These characteristics have 
been referred to as ‘protective factors’ which Rutter (1985) defined as “influences that 
modify, ameliorate, or alter a person’s response to some environmental hazard that 
predisposes to a maladaptive outcome” (p. 600). Work considering resilience as a process 
suggests that the effects of these protective factors will vary contextually (from situation to 
situation) and temporally (throughout a situation and across an individual’s lifespan; 
Fletcher & Sarkar, 2013). For example, if a person reacts positively to a stressor at one 
point in their life, this does not guarantee a positive reaction in the future. For the purposes 
of this study, resilience will be considered as the application of these personality traits. 
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This is based on the premise that an individual may have such traits, but simply possessing 
these traits does not necessarily mean one is resilient. Yet to effectively apply these traits 
would be to demonstrate resilience.   
In the interests of clarity, it is important to note the conceptual differences between 
resilience and coping. Fletcher and Sarkar (2013) summarise this by stating that resilience 
is a positive response to a potential stressful situation, whereas the nature of reactionary 
coping strategies may be positive (e.g. encouraging) or negative (e.g. substance abuse). 
Essentially, this suggests that resilience is being equipped to effectively deal with stress 
before it arrives, whereas coping is dealing with the stress, either effectively or 
ineffectively, once it has arrived.  
 
Research on resilience applied to this study 
Within sport, resilience has been explored across a range of different contexts. Work on 
athletes has explored the importance of resilience for sporting success and what may 
characterise resilience individually or in a team setting. For example, Holt and Dunn 
(2004) examined the psychosocial competencies among elite male adolescent soccer 
players and resilience emerged as one of the four major themes regarded as central to an 
individual’s success. Moreover, Gucciardi et al. (2011) examined individual resilient 
qualities in a sport context and found examples of such qualities to include; adaptability, 
staying focused under pressure and an ability to handle unpleasant feelings. Morgan and 
colleagues’ (2013) work sought to define team resilience, concluding that it is a “dynamic, 
psychosocial process which protects a group of individuals from the potential negative 
effect of stressors they collectively encounter” (p. 552). Morgan et al. (2013) went on to 
note that resilient characteristics of elite sport teams include; group structure, mastery 
approaches, social capital and collective efficacy.  
Research on resilience within the sport setting has also included work on coaches. 
Specifically, Wagstaff et al. (2018) explored how resilience moderated the relationship 
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between the frequency of stressors and burnout in both athletes and coaches. The findings 
of this work provided evidence of a positive relationship between the frequency  of 
organisational stressors and burnout, as well as the moderating effect of resilience in 
coaches, whereby as psychological resilience increased, there was a significantly weaker 
relationship between organisational stressors and burnout. These findings are supported by 
research beyond sport in other employment settings. Work exploring resilience within 
social workers found a significant negative relationship between resilience and 
psychological distress (Kinman & Grant, 2010), suggesting that workers with higher 
resilience experienced lower amounts of psychological distress. Moreover, a study by 
Arnetz et al. (2009) explored the effect of resilience training on stress and performance in 
policing. Resilience training resulted in significantly less negative mood, less heart rate 
reactivity and better police performance compared to control. Both of these studies 
therefore support Howard’s (2008) contention that resilience might buffer the negative 
impacts of work stress.  
When directly applied to the present study, the implication of this body of work is 
that coaches higher in resilience are less likely to suffer negative effects of a stressor, like 
that of a team selection decision. As such, this study hypothesises that coaches high in 
resilience are less likely to increase in their levels of dehumanisation of the athletes 
following a team selection decision, if they are to see any change. Similarly, it is also 
hypothesised that coaches high in resilience are less likely to engage in, or witness a very 
small increase in, self-dehumanisation following a selection decision. Contrarily, coaches 
low in resilience would be more likely to increase all three forms of dehumanisation. 
Individuals high in resilience should be sufficiently equipped to deal with the stressors 
such that they do not need to functionally employ dehumanisation in order to cope with the 
stress of a team selection decision.  
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Hypothesis 5: Coaches’ resilience will negatively predict both overall use, and increases 
when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation.  
67 
 
Relatedness 
This section will define relatedness within the context of SDT, explore relatedness’ links 
with ostracism and dehumanisation, whilst also reviewing work on relatedness in sports 
coaching. Moreover, this section will explain how relatedness may predict the extent to 
which a coach will engage with forms of dehumanisation when making a team selection 
decision.  
 
Understanding relatedness 
SDT suggests that humans have three innate psychological needs that are essential for 
ongoing psychological growth, integrity and wellbeing (Ryan & Deci, 2000). These three 
needs are; autonomy, competence and relatedness. Autonomy is the extent to which 
decisions and actions emanate from a person’s integrated self rather than being the product 
of external influence or coercion, competence is the extent to which a person feels capable 
of achieving their goals and relatedness is the extent to which a person feels connected to 
the people around him or her (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Ryan and Deci (2000) suggest that 
satisfaction of autonomy, competence and relatedness lead people to value continued 
satisfaction, implying that if these needs are met then an individual will appreciate them 
and seek to continually achieve them. This is contrary to thwarted need satisfaction, which 
prompts a process of accommodation in which individuals who have experienced long 
periods of need deprivation defend against the discomfort by placing less value on the 
satisfaction of need (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Research on SDT is wide ranging in its scope 
and includes, yet is not limited to, work on leadership (Kouzes & Posner, 2006), happiness 
(Ryan & Deci, 2001), self-talk (Oliver et al., 2008), physical activity (Teixeira et al., 2012) 
and education (Sheldon et al., 2007).  
 Here, I focus on relatedness because of its interpersonal dimension and clear 
relevance to the present study given its definition as “a psychological necessity that 
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involves having positive interpersonal interactions and trusting relationships” (Moller et 
al., 2010, p. 754). Relatedness has previously been explored in sports coaching literature, 
with the work of Jowett and colleagues on relational sports coaching dominating the 
landscape. Central to relational coaching is the concept of the coach-athlete relationship, 
which is defined as the situation in which coaches and athletes’ feelings, thoughts and 
behaviours are causally interconnected (Jowett, 2007). There are four key properties that 
correspond with the definition; closeness, commitment, complementarity and co-
orientation (Jowett & Shanmugam, 2016). It is the extent to which these four factors are 
satisfied that underpin the effectiveness of the coach-athlete relationship.  
Using Jowett et al.’s models, the quality of the coach-athlete relationship has been 
positively associated with basic need satisfaction and that need satisfaction has, in turn, 
been positively associated with motivation (Riley & Smith, 2011). Similarly, research on 
the coach-athlete relationships suggests that the better the quality of the coach-athlete 
relationship (in terms of greater closeness, commitment, complementarity and co-
orientation), the more satisfied athletes and coaches are with the coaching relationship 
(Davis, Jowett & Lafraniere, 2013; Jowett & Ntoumanis, 2004; Lorimer, 2009) as well as 
with performance, training and coach treatment (Jowett, 2009; Jowett, Shanmugam & 
Caccoulis, 2012). One of the mechanisms explaining this link, Jowett and Shanmugam 
(2016) suggest, is the fulfilment of the basic psychological needs; autonomy, competence 
and relatedness. Therefore, we suggest that coaches exhibiting strong coach-athlete 
relationships are most likely to experience high levels of relatedness, a positive predictor of 
wellbeing. 
 
Aligning relatedness with ostracism and dehumanisation 
As stated previously in this paper, team selection decisions can be conceptualised as a form 
of ostracism, given that decisions require a coach to exclude at least one individual from 
the selected group. Research on ostracism highlights how it can impact the target’s self-
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perception, with respect to their self-esteem and mood (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Twenge 
et al., 2003). Moreover, several studies including meta-analyses suggest that being 
ostracised leads to an increase in negative affect (Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Poulsen, 2006; 
Twenge et al., 2003).  
Studies focusing on the source of ostracism (in this case, the coach) have also 
reported negative impacts on affect, which is mediated by the thwarting of psychological 
needs. For example, the work of Williams et al. (1998) reported that ostracism can lead to 
a loss in the source’s sense of belongingness. Moreover, Poulsen and Kashy (2012) 
examined the experiences of both sources and targets of ostracism. Their study reported 
that sources experienced greater feelings of guilt than did targets. The general belief 
guiding these findings is that being the source of ostracism is painful because people 
depend heavily on social connections for their psychological wellbeing, as underpinned by 
SDT (Williams, 2009). This has been supported in a study by Legate et al. (2013) who 
found that the effect of ostracising others on affect was fully mediated by the thwarting of 
psychological needs, specifically relatedness. Applying this to the context of a team 
selection decision, here we predict different roles for relatedness. Instead of an outcome of 
ostracism, we predicted that relatedness would be a marker of the quality of the coach-
athlete relationship, and would therefore influence the extent to which coaches engage in 
both (i) dehumanisation of the athletes they work with, and (ii) self-dehumanisation 
following a team selection decision.  
Specifically, this paper suggests that coaches high in relatedness would increase 
their level of self-dehumanisation following a selection decision. This is anticipated as key 
factors when engaging in self-dehumanisation are feelings linked to transgression and 
immorality (Bastian et al., 2012a; Bastian et al., 2012b). We argue that as relatedness 
increases, coaches will perceive the act of ostracising another to be ‘worse’ (i.e. more of a 
transgression and more immoral). This would therefore predict that coaches with high 
levels of relatedness would engage in more self-dehumanisation following a team selection 
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decision. Conversely, coaches with high relatedness satisfaction would be expected to 
engage less with animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation following a team selection 
decision. This is because individuals are less likely to dehumanise those close to them 
(Leyens et al., 2003), and high relatedness satisfaction would be characterised in part by 
closeness.  
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Summary 
In summary, relatedness is one of three basic psychological needs, proposed by SDT to 
contribute to wellbeing. The act of ostracising another, be it an individual or group, has 
been found to thwart relatedness. In sport coaching, relatedness is exemplified through the 
coach-athlete relationship which has been found to be central to effective coaching. 
Therefore, it is predicted that as relatedness within coaches increases, there will be an 
increase in self-dehumanisation and a decrease in both animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanisation.  
 
Hypothesis 4: As coaches’ relatedness increases, there will be an increase in self-
dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation 
  
72 
 
Gender 
Introduction  
This section will explore how the internalisation of gender stereotypes may influence the 
extent to which a coach engages with forms of dehumanisation. In doing so, the concept of 
hegemony will be explained, with examples given to how it may manifest itself in sporting 
settings. Furthermore, the notion of gender stereotypes and ‘doing gender’ will be 
discussed, closing with an explanation of how the internalisation of such stereotypes may 
influence the extent to which a coach engages with forms of dehumanisation. Despite 
psychological literature and theory being central to this study, some sociological concepts 
will are drawn upon here in order to further understand coach-athlete relationships. 
To start, it is important to define the concepts of sex and gender so to ensure 
theoretical clarity and this can be achieved primarily using the work of West and 
Zimmerman (1987). West and Zimmerman (1987) state that “sex is a determination made 
through the application of socially agreed upon biological criteria for classifying persons as 
females or males” (p. 127). The criteria for such classification, West and Zimmerman 
(1987) continue, can be at birth or chromosomal typing before birth, in which the 
classifications do not necessarily agree with one another. Placement in a sex category is 
achieved through application of the sex criteria, but in everyday life, categorisation is 
established and sustained by the socially required identificatory displays that proclaim 
one’s membership in one or the other category (West & Zimmerman, 1987). In contrast, 
gender is the activity of managing situated conduct in light of the normative connections of 
attitudes and activities appropriate for one’s sec category (West & Zimmerman, 1987). 
Therefore, for West and Zimmerman (1987), gender “is not a set of traits, nor a variable, 
nor a role, but the product of social doings of some sort” (p .129).  
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Gender and dehumanisation 
One of the ways in which I propose gender to influence coach engagement with 
dehumanisation can first be explained through the concept of hegemony (Gramsci et al., 
1971). Hegemony describes a form of control which is persuasive, rather than coercive and 
is understood to be the result of people’s positive reactions to values and beliefs, which, in 
specific social and historical situations, support established social relations and structures 
of power (Gramsci et al., 1971). Hargreaves (1994) argues that specifically in sport, the 
concept of male hegemony is present, an idea originally developed by Connell (2005). For 
example, Hargreaves (1994) claims it is possible to apply the concept of hegemony to 
specifically male leadership and domination of sports.  
A further way in which male hegemony may manifest itself within sport is through 
gender stereotypes, which in turn, may influence coaches’ engagement with 
dehumanisation. Bakan (1966) summarises gender stereotypes to be how men and women 
are thought to differ in terms of achievement-oriented traits. Within this, men are 
characterised as aggressive, forceful, independent and decisive, whereas women are 
characterised as kind, helpful, sympathetic and concerned about others (Heilman, 2001). 
Avolio (2009) adds that men are generally evaluated as being more agentic in terms of 
displaying attributes like aggressiveness, ambitiousness, self-confidence and dominance. 
Women, on the other hand, have generally been evaluated as being more communal using 
attributes such as friendly, kind, sympathetic and affectionate (Eagly & Carli, 2007). 
Furthermore, Heilman (2001) contends that gender stereotypes are not only descriptive, but 
also prescriptive. That is, they denote not only differences in how women and men actually 
are, but also norms and behaviours that are suitable for each. Specifically, this includes 
norms about how women and men should be (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Eagly, 1987; 
Terborg, 1977, as cited in Heilman, 2001).  
Essentially, what this refers to is Butler’s (1990, 2004) notion of ‘doing gender.’ 
Butler (1990) developed the often-debated notion of performativity, which can be 
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summarised as the process through which gendered subjects are constituted by regulatory 
notions within a heterosexual matrix (Kelan, 2010). To ‘do gender’, therefore, involves a 
combination of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micro-political activities that 
cast particular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine “natures” (West & 
Zimmerman, 1987) i.e. stereotypical feminine nature is to be kind, helpful and sympathetic 
towards others, as Heilman (2001) notes. In explaining the concept of ‘doing gender’, 
Butler also utilises Althusser’s notion of interpellation; the process through which ideology 
addresses and calls upon individuals.  
More simplistically, this is how, in response to being hailed in a certain way, 
people identify with an ideology and become subjects (Butler, 1997). An illustration of this 
process, as cited by Kelan (2010), is what Butler calls ‘girling the girl’ (Butler, 1993, pp.7-
8). Within this process, a girl is named a girl at birth, or in the ultrasound procedure before. 
This naming serves as a performative act, thus creating the girl as a social reality. 
However, this process is not complete until the girl responds to the label ‘girl’ by citing 
subject positions that are deemed appropriate for girls. Doing so involves the girl creating 
herself constantly as a girl through citing gendered positions. This ‘doing’ gender, 
therefore, is not a matter of free will, yet compulsory and enforced (Butler, 1993). To link 
this work back to the present study, male and female coaches, and male and female athletes 
may be socially expected to behave, speak or dress in a certain way and this may influence 
the extent to which dehumanisation occurs in a sport setting. 
Building towards a direct application of this theory to a sport coaching context, 
Schein’s (2001) research on sex stereotypes associated with managerial or leadership roles 
showed that when individuals thought about managerial roles, they thought more about 
men and stereotypical male attributes, than they thought about women and stereotypical 
female attributes. This demonstrates an ‘upward’ consideration of gender, i.e. how those 
lower on the management hierarchy perceive those higher on a hierarchy. However, what I 
am proposing to explore in this study is the ‘downward’ influence of gender, in which how 
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those in higher positions in the management hierarchy perceive those lower down is 
explored.  
Thus, considering the characteristics associated with both men and women, either 
by stereotype, evaluation or by ‘doing gender’, I contend that these will influence how a 
coach engages with dehumanisation of the athletes they work with. Specifically, the 
coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with will be likely to 
animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches who are discordant 
with the gender of the athletes they work with. With reference to Heilman’s (2001) 
contention that gender stereotypes can be prescriptive, we suggest here that gender 
stereotypes will dictate the extent to which a coach engages with forms of dehumanisation.  
For example, as Eagly and Carli (2007) observe, women are generally evaluated in 
regard to attributes such as friendliness, affection and sympathy. I argue that male coaches 
working with female athletes, for example, will internalise this stereotype and thus, 
dehumanise less than male coaches working with male athletes. Furthermore, coaches of a 
discordant gender to the athletes they work with are likely to self-dehumanise more, also as 
a result of internalisation of gender stereotypes. It has been hypothesised that the act of a 
team selection decision itself is a transgression and if this contradicts gender stereotypes, 
the sense of transgression and immorality surrounding the team selection decision will be 
exacerbated, thus leading to greater self-dehumanisation. 
  
76 
 
Summary 
To summarise, it is predicted that the internalisation of gender stereotypes will 
influence the extent to which coaches engage with dehumanisation. Specifically, coaches 
of a concordant gender to their athletes will dehumanise more than coaches who are a 
discordant gender, as a result of gender stereotype internalisation. Moreover, given how 
self-dehumanisation may occur as a response to a transgression, any contradictory 
behaviour to internalised gender stereotypes will result in greater self-dehumanisation.  
 
Hypothesis 7: Coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with 
will be likely to animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches who 
are discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. Coaches of a discordant 
gender are predicted to self-dehumanise more than those of a concordant gender for 
their athletes. 
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Coaches’ previous level of participation and its influence on engagement with 
dehumanisation. 
 
Introduction  
This section will discuss how the commodification and professionalization of elite sport 
may deny athletes autonomy, specifically through the mechanisation of the athletic body. 
In doing so, sporting sociological theory and literature will be utilised, in order to seek a 
clear understanding of the explicit and implicit interactions that take place between 
coaches and athletes. Following this, the possibility of a coach internalising this lack of 
autonomy they experienced as an athlete will be examined. To close, the impact these 
factors have on the extent to which a coach engages with dehumanisation will be explored.  
 
The mechanisation of athletes, its impact on coach autonomy and how this may 
influence coaches’ engagement with dehumanisation 
There is an abundance of sociological sport literature considering the commodification 
and/or mechanisation of the human body in elite sport (e.g. Brohm, 1978; Connor, 2009; 
Walsh & Giulianotti, 2001; Sewart, 1987). For example, the professionalization of elite 
sport, Walsh and Giulianotti (2001) argue, has contributed to sport organisations 
perceiving athletes as commodities who fluctuate in value and can be bought or sold at any 
time based on prevailing market conditions. This leads to the mechanisation of the sporting 
body, which in itself is governed by the principle of maximising output, as posited by 
Brohm (1978). This view is supported by Connor (2009, p.1369), who contends that in 
elite sport; “athletes have become a business input and as such, managers, coaches and 
administrators seeks to exploit that input as much as possible.” These Marxist ideologies 
surrounding the mechanisation and commodification of athletes at a high level of sport, 
Manley et al. (2016) argue, contribute to the removal of employee voice. Put differently, 
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the removal of employee voice can also be interpreted as the denial of an athlete’s 
autonomy.  
Sewart (1987) was one of the first authors to discuss how the commodification of 
sport can work to reduce autonomy in the sporting context, not least on behalf of the 
athletes. Specifically, Sewart (1987, p. 184) suggested that “when confronted with the 
reality of sensationalism, spectacle and the predominance of a market mentality in sport, 
critical theory highlights the extent to which sport has lost its previous autonomy.” The 
implication here is that throughout the growth of commodity exchange within sport and 
instrumental rationalisation, sport loses its autonomy.  
There are two examples from modern sport which show how the commodification 
of elite sport can lead to a reduction in autonomy specifically for athletes. The first, 
highlighted by Sanderson (2009), is the draft system that currently operates in many 
American sports. Throughout the process of amateur drafts, players are subjected to 
constant news about their draft ‘stock’ rising or falling. These practices position players as 
commodities who see their values increase or decrease on the open markets. Moreover, 
when athletes are drafted, they complete a routine of walking up to a podium and posing 
for photographs in their new team’s kit (Oates & Durham, 2004). Thus, Sanderson (2009) 
argues, as players are brought before the audience, sports, consumers and the sports 
organisation have the opportunity to inspect the merchandise they have just selected. 
Taken together, these processes deny an athlete any aspect of choice, progressively making 
them like pawns, and as such, work to deny the athlete autonomy. 
The second example surrounds how athlete exploitation co-exists with athlete 
commodification. When combined, these factors further contribute to a lack of autonomy 
for the athlete. In professional sport, athletes often generate large revenue streams for the 
organisation by whom they are employed (Sanderson, 2009), yet in many cases their 
compensation is highly disproportionate to the amount of income they generate. As a 
result, sporting organisations have a vested interest in preserving the athletes’ health and 
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wellbeing (Sanderson, 2009). However, this concern is not so much grounded in a genuine 
regard for the athletes, but rather, stems from commodification – the athletes must be 
‘protected’ so that their performance will generate maximum revenues.  
Equally, this concern does not necessarily always manifest itself with preservation 
of athletes’ wellbeing. Work exploring injury within professional football has found that 
there is a culture of athletes ‘playing hurt’ (Roderick et al., 2000). For example, in the 
professional game there is a perception that players who play through injury are perceived 
to have a ‘good attitude’ (Roderick et al., 2000). In Roderick et al.’s (2000) research on 
managing injuries in English professional football, players felt that due to their 
circumstances, they were made to feel, and did feel, like they were of no use to their 
managers when they were injured. This complies with Brohm’s (1978) assertion that the 
sole aim of the manager or coach is to maximise his/her athlete’s output. In this situation, 
with the athletes unable to ‘produce’, they are of no use to their coach and such treatment 
from managers occurs as a result.  
However, Murphy and Waddington (2007) contend that elite sportspeople, such as 
professional footballers, are willing participants in their own exploitation. Such willingness 
occurs as a result of a desire to display the ‘good attitude’ Roderick et al. (2000) describe, 
to coaches and managers (Murphy & Waddington, 2007). Connor (2009) refutes this 
contention however, suggesting that the entire sporting complex is geared to requiring 
athletes to play at all times, regardless of injury. Returning to the case in point, these 
examples firstly highlight the complexity for athletes unwillingly involved in the 
commodification, or even commodified nature, of sport, and secondly suggest that the 
athlete is not necessarily at the forefront of consideration in elite sport. Thus, this poses the 
question of how athletes are able to achieve autonomy within these environments.  
Given this literature (Murphy & Waddington, 2007; Roderick et al., 2000; 
Sanderson, 2009; Manley et al., 2016) pointing towards a lack of autonomy for athletes, 
this study contends that the previous playing experience of the coach will influence the 
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extent to which they engage with forms of dehumanisation. To be precise, if a coach has 
participated at an elite level, they may internalise this lack of autonomy experienced and 
thus, this may influence the extent to which they dehumanise the athletes they work with. 
It is proposed that this will be exemplified through increased dehumanisation of the 
athletes, most likely to be mechanistic dehumanisation. This is because the denial of 
autonomy is similar to the traits that are denied when mechanistic dehumanisation occurs, 
for example, cognitive openness and individual agency (Haslam, 2006). Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that coaches who have participated in their sport at an elite level 
(international or national) may internalise a lack of autonomy they experienced, and thus, 
be more likely to dehumanise the athletes they work with.  
 
Summary 
This section has discussed how the professionalization and commodification of elite sport 
can progressively lead to the denial of an athlete’s autonomy. Following this, it has been 
argued that a coach who has participated in elite sport as an athlete may internalise this 
lack of autonomy. This, in turn, leads them to be more likely to engage in the 
dehumanisation of the athletes the work with. As such, it is hypothesised that coaches who 
have participated at a high level of the sport they coach in are more likely to dehumanise 
the athletes they work with.  
 
Hypothesis 8: The higher level of sport the coach has coach has participated in as an 
athlete, the more likely they are to dehumanise the athletes they work with and the less 
likely they will be to self-dehumanise. 
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Mental wellbeing 
 
Introduction 
This section will discuss the hypothesised relationship between three forms of 
dehumanisation and coaches’ mental wellbeing. In doing so, this section ties together 
various elements already discussed in the introduction and literature review to highlight 
this hypothesised relationship. First, mental wellbeing is defined alongside an outline of 
different perspectives taken on it as a concept. Second, how dehumanisation of others is 
related to mental wellbeing will be discussed and to finish, a hypothesis on how self-
dehumanisation is related to mental wellbeing will be explained.  
 
Defining mental wellbeing 
According to Lundqvist (2011), sport psychological research on wellbeing, specifically 
among competitive athletes, suffers from ambiguous and inconsistent definitions of 
wellbeing as many studies do not provide a definition, or use diverse wellbeings seemingly 
interchangeably. Thus, in seeking to overcome this ambiguity, in this study mental 
wellbeing will be clearly defined with a rationale provided for the definition. For the 
purposes of this study, the World Health Organisation’s (2004) definition of mental health 
will be used, as both mental health and mental wellbeing are used interchangeably (Tenant 
et al., 2007). This definition declared positive mental health to be the ‘foundation for 
wellbeing and effective functioning for both the individual and the community’ and 
defined it as a state ‘which allows individuals to realise their abilities, cope with the normal 
stressors of life, work productively and fruitfully, and make a contribution to their 
community’ (WHO, 2004: 12).  
Importantly, this definition includes elements of the definition used in Norris et 
al.’s (2017) study exploring stressors coping and mental wellbeing in coaches. Specifically, 
Norris et al. (2017) defined mental wellbeing as “a broad category of phenomena that 
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includes people’s emotional responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgements of life 
satisfaction” (Diener et al. 1999: 277). This definition was adopted because it complements 
the basic premises of transactional stress theory that have dominated the sport psychology 
literature on psychological stress which is important for this study, given the 
conceptualisation of dehumanisation as a potential coping method for stress. 
There are two main perspectives to mental wellbeing, the hedonic perspective and 
the eudaimonic perspective (Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff et al., 2004). The hedonic 
perspective is founded on the general idea that happiness and pleasures form the essential 
goal of human life (Lundqvist, 2011). Thus, according to this perspective wellbeing is 
achieved by increasing happiness through striving for pleasurable moments, moving 
toward rewarding goals in line with individual values, and approaching stimuli that 
increase positive affect. In contrast, eudaimonic tradition considers wellbeing to be 
separated from pleasure and happiness. Instead, the eudaimonic perspective does not view 
human goals and values that increase positive affect necessarily helpful the individuals’ 
growth and development (Lundqvist, 2011). Rather than defining wellbeing as primarily 
obtaining happiness, the eudaimonic tradition is concerned with activities and challenges 
people engage in to develop and reach individual potential that is in line with important 
values and engagements rooted in the self.   
 
Mental wellbeing and dehumanisation 
This literature review has already outlined how team selection decisions can be deemed a 
stressor for coaches, with ample supporting literature e.g. Didymus (2017), Thelwell et al. 
(2008), Olusoga et al. (2009), Coutrier (2009) and Lundkvist et al. (2012). Moreover, the 
range of current coping methods employed by coaches has also been discussed, as these 
included a range of cognitive, behavioural and emotional strategies to cope with stressors 
(Olusoga et al., 2010; Frey, 2007). The relevance of wellbeing here however, is that how 
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an individual copes with a stressor is a complex phenomenon that will influence their 
mental wellbeing (Malik & Noreen, 2015).  
Therefore, given that this study is going to explore if dehumanisation may be 
employed by coaches when making a team selection decision, the effectiveness of 
dehumanisation as a coping method will also be explored, yet through the prism of mental 
wellbeing. The ‘effectiveness’ or extent to which dehumanisation is adaptive can, to an 
extent, be measured through the correlation between coaches’ engagement with 
dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. Previous literature has pointed towards adaptive 
properties of dehumanisation, particularly when making tough decisions (Lammers & 
Stapel, 2011; Haque & Waytz, 2012). Therefore, this study proposes that if 
dehumanisation does have adaptive properties in protecting against the stress of team 
selection decisions, one of the ways in which this will manifest itself is through a greater 
wellbeing. However, this is only predicted for the dehumanisation of athletes, not self-
dehumanisation.  
With regard to self-dehumanisation, it is hypothesised that coaches who self-
dehumanise more will have a lower mental wellbeing. This is based upon one’s perception 
of self, in that self-dehumanisation is in part a response to cope with one’s own 
transgressions and the immoral treatment of others (Bastian et al., 2013). Now, using 
Taylor and Brown’s (1988) theory suggesting that positive illusions of oneself are linked to 
linked to greater mental wellbeing, we are predicting an opposite effect whereby if a coach 
perceives themselves to have committed a transgression, they may have a negative illusion 
of themselves and therefore a lower mental wellbeing 
 
Summary 
To summarise, if dehumanisation does have adaptive properties in relieving the stress of a 
team selection decision, this will be manifested in a positive relationship between other-
dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. However, given that self-dehumanisation is centred 
84 
 
on the perception of oneself as being ‘less’ human, it is hypothesised that self-
dehumanisation and mental wellbeing will be negatively related.  
 
Hypothesis 9: For both overall and change in dehumanisation, mechanistic and or 
animalistic dehumanisation will positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self-
dehumanisation will negatively predict lower mental wellbeing.   
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Part 5 - Literature Review Summary: Research questions and hypotheses 
In sum, this literature review has explored coping with stress broadly, and also specifically 
within sporting contexts, continuing to examine previous work which enabled a link 
between coping and dehumanisation. Further, an overview, operationalisation and 
delimitation of three forms of dehumanisation has been provided. This work built upon the 
conceptualisation of team selection decision as a stressor for coaches already made in the 
introduction to this study. Doing so facilitated the first research question of this study:  
 
Research Question 1: To what extent do coaches engage with dehumanisation when 
making a team selection decision? 
 
Following the development of this first research question, it was observed that there 
was likely to be individual variation in the extent to which coaches engage with forms of 
dehumanisation, and as such, a need to understand why this is the case was recognised. 
This formulated the second research question of the study:  
 
Research Question 2: What factors predict coaches’ engagement with dehumanisation? 
 
With respect to the factors that predicted coaches’ engagement with 
dehumanisation, Part 3 of this literature review has explored the personal and contextual 
factors hypothesised to predict the extent to extent to which coaches dehumanise others 
and/or themselves.  
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Taken together, there were nine hypotheses developed for this study:  
 
Hypothesis 1: All three forms of dehumanisation will be significantly higher following a 
selection decision than on a non-selection day.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Following a selection decision, the more a coach engages with 
dehumanisation of the athletes, the less they will engage in self-dehumanisation. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Coaches’ personal sense of power will positively predict overall level of, 
and increases in following a team selection decision, athlete dehumanisation. 
 
Hypothesis 4: As coaches’ relatedness increases, there will be an increase in self-
dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Coaches’ resilience will negatively predict both overall use, and increases 
when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Emotional intelligence will be negatively related to all three forms of 
dehumanisation. 
 
Hypothesis 7: Coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with will 
be likely to animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches who are 
discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. Coaches of a discordant gender 
are predicted to self-dehumanise more than those of a concordant gender for their athletes. 
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Hypothesis 8: The higher level of sport the coach has coach has participated in as an 
athlete, the more likely they are to dehumanise the athletes they work with and the less 
likely they will be to self-dehumanise. 
 
Hypothesis 9: For both overall and change in dehumanisation, mechanistic and or 
animalistic dehumanisation will positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self-
dehumanisation will negatively predict lower mental wellbeing.   
 
Hypotheses 3-6 and their predicted relationships with mental wellbeing are most clearly 
explained through Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: A hypothesised model of the relationships between predictive factors, three forms of dehumanisation and mental wellbeing.  
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Chapter 3: Methods 
This section provides an overview of the methods employed throughout this study. This 
will include a summary of the study design and epistemological stance taken, sampling 
methods and participant recruitment, the study procedure and measures and the data 
analysis techniques used.  
 
Study Design and Epistemology 
With regard to the epistemological standpoint taken in this study, a positivist 
approach was adopted. As such, this study was grounded in a belief that the nature of 
reality is ultimately knowable through the application of the right methods of observation 
(Atkinson, 2011). The strengths of adopting a positivist approach lie in the precision, 
control and objectivity facilitated by the associated methods employed (Gratton & Jones, 
2001). Moreover, the straightforward nature of data analysis provides for more clear-cut 
interpretation of results (Gratton & Jones, 2001). However, the key argument of those who 
reject using a positivist approach for sport-based research is centred upon the social nature 
of sport (Gratton & Jones, 2001). For example, those who engage in sport, by either 
playing, coaching or watching, are theorised to be acted upon by a number of external 
forces, but these individuals also have free will to respond to such force in an active way 
and thus, their behaviour should be understood in terms of causal relationships. Despite 
these criticisms, a positivist approach was used for this study as it allows for the objective 
measurement and analysis of particular behaviour(s), which in the case of this study was 
that of dehumanisation.  
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Closely aligned with a positivist approach are quantitative research methods 
(Gratton & Jones, 2001). In seeking objective measurement and analysis of 
dehumanisation and other indicators of human behaviour (e.g. emotional intelligence, 
personal sense of power, resilience), a quantitative approach was adopted. This refers to 
the characteristics of the data collected, as they constituted numerical measurement and 
statistical analysis.  
More specifically, the quantitative data used within the research was gathered by a 
repeated measures design, in which participants completed a series of self-report 
questionnaires at two different time points. Collecting data at two different time points 
facilitated a comparison before and after a team selection decision, enabling observation of 
any changes in engagement with dehumanisation. Self-report measures have been 
criticised for potential prevalence of social desirability bias (Conroy et al., 2008) in 
addition to an increased likeliness of them yielding an individual’s perception of ability as 
opposed to their actual ability (Meyer & Fletcher, 2007). Despite this, due to a large target 
sample size and the ease of employing self-report measures, they were used in this study, 
whilst remaining cognisant of their potential limitations. 
 
Sampling and participant recruitment 
A combination of three different sampling methods were used in this study; 
snowball sampling, the key informant technique and convenience sampling. Snowball 
sampling involves locating initial participants who assist in identifying further potential 
participants themselves, the key informant technique involves selecting individuals on the 
basis of specific knowledge they possess and convenience sampling concerns recruiting 
participants who are easily accessible (Sadler et al., 2010). These were utilised in order to 
achieve a large sample size across wide range of sports coaches.  
Snowball sampling was characterised in this study by contacting ‘gatekeepers’ who 
facilitated access to large numbers of coaches, Specifically, these individuals were course 
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tutors within local county football associations, often already known to the researcher, who 
were approached with regard to asking the ‘learners’ on the course to participate in the 
research. This involved attending one day of the coaching course, being introduced to the 
cohort by the course tutor and providing a brief description of the research. Following this, 
the learners on the course were given the opportunity to take part in the study. With regard 
to the key informant technique and convenience sampling, coaches already known to the 
researcher were asked if they would be willing to take part in the study. Additionally, links 
to online versions of the questionnaires were shared on the researcher’s social media 
platforms, notably Twitter and LinkedIn (Gelinas et al., 2017). 
The inclusion criterion for the study was that coaches must be “aged over 18, 
currently be responsible (solely or jointly) for team selection decisions and coach within 
the UK.” Participants were aged over 18 to avoid ethical issues in storing the personal data 
of minors and had to coach within the UK so to fit with the standardised national coaching 
qualifications. Notable by its absence, there was no specific coaching level required. The 
reasons for this are twofold. First, by not limiting the participants to a specific coaching 
level, any potential differences across coaching levels within the data can be observed, and 
recommendations from the study can be tailored to the appropriate level.  
Second, Potts et al. (2019) contended that empirical sports coaching literature has 
focused almost exclusively on the experiences of full-time paid male coaches, which has 
contributed to a biased evidence base. They argue that this does not accurately reflect the 
UK coaching workforce. Such a contention can be underpinned by the gender split of 
coaches in the UK, which currently lies at 46:54 for females-to-males (UK Coaching 
2017), moreover, full-time coaches only make up 12% of the coaching population (Sport 
England, 2016). Finally, in their exploration of stressors, coping and wellbeing amongst 
sport coaches, Norris et al. (2017) stated that to maintain and enhance sport participation, 
retain coaches and develop higher quality high-performance coaches, more attention 
should be dedicated to coaches working at sub-elite levels. Thus, a wider remit with 
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regards to paid/part-time/voluntary, male/female/non-binary and elite/sub-elite/non-elite 
coaches would provide a more accurate reflection of the behaviour of the UK coaching 
workforce as a whole. This study has sought to achieve this by setting wider inclusion 
criteria. 
With respect to sample size, a combination of Green’s (1991) and Harris’ (1985) 
recommendations were used to develop a target sample size that ensured 80% power, the 
minimum suggested power for an ordinary study (Van Voorhis & Morgan, 2007). Green 
(1991) suggested that for testing multiple correlations the formula N>50+8m (where m is 
the number of independent variables) should be used. Given that there are seven 
independent variables, this would put the recommended sample size at a minimum of 106. 
However, Harris (1985) suggests that for regression using six or more predictors requires a 
minimum of 10 participants per predictor which would total a minimum of 70 participants. 
However, Harris (1985) further notes that better power to detect a small effect size would 
be gained at 30 participants per predictor. Taken together, this suggested a target range of 
participants of between 106 and 240 to ensure 80% power. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Consistent with university ethical requirements, ethical approval was obtained from 
the Department’s ethics committee prior to data collection commencing. All participants 
were presented with a participant information sheet (Appendix A) and provided informed 
consent prior to taking part in the study (Appendix B). The responses submitted via 
questionnaires were entered into a database for analysis. From the point of entry into the 
database (which was one week after the participant completed all four parts of the 
questionnaire), the data was anonymised. Each participant was be allocated an anonymous 
number for data collection not connected to their name or identity. All personal data in 
electronic form was stored on a password protected computer, and any hardcopies kept in 
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locked storage. Data was not available to anyone outside the research team. These 
procedures were outlined in the privacy notice which given to all participants prior to them 
giving consent to take part (Appendix C) and followed APA guidelines (APA, 2017) 
 
Procedure and measures 
Having provided their informed consent, taking part in the study required 
participants to complete a two-part questionnaire. Part 1 (Appendix D) was completed at a 
time convenient to the participant and was filled out either via a paper or online version. 
On completing Part 1 of the questionnaire, participants were e-mailed a link to Part 2 
(Appendix E), which could only be completed online. Participants were instructed to 
complete Part 2 within 24 hours of making a team selection decision. For participants that 
did not complete Part 2 of the questionnaire within two weeks, two e-mail reminders were 
sent at two-week intervals requesting they do so at their earliest convenience.  
 
Part 1  
Part 1 was split into three sections. The first section contained questions regarding 
the participant’s demographic information (e.g. age, gender, ethnic background) and sport 
experience (e.g. sport coached, years spent coaching, coaching qualification). The second 
section contained measures hypothesised to influence the extent to which a coach engaged 
with forms of dehumanisation. 
 
Personal Sense of Power 
As in Lammers and Stapel’s (2010) study assessing the relationship between power 
and dehumanisation, the Sense of Power Scale (Anderson et al., 2012) was used to 
measure coaches’ personal sense of power in this study. Participants were asked to what 
extent they agreed with eight different statements, having been given the stem of “In my 
relationships with the athletes I coach…” Responses were given on a 7-point scale, with 
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items including “I can get them to listen to what I say” and “I think I have a great deal of 
power.” With regard to the internal consistency of the measure, previous work reported 
Cronbach’s alpha for a relationship with a friend was 0.78 and for a relationship with a 
parent was 0.87 (Anderson et al., 2012), demonstrating an acceptable level of internal 
consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). 
 
Emotional Intelligence 
Emotional Intelligence within coaches was measured using Schutte et al.’s (1998) 
Emotional Intelligence Scale (EIS), as it was in Thelwell et al.’s (2008) study exploring the 
relationship between emotional intelligence and coaching efficacy. The EIS totals 33 items 
(where items are rated on a 5-point scale anchored by 1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly 
disagree and is made up from six factors. These factors include; appraisal of own emotions 
(five items), appraisal of others’ emotions (seven items), optimism (five items), regulation 
(four items), social skills (five items) and utilisation of emotions (seven items). Examples 
of items include “I am aware of my emotions as I experience them” (appraisal of own 
emotions) and “I have control over my emotions” (regulation). Schutte et al. (1998) 
reported two-week test-retest reliability of .78 for the scale, with a cross-check of internal 
consistency reporting a Cronbach’s alpha of .87.  
 
Resilience 
Campbell-Sills and Stein’s (2007) 10-item CD-RISC, an adapted measure of 
Connor and Davidsons’s (2003) 25-item scale, was used to measure resilience. The scale 
assesses the respondent’s ability to cope with adversity and requires them to rate items on a 
scale from 0 (not true at all) to 4 (true nearly all the time). The CD-RISC 10 highly 
correlated with scores on the original instrument (r = .92) and had a Cronbach’s alpha 
value of .85 (Campbell-Sills & Stein, 2007). Supporting evidence for the CD-RISC-10 has 
95 
 
been provided by Gucciardi et al. (2011), with a Cronbach’s alpha reported as ≥ .70, 
suggesting it is a reliable instrument to assess resilient qualities in sport.  
 
Relatedness 
Relatedness was measured using an adaptation of the relatedness items from the 
Basic Needs Satisfaction in Sport Scale (BNSSS) (Ng et al., 2011). The BNSSS has been 
used in sport settings in by Stenling and Tafvelin (2014) for work which focused on 
leadership and wellbeing in sport, but it has also been used by Jowett et al. (2016) in a 
study exploring perfectionism in youth sport. The relatedness items in the BNSSS include 
questions such as “In my sport, I feel close to other people” and “I show concern for others 
in my sport.” However, for this study, the questions were adapted such that they measured 
the coach’s relatedness specifically with their athletes. As such, the items included read “In 
my sport, I feel close to the athletes I work with”, “I show concern for the athletes I work 
with”, “The athletes I work with care about me”, “I trust the athletes I work with” and “I 
have close relationships with the athletes I work with.” Respondents rated the extent to 
which they felt the statements were true on a 7-point scale from 1 (Not true at all) to 7 
(Very true). The alpha coefficient for relatedness as a subscale of the BNSSS was 0.80, 
suggesting strong internal consistency (Ng et al., 2011).  
 
Mental Wellbeing 
The Warwick-Edinburgh Mental Wellbeing Scale (WEMWBS) (Tenant et al., 
2007) measured participants’ mental wellbeing. The WEMWBS uses 14 items, such as 
“I’ve been feeling confident”, measured on a five-point Likert type scale from 1 (none of 
the time) to 5 (all of the time). High correlations with wellbeing measures such as the 
PANAS-PA (r = .71) and the Scale of Psychological Wellbeing (r = .74) have 
demonstrated criterion validity (Tennant et al., 2007). In addition, internal consistency 
based on Cronbach’s alpha was .91 for this measure (Stewart-Brown et al., 2009) and test-
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retest reliability after one week was .83 (Tennant et al., 2007). Previous work that has 
employed the WEMWBS in a sport setting includes Appelqvist-Schmidlechner et al. 
(2018) (youth sport participation and mental health), Zhou et al. (2016) (association with 
sports-related identities and wellbeing) and Shaikh et al. (2016) (mental health among 
sports participants and non-participants).  
The third section of the questionnaire measured the extent to which coaches 
engaged in forms of dehumanisation.  
 
Mechanistic dehumanisation 
Aron and colleagues (Aron et al., 1992) utilised the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) 
measure, first employed by Pipp et al. (1985), to assess closeness between two individuals. 
This was done so by asking about the degree to which individuals feel that another person 
is a part of their conceptualisation of self. The IOS consists of seven pairs of circles 
labelled Self and Other, that overlap to various degrees, creating a 7-point interval scale. 
Moller and Deci (2009) adapted the IOS to measure mechanistic dehumanisation, with 
participants in their study selecting circles representing the degree of overlap between 
“human beings” and “machines.” For this study, the mechanistic dehumanisation of 
athletes was measured by participants selecting circles representing the degree of overlap 
between “athletes” and “machines.”   
Using Haslam’s (2006) proposed links between conceptions of humanness and 
corresponding forms of dehumanisation, a questionnaire to measure mechanistic 
dehumanisation was developed. Participants were asked about the extent to which they 
attributed Human Nature characteristics to their athletes. For example, given the prefix of 
“When thinking about the athletes I work with…” participants responded to statements 
such as “I consider the athletes as a means to an end” and “I consider the athletes to be 
replaceable.” Participants gave their answers to five statements on a seven-point Likert 
type scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so).  
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Animalistic dehumanisation 
IOS scales were adapted to measure animalistic dehumanisation, like with 
mechanistic dehumanisation. Participants selected circles representing the degree of 
overlap between “athletes” and “animals.” Participants were asked about the extent they 
attributed Human Uniqueness characteristics to their athletes in the same fashion that 
mechanistic dehumanisation was measured. Using the same scoring method as for 
mechanistic dehumanisation, participants responded to five statements like “I see the 
athletes as refined individuals” and “I feel that the athletes act morally.” 
 
Self-dehumanisation 
IOS scales were again adapted to measure self-dehumanisation, in which 
participants selected circles representing the degree of overlap between “me” and 
“animals”, and “me” and “machines.” A measure of self-humanity was also used, 
specifically the measure used by Bastian et al. (2012) which itself was adapted from 
Bastian and Haslam (2010). This measure assessed the attribution of Human Nature (4-
items; e.g., “I felt like I was open minded, like I could think clearly about things”, “I felt 
that I was emotional, like I was responsive and warm”, “I felt superficial like I had no 
depth” (reversed), “I felt like I was mechanical and cold, like a robot” (reversed)) and 
Human Uniqueness (4-items; e.g., “I felt like I was refined and cultured”, “I felt like I was 
rational and logical, like I was intelligent”, “I felt like I lacked self-restraint, like an 
animal” (reversed), “I felt like I was unsophisticated” (reversed)). Responses were made 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so). Specifically, participants were asked to answer each 
question in relation to how they feel when working with their athletes.  
With regards to scoring self-dehumanisation on the measured used by Bastian et al. 
(2012) and Bastian and Haslam (2010), Bastian et al. (2012) calculated a mean score for 
overall self-humanity, whilst Bastian and Haslam (2010) calculated two mean scores for 
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self-humanity, one for human nature and one for human uniqueness. However, in order to 
account for outliers, this study used a total self-dehumanisation score, calculated by adding 
each the scores from each of the answers (noting reversed scores), as opposed to a mean 
score. This provided one total score for self-humanity/self-dehumanisation.  
 
Part 2 
Part 2 of the questionnaire repeated all the dehumanisation measures used in the 
third section of Part 1. However, when completing the dehumanisation measures, 
participants were reminded to respond having made their selection decision. This was done 
so by inserting “Having made your selection decision…” and “Right now, having made my 
selection decision…” in bold before each question.  
 
Participants 
In total, 192 coaches completed Part 1 of the questionnaire, with 104 coaches 
completing both Part 1 and Part 2. Of the 192, 166 coaches were male, 24 were female and 
two respondents chose not to declare their gender. The average age of the participants was 
33.18 years old (SD = 10.42). Table 1 provides an overview of the experience of the 
coaches who completed Part 1 of the questionnaire.   
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Table 1: Participant overview for coaches who completed Part 1 of the questionnaire. 
Sports. N 
Level of 
competition (all 
sports). 
N 
Coaching 
Qualification 
(or 
equivalent) 
N 
Football 180 International 1 Level 5 1 
Hockey 3 National 15 Level 4 7 
Rugby Union 3 Regional 39 Level 3 29 
Basketball 1 University 11 Level 2 70 
Rowing 1 Local 126 Level 1 56 
Netball 2   
No current 
qualification 
29 
Volleyball 2     
 
  
100 
 
Data analysis 
Data analysis was carried out using SPSS (IBM SPSS for Windows, Version 22.0, 
Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.), with raw data from both paper and electronic questionnaires 
being entered into the programme. The first stage of data analysis was the data screening 
which involved analysis of the reliability of the measures, analysis of the normality of the 
data and recognition and subsequent action for any outliers.  
 
Table 2: Tests used for each specific hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 
number 
 
Focus of hypothesis Test used 
1 Change in dehumanisation following a 
selection decision. 
Paired samples t-test. 
2 Relationship between forms of 
dehumanisation. 
Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. 
 
3 Dehumanisation and personal sense of 
power. 
Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. 
 
4 Dehumanisation and relatedness. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. 
 
5 Dehumanisation and resilience. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. 
 
6 Dehumanisation and emotional intelligence. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. 
 
7 Dehumanisation and gender. Independent samples t-test. 
8 Dehumanisation and previous level of 
participation. 
Descriptive statistics. 
9 Dehumanisation and Mental Wellbeing Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient. 
 
 
Table 2 shows the specific tests used for each hypothesis in the study. A paired 
samples t-test was used to examine the change in dehumanisation following a selection 
decision, as this measures whether the mean of a single group is different when measured 
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at different times (Jones, 2014). This was required for hypothesis 1 because it assessed a 
change in the amount of dehumanisation before and after a selection decision.   
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Hypotheses 2-6 and 9 used Pearson’s correlation coefficients to measure 
correlations between dehumanisation and its predictors. A correlation provides one with 
the ability to quantify the strength of a relationship between two variables (Williams & 
Wragg, 2004). Strong correlations are often interpreted as indicating the existence of a link 
between two variables, or even an influence of one variable on the other (Williams & 
Wragg, 2004). However, there is scope for misconception within the interpretation of a 
correlation, as correlations are unable to determine causality (Jones, 2014). Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient was used specifically in this study as it analyses two variables 
collected at interval/ratio level of measurement, where the data is parametric (referring to a 
normal distribution) (Jones, 2014). Pearson’s correlation coefficient provides a value 
between -1 and +1. A value of -1 denotes a perfect relationship, while a value of +1 
signifies a perfect positive relationship, and a value of 0 indicates the complete absence of 
any relationships between the two variables. 
Hypothesis 7 required an independent samples t-test which examines the mean 
scores of different groups and their significance (Jones, 2014). This was used for 
hypothesis 7 to assess the mean scores for coaches working with concordant or discordant 
genders. Finally, descriptive statistics, specifically means, were used to analyse the 
findings in relation to Hypothesis 8. More accurately, the mean was used as a measure of 
central tendency, which is a value that describes a particular characteristic of a set of 
scores, with the mean being the average score of all observations of a variable (Jones, 
2014).  
Moreover, it is important to have a measurement of statistical 
difference/significance for the above measures. In this study the threshold for significance 
(also referred to as the p-value) was set at .05 because, as Jones (2014) and Williams and 
Wragg (2004) note, this is a generally accepted level of significance in sport-based studies.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
The results of this study are preceded by a ‘Data Screening’ section, discussing the 
reliability and normality of the measures used alongside an analysis of how the outliers 
within the study were treated. Following this, the results relating to each hypothesis are 
outlined. To aid the reader, a brief reminder of the rationale for each hypothesis is 
provided, prior the results for that specific hypothesis. 
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Part 1 - Data screening 
Reliability  
Table 3 shows the Cronbach Alpha coefficients for the measures used in the study. 
Every measure except for mechanistic dehumanisation shows a Cronbach Alpha 
coefficient above .7, indicating acceptable internal consistency (George & Mallery, 2003). 
The measure used for mechanistic dehumanisation had a Cronbach alpha coefficient of 
.599 pre-selection and a score of .493 post selection, suggesting poor internal consistency. 
One possible reason for this is that the wording of the statements used in the measure may 
be perceived as extreme when considered in a coaching context. For example, items 
included ‘I consider the athletes to be replaceable’ and ‘I consider the athletes as a means 
to an end.’ These directly contrast to ‘closeness’, which reflects the bond between coaches 
and athletes, and ‘commitment’, which reflects the intent to maintain such a bond, 
previously identified as components of effective coaching (Jowett, 2007). Considering 
athletes to be replaceable and/or as an instrument may not be deemed socially acceptable 
by some, leading to the inconsistent responses to the item set as a whole. As such, readers 
should interpret analyses involving the mechanistic dehumanisation scale with caution, it 
should also be noted that internal reliability issues are most likely to impact on Type II 
rather than Type I errors. A more detailed item-wise breakdown of variance and range for 
this scale is shown in Appendix F.  
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Table 3: Cronbach Alpha coefficients for measures. 
Measure Cronbach Alpha coefficient 
Predictors of dehumanisation 
Personal Sense of Power .702 
EIS .822 
Resilience Scale .837 
MWB Scale  .918 
Relatedness .855 
Pre-selection dehumanisation measures 
Pre IOS Scales .758 
Pre Self-dehumanisation .783 
Pre Animalistic dehumanisation .884 
Pre Mechanistic dehumanisation .599 
Post-selection dehumanisation measures 
Post IOS Scales .881 
Post self-dehumanisation .794 
Post animalistic dehumanisation .839 
Post mechanistic dehumanisation .493 
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Normality  
Table 4 shows the Skewness and Kurtosis of the measures used in the study. The 
values for asymmetry and kurtosis relative to their normal error of between -2 and +2 are 
considered acceptable for assuming normal univariate distribution (George & Mallery, 
2010). Using this as a guide, the data indicated acceptable distribution which facilitated 
progression to the next stage of data screening.  
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Table 4: Skewness and Kurtosis for measures used.  
Measure Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) 
Predictors of dehumanisation 
 
Personal Sense of Power -.174 (.175) -.089 (.349) 
EIS .284 (.176) .746 (.351) 
Resilience Scale -.345 (.176) .261 (.351) 
MWB Scale .018 (.176) -.020 (.350) 
Relatedness -.321 (.176) -.208 (.351) 
Pre-selection dehumanisation measures 
 
Pre Self-dehumanisation -.741 (.176) 1.048 (.350) 
Pre Animalistic dehumanisation .025 (.176) .182 (.350) 
Pre Mechanistic dehumanisation .214 (.178) -.696 (.354) 
Post-selection dehumanisation measures 
 
Post Self-dehumanisation -.786 (.235) .248 (.465) 
Post Animalistic dehumanisation .450 (.233) .068 (.461) 
Post Mechanistic dehumanisation .164 (.233) -.761 (.461) 
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Outliers 
Following the analysis of skewness and kurtosis, boxplots were used to identify 
outliers in the sample. Cases more than three standard deviations away from the mean were 
marked as an outlier and removed from the sample by changing the value to ‘missing.’ One 
case was deleted from the sample due to presentation as an outlier on multiple (n = 4) 
variables.   
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Part 2 - Hypotheses and results 
Research Question 1: What are the effects of selection decisions on coaches’ use of 
dehumanisation? 
 
Hypothesis 1: All three forms of dehumanisation will be significantly higher following 
a selection decision than on a non-selection day.  
Rationale 
Literature evidences that team selection decisions are stressful for coaches. Given 
this, we hypothesised that coaches would need to cope with this stress and that one way to 
do this would be to engage in forms of dehumanisation. Specifically, it was predicted that 
coaches would dehumanise the athletes they work with, either animalistically or 
mechanistically, to help justify their selection decision and to act as a form of self-
protection.  
Furthermore, it was predicted that coaches would also self-dehumanise as a 
response to feelings of guilt for not selecting an athlete, given that team selection decisions 
can be conceptualised as a form of ostracism.  
 
Findings 
Table 5: Change in dehumanisation following a selection decision. 
Change in dehumanisation from pre to post selection  
  N Mean (SD) Sig 
Animalistic DH  105 -.819 (4.81) .084 
Mechanistic DH 105 -.057 (3.43) .865 
Self DH*** 104  .894 (4.11) .029 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
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Table 5 shows a decrease in all three forms of dehumanisation following a selection 
decision, however, only the change in self-dehumanisation was significant. This therefore 
contradicts the hypothesis which predicted an increase in all three forms of dehumanisation 
following a selection decision.   
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Hypothesis 2: Following a selection decision, the more a coach engages with 
dehumanisation of the athletes, the less they will engage in self-dehumanisation. 
Rationale 
This hypothesis centres upon examining the relationship between the 
mechanistic/animalistic dehumanisation of athletes and self-dehumanisation. For the 
purposes of this study, dehumanisation has been explored as a potential coping method for 
the stressor of a team selection decision and as such, was hypothesised to increase 
following a team selection decision (Hypothesis 1). However, within this, it is 
hypothesised that coaches who engage more with the dehumanisation of the athletes 
(animalistic or mechanistic) are less likely to need to engage in self-dehumanisation. If a 
team selection decision can be conceptualised as a form of ostracism, which is known to be 
painful for the source (e.g. Williams, 2001; Zadro, 2004; Zadro, Godwin & Gonsalkorale, 
2013), coaches who engages less with dehumanisation of the athletes are hypothesised to 
self-dehumanise more to cope with the pain of this transgression.    
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Findings 
Table 6: Relationships between self and other dehumanisation following a selection 
decision. 
 Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
 
Animalistic DH 
(n) 
Mechanistic DH 
(n) 
Animalistic DH - - 
Mechanistic DH 
-.211* 
(104) 
- 
Self DH*** 
-.278** 
(102) 
-.221* 
(102) 
*p values ≤ 0.05. 
**p values ≤ 0.01. 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
 
Table 6 shows a small, negative and statistically significant relationship (r = -.278, 
p = ≤ 0.01) between a change in animalistic dehumanisation and a change in self-
dehumanisation. Given that higher self-dehumanisation scores indicate less self-
dehumanisation, this suggests that following a team selection decision, as animalistic 
dehumanisation of the athletes increases, so does self-dehumanisation. This contradicts the 
hypothesis. 
Similarly, table 6 shows a small, negative and statistically significant relationship (r 
= -.221, p = ≤ 0.05) between a change in mechanistic dehumanisation and a change in self-
dehumanisation. This suggests that following a team selection decision, as mechanistic 
dehumanisation of athletes increases, so does self-dehumanisation, again contradicting the 
hypothesis. 
Finally, table 6 highlights a small, negative and statistically signification 
relationship (r = -.211, p = ≤ 0.05) between a change in mechanistic dehumanisation and a 
change in animalistic dehumanisation. This suggests that following a selection decision, as 
animalistic dehumanisation of athletes increases, mechanistic dehumanisation decreases 
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and vice versa. Taken together, these findings imply that following a team selecting 
decision, coaches can either mechanistically or animalistically dehumanise an athlete 
whilst also self-dehumanising, but coaches do not simultaneously mechanistically and 
animalistically dehumanise athletes. 
 
Types of dehumanisation results used 
Pre-selection dehumanisation measures were used to test the remaining hypotheses 
not specific to a change in dehumanisation. For hypotheses specific to a change in 
dehumanisation, both post-selection dehumanisation and change in dehumanisation are 
shown. There are two reasons for this. First, pre selection dehumanisation has a larger 
sample size than post selection dehumanisation (n = 177-187 compared to n = 101-104) 
facilitating greater statistical strength for analyses. Second, the change from pre to post 
selection dehumanisation was nonsignificant, suggesting dehumanisation may be 
influenced by individual traits more strongly as opposed to the specific context. Therefore, 
it is appropriate to use the pre-selection data.  
With regards to the terminology used, from here onwards, pre selection 
dehumanisation is termed ‘overall dehumanisation’ whilst the change in dehumanisation 
will continue to be termed ‘change in dehumanisation.’  
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Research Question 2: What factors predict coaches’ use of dehumanisation?  
 
Personal factors predicting coaches’ use of dehumanisation.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Coaches’ personal sense of power will positively predict overall level 
of, and increases in following a team selection decision, athlete dehumanisation.  
Rationale 
Lammers and Stapel (2011) identified that dehumanisation can act as a form of 
justification when making tough decision, but that the use of this varied depending on the 
position of the decision maker. Specifically, when making tough decisions, high power 
participants were more inclined to adopt a dehumanised view of the target. As such, in this 
study it was hypothesised that personal sense of power (PSP) would be positively related to 
increases in athlete dehumanisation following a selection decision. This would be because 
power is intricately linked with feeling different to and above others, and may also be 
linked to greater perceived ‘ownership’ over athletes.  
 
Findings 
Table 7 demonstrates that there is a small, negative and significant correlation 
between PSP and overall animalistic dehumanisation (r = -.144, p = ≤ 0.05). This indicates 
that as PSP increases, animalistic dehumanisation decreases. There is a small, negative and 
significant correlation between PSP and overall mechanistic dehumanisation (r = -.182, p = 
≤ 0.05). This suggests as PSP increases, mechanistic dehumanisation decreases. Table 7 
also highlights a small, positive and significant correlation between PSP and overall self-
dehumanisation (r = .426, p = ≤ 0.01). This suggests that as PSP increases, self-
dehumanisation decreases. 
There is a small, positive and significant correlation between PSP and change in 
animalistic dehumanisation (r = .292, p = ≤ 0.05) as highlighted in table 7. This indicates 
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that as PSP increases, so does the likelihood of coaches increasing their animalistic 
dehumanisation of athletes following a selection decision. PSP was non-significantly 
related to changes in both mechanistic dehumanisation (r = -.061) and self-dehumanisation 
(r = .051).  
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Hypothesis 4: As coaches’ relatedness increases, there will be an increase in self-
dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. 
Rationale 
Moller, Deci and Elliott (2010) defined relatedness as “a psychological necessity 
that involves having positive interpersonal interactions and trusting relationships” (p. 754). 
This study hypothesised that as coaches relatedness, characterised by positive interpersonal 
interactions and trusting relationships, increased, there would be an increase in self-
dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation. The 
increase in self-dehumanisation was predicted to occur as coaches would perceive the act 
of ostracising another to be more of a transgression. Moreover, the decrease in animalistic 
and mechanistic dehumanisation was predicted to arise from individuals being less likely 
to dehumanise those with whom they are close to (Leyens et al., 2003), which can be 
characterised by higher relatedness.  
 
Findings 
There is a medium, positive and significant correlation between a coach’s sense of 
relatedness and self-dehumanisation (r = .423, p = ≤ 0.01). This suggests that the greater a 
coach’s relatedness is, the less they self-dehumanise. There is a medium, negative and 
significant correlation between relatedness and animalistic dehumanisation (r = -.419, p = 
≤ 0.01). This suggests that the greater a coach’s sense of relatedness is with the athletes, 
the less they animalistically dehumanise the athletes. There is a small, negative and 
significant correlation between relatedness and mechanistic dehumanisation (r = -.254, p = 
≤ 0.01). This suggests that the greater a coach’s sense of relatedness is, the less 
mechanistically dehumanise the athletes. Taken together, these findings support hypothesis 
4 in relation to animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation, but lead to the rejection of 
hypothesis 4 in relation to self-dehumanisation.  
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Hypothesis 5: Coaches’ resilience will negatively predict both overall use, and 
increases when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation.  
Rationale 
Resilience has previously been defined as the role of mental processes and 
behaviour in promoting personal assets and protecting an individual from the potential 
negative effect of stressors (Fletcher & Sarkar, 2013). However, the current study adapted 
this definition and conceptualised resilience as the effective application of personality 
traits that promote personal assets and protect an individual from the potential negative 
effect of stressors. Given there is a considerable amount of literature suggests that team 
selection decisions are a stressor for coaches (e.g. Didymus, 2017; Thelwell et al., 2008; 
Olusoga et al., 2009; Coutrier, 2009 & Lundkvist et al., 2012), that resilience’s definition is 
linked to one’s ability to cope with stressors and here I conceptualise dehumanisation as a 
coping method, it was hypothesised that resilience may predict the extent to which coaches 
engage with dehumanisation overall and when making a selection decision.  
Specifically, it was predicted that as coaches’ resilience increased, overall use of 
dehumanisation would decrease and the likelihood of an increase in change in 
dehumanisation would decrease, with respect to all three forms of dehumanisation. This is 
because coaches high in resilience would be able to effectively employ protective factors 
to deal with the stressors involved in a team selection decision, thus there being no need 
for them to engage in dehumanisation, explaining why it is predicted that there will be 
little, if any, change. 
 
Findings 
In respect of the relationship between resilience and overall dehumanisation, table 7 
shows a small, negative and significant relationship between resilience and animalistic 
dehumanisation (r = -.171, p = ≤ 0.05). This indicates that as coaches’ resilience increases, 
animalistic dehumanisation decreases. Moreover, table 7 shows a small, negative and 
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significant relationship between resilience and mechanistic dehumanisation (r = -.305, p = 
≤ 0.01) which suggests that as coaches’ resilience increases, mechanistic dehumanisation 
decreases. Finally, table 7 shows a small, positive and significant relationship between 
resilience and self-dehumanisation (r = .330, p = ≤ 0.01). This implies that as coaches’ 
resilience increases, self-dehumanisation decreases.  
With regard to a change in dehumanisation following a selection decision, table 8 
shows a small, positive but non-significant correlation between resilience and animalistic 
dehumanisation (r = .068). In addition, table 8 indicates resilience was unrelated to both 
mechanistic dehumanisation (r = -.171) and self-dehumanisation (r = -0.22).  
Taken together, the findings on a change in dehumanisation support our hypothesis 
of little or no change in dehumanisation following a selection decision. In addition, it can 
be suggested that resilience decreases coaches’ dehumanisation. 
  
119 
 
Hypothesis 6: Emotional intelligence will be negatively related to all there forms of 
dehumanisation. 
Rationale 
Emotional intelligence is defined as “the ability to monitor one’s own and others’ 
feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide 
one’s thinking and actions” (Salovey & Mayer, 1989, p. 189). Chan and Mallet (2011) 
contend that emotional intelligence is an important skill within coaching that can facilitate 
improved interpersonal relationships, leading to enhanced interpersonal function and 
performance outcomes. Thus, this study hypothesised that the more emotional intelligence 
a coach has, the less likely they are to engage in all forms of dehumanisation; animalistic, 
mechanistic and self. First, they are less likely to dehumanise the athletes they work with 
because they would be aware of the emotional detachment this would cause between them 
and the athlete, and the negative outcomes this may have on relationships and 
performance. Second, coaches high in emotional intelligence are hypothesised not to 
engage in self-dehumanisation due to the characteristics of emotional intelligence being the 
ability to guide one’s own thinking and emotions, and thus, an emotionally intelligent 
coach would not engage in self-dehumanisation as it is associated with negative thoughts 
and feelings (e.g. guilt and sadness). 
 
Findings 
Table 7 shows the results for the relationship between overall dehumanisation and 
emotional intelligence. First, there is a small, negative and significant correlation between 
emotional intelligence and animalistic dehumanisation (r = -.353, p = ≤ 0.01). This 
suggests that as emotional intelligence increases, animalistic dehumanisation decreases. 
Second, there is a small, negative and significant correlation between emotional 
intelligence and mechanistic dehumanisation (r = -.190, p = ≤ 0.05). This suggests that as 
emotional intelligence increases, mechanistic dehumanisation decreases. Third, there is a 
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medium, positive and significant correlation between emotional intelligence and self-
dehumanisation (r = .466, p = ≤ 0.01). This suggests that as emotional intelligence 
increases, self-dehumanisation decreases. Collectively, these findings support the 
hypothesis.  
 
Table 7: Relationship between overall dehumanisation and four predictors: personal sense 
of power, relatedness, resilience and emotional intelligence. 
OVERALL DEHUMANISATION 
 
Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
 Personal Sense 
of Power 
(n) 
Relatedness 
(n) 
Resilience 
(n) 
Emotional 
Intelligence 
(n) 
Animalistic DH 
-.144* 
(187) 
-.419** 
(185) 
-.171* 
(183) 
-.353** 
(181) 
Mechanistic DH 
-.182* 
(184) 
-.254** 
(182) 
-.305** 
(180) 
-.190* 
(177) 
Self DH*** 
.426** 
(184) 
.423** 
(181) 
.330** 
(182) 
.466** 
(178) 
*p values ≤ 0.05. 
**p values ≤ 0.01. 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
  
121 
 
Table 8: Relationship between change in dehumanisation following a selection decision, 
personal sense of power and resilience.  
CHANGE IN DEHUMANISATION FOLLOWING SELECTION 
 Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
 
Personal Sense of Power 
(n) 
Resilience 
(n) 
Animalistic DH 
.292* 
(104) 
.068 
(102) 
Mechanistic DH 
-.061 
(104) 
-.171 
(102) 
Self DH*** 
.051 
(103) 
-.022 
(102) 
*p values ≤ 0.05. 
**p values ≤ 0.01. 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
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Situational factors predicting coaches’ use of dehumanisation.  
Hypothesis 7: Coaches who are a concordant gender with the athletes they work with 
will be likely to animalistically and mechanistically dehumanise more than coaches 
who are discordant with the gender of the athletes they work with. Coaches of a 
discordant gender self-dehumanise more than those of a concordant gender for their 
athletes.  
Rationale 
The reasoning for this hypothesis is grounded in the social and cultural norms about 
how one should treat the opposite gender, and whether or not coaches are compliant with 
this when engaging with dehumanisation in the context of a team selection decision. Such 
social and cultural norms dictate that individuals should be ‘softer’ around the opposite 
gender, specifically from males to females. In the context of team selection decisions, this 
study predicted that this may manifest itself with a lower form of dehumanisation. More 
accurately, it was hypothesised that male coaches working with female athletes will 
dehumanise the athletes less than male coaches working with male athletes.  
 
Findings 
Table 9: The relationship between coach and athlete gender and the extent to which they 
engage with overall dehumanisation. 
 Animalistic DH Mechanistic DH Self DH*** 
Coach 
Gender/Athlete 
Gender**** 
N 
Mean 
(SD) 
N 
Mean 
(SD) 
N 
Mean 
(SD) 
Male/Male 118 
18.81  
(4.85) 
118 
12.53 
(4.35) 
117 
45.31 
(5.54) 
Male/Female 25 
18.1  
(6.12) 
24 
14.17 
(2.83) 
24 
43.75 
(5.02) 
Male/Mixed 19 
18.37  
(5.19) 
19 
12.31 
(4.36) 
19 
46.11 
(3.46) 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
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****Only male coaches presented due to small sample size of female coaches not working 
with female athletes (n = ≤ 3). 
 
Table 9 shows the mean dehumanisation scores for male coaches working with 
male athletes, male coaches working with female athletes and male coaches working with a 
mixed group of athletes. An ANOVA demonstrated no significant differences between the 
three groups in Table 9 (see Appendix G; p ranged from .192 to .787).  
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Hypothesis 8: The higher level of sport the coach has coach has participated in as an 
athlete, the more likely they are to dehumanise the athletes they work with and the less 
likely they will be to self-dehumanise. 
Rationale 
Sociological literature on sport suggests that athletes are considered to be parts of a 
machine that contribute to an output (e.g. Ingham, 2004; Brohm, 1978; Connor, 2009; 
Rigauer, 2000; Giulianotti, 2005). As such, this hypothesis contends the identity-stripping 
and robotic-like nature of elite sport may be internalised by coaches who have competed at 
this level themselves and therefore be reflected in the extent to which they engage in 
dehumanisation. Explicitly, it is hypothesised that this will be demonstrated by coaches 
who have competed at a higher level of sport mechanistically dehumanising the athletes 
more than coaches who have competed at a lower level of sport. In addition, this 
internalisation may be demonstrated by coaches who have participated at a high level self-
dehumanising less than coaches who have participated at a lower level. 
 
Findings 
The exploratory and descriptive analyses displayed in Table 10 suggest no clear 
relationship between the coach’s previous highest level of participation and the extent to 
which they engage with dehumanisation of the athletes, both mechanistically and 
animalistically. Despite this, for animalistic dehumanisation, coaches who had participated 
at an international level dehumanised the athletes least when compared with other coaches 
who had not participated at such a high level. This is contradicted by the findings for 
mechanistic dehumanisation, in which the coaches who had participated at university level 
dehumanised the least. Together, the data lead us to reject the proposed hypothesis.  
With regards to self-dehumanisation, there is a clearer pattern in respect to the 
coach’s highest previous participation level and the tendency to self-dehumanise. Apart 
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from university level coaches, the higher the level of sport the coach has participated in, 
the less they engage in self-dehumanisation, which supports the hypothesis. 
 
Table 10: Overall dehumanisation across different levels of coach participation. 
 
Animalistic DH Mechanistic DH Self DH*** 
 
N 
Mean  
(SD) 
N 
Mean  
(SD) 
N 
Mean 
(SD) 
International 10 
16.8  
(4.52) 
10 
11.3  
(2.63) 
9 
46.56 
(1.56) 
National 17 
18.35 
(5.68) 
17 
12.94 
(3.07) 
16 
45.75 
(3.84) 
Regional 59 
18.81 
(5.26) 
58 
13.4  
(4.23) 
58 
45.21 
(5.17) 
University 17 
17.71 
(5.92) 
17 
10.65 
(3.72) 
82 
47.24 
(5.12) 
Local 80 
18.23 
(4.93) 
78 
13  
(4.4) 
17 
44.4  
(5.86) 
Have never 
played the sport 
4 
18.25 
(5.19) 
4 
11.5 
(6.35) 
2 
41 
(8.49) 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
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Research Question 3: Is there a relationship between the extent to which coaches engage 
with dehumanisation and their mental wellbeing? 
 
Hypothesis 9: For both overall and change in dehumanisation, mechanistic and or 
animalistic dehumanisation will positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self -
dehumanisation will negatively predict lower mental wellbeing.   
Rationale 
Within this study, the premise behind a coach engaging with dehumanisation was 
that it may potentially have adaptive elements for the coach. Specifically, it was 
hypothesised that dehumanising athletes may protect the coach from the stress of a team 
selection decision. One of the ways in which this stress may manifest itself within the 
coach could potentially be a lower mental wellbeing. Therefore, if dehumanisation was to 
have adaptive elements, one of the ways to demonstrate this would be that coaches who 
dehumanise the athletes more have a greater mental wellbeing than coaches who 
dehumanise the athletes less, as indicated in the hypothesis. 
However, it was also predicted that coaches who self-dehumanise more will have a 
lower mental wellbeing. This is because self-dehumanisation is associated with negative 
emotions, such as that of sadness and guilt. Therefore, a greater prevalence of these 
emotions may lead to a lower mental wellbeing. 
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Findings 
Table 11 indicates that animalistic dehumanisation has a small, negative and 
significant correlation with mental wellbeing (r = -.169). This suggests that as animalistic 
dehumanisation decreases, mental wellbeing increases. Moreover, as shown in table 11, 
mechanistic dehumanisation has a small, negative and significant correlation with mental 
wellbeing (r = -.170). This suggests that as mechanistic dehumanisation decreases, mental 
wellbeing increases. Finally, within table 11, self-dehumanisation is shown to have a small, 
positive and significant correlation with mental wellbeing (r = .316). This suggests that as 
self-dehumanisation decreases, mental wellbeing increases. Taken tougher, all the findings 
stated in this section are contrary to hypothesis 9. Potential reasons for this will be 
explored in the discussion section.   
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Table 11: Correlations between mental wellbeing, individual difference predictors and 
overall dehumanisation.  
Correlations with Mental Wellbeing 
 
n Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
Dehumanisation predictors 
Personal Sense of Power 182 .148* 
Relatedness 179 .257** 
Resilience 178 .468** 
Emotional Intelligence 178 .446** 
Overall Dehumanisation 
Animalistic DH 181 -.169* 
Mechanistic DH 178 -.170* 
Self DH*** 180 .316** 
*p values ≤ 0.05. 
**p values ≤ 0.01. 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
The overall aim of this study was to examine the extent of, and factors affecting, 
coaches’ use of dehumanisation when making team selection decisions. This section will 
outline the key findings and contributions of the study, in light of these aims. To start, 
three key findings will be discussed with acknowledgement of relevant literature. These 
relate to: (i) coaches’ use of dehumanisation generally and following a selection decision, 
(ii) predictors of dehumanisation, and (iii) dehumanisation’s relationship with wellbeing. 
Following this, the theoretical and methodological contributions made by this study will be 
discussed along with strengths, limitations and recommended directions for future 
research. To close, in the tradition of reflective learning (Rogers, 2001; Ryan, 2011) there 
is a brief autobiographical reflection on the process and experiences of completing this 
thesis  
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Part 1 - Key findings: Summary 
Overall, findings demonstrated that other-dehumanisation (animalistic and mechanistic) 
did not change following a team selection decision, whereas self-dehumanisation 
decreased. Dehumanisation was negatively associated with wellbeing. Together, these 
findings lead us to reject our conceptualisation of dehumanisation as a potentially adaptive 
response to a team selection stressor. In addition, personal sense of power, resilience, 
relatedness and emotional intelligence all negatively predicted use of dehumanisation, 
suggesting individual differences in coaches are more strongly related to dehumanisation 
use than context. 
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Part 2 - Key findings: Coaches’ use of dehumanisation 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that following a team selection decision, coaches would 
significantly increase animalistic, mechanistic and self-dehumanisation relative to a non-
selection day. This was based upon the theorising that dehumanisation may have adaptive 
qualities for the coach, potentially protecting them from the stress surrounding team 
selection decisions. However, the results from Hypothesis 1 demonstrated that following a 
team selection decision there was no significant change in animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanisation (here termed ‘other-dehumanisation’) whilst self-dehumanisation 
decreased, thus rejecting the hypothesis. This would indicate that the context of a team 
selection decision does not influence coaches’ dehumanisation of athletes, instead 
implying that coaches’ tendency to dehumanise may be influenced by individual traits as 
opposed to contextual factors.  
With regard to the findings of reduced self-dehumanisation, one proposed 
explanation for this is that the situation may arouse empathy and subsequently a coach’s 
consideration of their own humanness. Empathy can be defined as an other-oriented 
emotional response elicited by, and congruent with, the perceived welfare of a person in 
need (Eklund et al., 2009). According to Riess (2017), empathy plays a critical 
interpersonal and societal role in the enabling of experiences, needs and desires between 
individuals. An individual’s capacity to demonstrate empathy enables them to perceive the 
emotions of others, resonate with them emotionally and cognitively, to adopt the 
perspective of others and to distinguish between emotions (Riess, 2017). The relevance of 
the empathiser’s previous similar experiences when it comes to displaying empathy has 
been widely acknowledged in psychological literature (e.g. Batson et al., 1996; Houston, 
1990; Ickes, 1997 and Stotland, 1969). For example in this study, the coach’s own previous 
experiences of selection decisions, in sport or more broadly, may influence their display of 
empathy.  
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Moreover, Hume (1957), as cited in Eklund et al. (2009), argued that because 
people have similar constitutions and experiences, they are able to vicariously experience 
the same feelings as another person when they imagine being in the person’s situation. 
Coaches would have been involved in some way in a form of selection decision in their 
lives to varying degrees. For example, as Eklund et al. (2009) observe, the coach may have 
had precisely the same experience as the athlete, at the same level they are coaching and in 
the same sport. So linking it to this study, this may be a national level football coach who 
has played national level football. Or alternatively, the experience may be more abstract, in 
that the coach has experienced an invitation (or lack of) to a social event, in which they 
were (or weren’t) selected to attend. Thus, they would have an experience of (de)selection 
at a higher level of generality. For example, in this study this may be a coach who never 
played the sport but has yet experienced selection in their workplace or social settings. 
Moreover, empathy can be aligned with emotional responsiveness and interpersonal 
warmth, two characteristics of human nature as a sense of humanness (Haslam, 2006) and 
included in the measure of self-dehumanisation we used. Taken together, given how 
previous experiences are an important situational antecedent for feeling empathy, if a 
coach has experienced something close to what the athletes they work with are going 
through, they are likely to feel more human themselves, as a result of this sense of empathy 
and its similarities to human nature as a sense of humanness. This would then explain the 
finding of decreased self-dehumanisation following a team selection decision.  
Despite findings related to other-dehumanisation not being significant, a pattern 
was observed in which use of all three forms of dehumanisation decreased following a 
team selection decision. This implies there may be some form of a self and other 
‘humanising’ effect associated with making a team selection decision. If this pattern could 
be replicated, one potential explanation is that, for the coach, a selection decision triggers 
greater consideration of the athlete as an individual, and therefore also their humanness, 
when a selection has to be made. This could involve, for example, consideration of 
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players’ athletic identity, the quality of the coach-athlete relationship, and concern for 
athletes’ reactions.    
Athletic identity is the degree to which an individual identifies with the athlete role 
- a person with a strong athletic identity is more likely to interpret a given event in terms of 
its implications for their athletic function than a person who weakly identifies with the role 
(Brewer et al., 1993). Within the context of a team selection decision, a coach may 
consider the strength of each individual athlete’s athletic identity, as this may be perceived 
as contributing to who they are as a person. In turn, the consideration of how the athlete 
may react to a team selection decision (e.g. the implications for those with high athletic 
identity compared to low athletic identity), is evidence of thinking about the athlete on 
more human terms, thus leading to reduced athlete dehumanisation.  
This consideration of who an athlete is as a person can be linked to the coach-
athlete relationship, which is defined as the situation in which coaches and athletes’ 
feelings, thoughts and behaviours are causally interconnected (Jowett, 2007). Closeness 
contributes to the coach-athlete relationship (Jowett & Shanmugam, 2016) and reflects the 
affective bond developed between coaches and athletes. As such, when making a team 
selection decision, it is possible that a coach considers the relationship they have with the 
athletes as individuals, further contributing to humanising the athletes. In addition, if said 
relationship is strong, closeness is likely to be higher and therefore, the coach will consider 
the athlete to be more human than on a non-selection day, as a result of this consideration. 
This can be linked to dehumanisation literature on ingroups and outgroups which 
states that individuals seen as ‘ingroup’ members are dehumanised less than those seen as 
‘outgroup’ members (Leyens et al., 2003). It can then be argued that if an athlete has a 
close relationship with the coach, they are more likely to be defined upon ingroup terms, as 
Leyens et al. (2003) found that individuals attribute more uniquely human emotions to 
their ingroup than outgroup, thus leading to less dehumanisation. In essence, this suggests 
that the quality of the coach-athlete relationship may moderate the extent to which the 
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coach engages with dehumanisation of the athletes. Thus, one reason as to why no effect of 
selection upon dehumanisation was observed is because, based on this theory, it would 
depend upon the athlete as an individual and this study measured athlete dehumanisation as 
a whole group, and not individually. 
Building on this, Blakelock et al.’s (2016) research highlighted how deselected elite 
adolescent soccer players experienced symptoms of anxiety, depression, loss of confidence 
and social dysfunction in the first month of deselection. Blakelock et al. (2016) explored 
deselection from an elite programme and not just one match day; yet, the findings are still 
relevant to the current study because it may be argued that the psychological distress still 
occurs after deselection for one game, although the effects may be short-lived and not as 
strong. If a coach is aware or fears the risk of causing psychological distress to the athletes, 
individually or as a group, regardless of the extent to which it occurs, it can be argued that 
they are likely to show more care for the athletes, which may manifest itself in seeing them 
as ‘more human.’ 
 
Summary 
Collectively, the findings suggest that coaches’ use of other-dehumanisation is not 
altered by selection context, however, self-dehumanisation negligibly decreased following 
a selection decision perhaps indicating deeper awareness of one’s own ‘humanness’ at that 
point. One mechanism to explain this may be empathy, in that previous selection-related 
experiences influence the coach’s experience of, and awareness of, their own emotions at 
that time. 
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Part 3 - Key findings: Predictors of dehumanisation 
Personal sense of power 
The results from this study suggest that as coaches’ personal sense of power 
increases, all three forms of dehumanisation decrease. In addition, personal sense of power 
positively predicted increases in animalistic dehumanisation from a normal to a selection 
day. One of the possible reasons for the finding that as coaches’ personal sense of power 
increases, all three forms of dehumanisation decrease, is that power has been shown to 
increase social distance (Lammers et al., 2012). By virtue of being distant, powerful 
individuals can be perceived as not being close to others. If this can be extrapolated to the 
extent that low power individuals are closer to others, when they need to separate 
themselves from others, they may dehumanise in order to do this. However, given that high 
power individuals are more socially distant, dehumanisation is not needed to facilitate this 
separation. This contention can partially be supported by Waytz and Epley’s (2012) work 
which found that social connection enables dehumanisation, although this was specifically 
when considering distant others in the presence of a close other. 
This does pose the question of why a coach would need to separate themselves 
from others, and thus how social distance may be relevant here. This can be answered by 
referencing the way in which the data was gathered, in that by asking coaches to consider 
their own sense of humanness and the humanness of the athletes, they are seen being 
considered as separate entities.   
Interestingly however, the present study also found that the influence of personal 
sense of power on dehumanisation may be influenced by the context in which coaches are 
having to consider the athletes. Specifically, the findings from this study suggest that as 
coaches’ personal sense of power increased, they would be more likely to increase their 
animalistic dehumanisation on a selection day but the probability of engaging in 
dehumanisation on a normal day decreased. This implies that the greater a coach’s personal 
sense power is, the more selective they are as to when this power influences the extent to 
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which they dehumanise others. This can be explained by one of the processes in which 
power affects behaviour, in that power leads people to adopt a greater focus on the self and 
their own needs and goals (Fiske, 1993; Overbeck et al., 2006). The coach’s own needs 
and goals here may be a form of self-protection from the stress of the selection decision.  
Thus, the positive relationship between coaches’ power and the likelihood of an 
increase in animalistic dehumanisation on a selection day may arise from coaches’ desire 
to protect themselves from the potential stress of a selection decision incurred. This would 
then imply that dehumanisation may have a protective function for the coach. This 
supports the work of Fiske (1993), Overbeck et al. (2006) and Rucker et al. (2011) which 
implies that high power individuals focus on their own needs and goals, and perceive 
themselves as having greater value to society than others. If this is the case then, 
interestingly, coaches with a higher personal sense of power are only more likely to engage 
with dehumanisation on a selection day where they stand to benefit (i.e. from theorised 
protection against stress) and not on a normal day, where there is no obvious benefit.   
With respect to the form of dehumanisation likely to increase on a selection day, 
animalistic dehumanisation was the only form more likely to do so. This partly contradicts 
the hypothesis because it was predicted that mechanistic dehumanisation would be more 
likely to increase, given that power can lead to objectification (Gruenfeld et al., 2008) and 
that objectification is closely aligned with mechanistic dehumanisation. However, these 
findings related to the form of dehumanisation taking place support Gwinn et al.’s (2013) 
work in which powerful perceivers animalistically dehumanised low-power targets in two 
experiments. The authors attributed this to mechanistic dehumanisation usually involving a 
denial of the target’s emotionality and given the context of the study (making job offers), 
the high-power individuals still had good reason to consider the low-power individual’s 
emotional state (participants had to make more than one job offer) (Gwinn et al., 2013).  
This can be applied to the coaching context as coaches must also consider the 
athlete’s emotional state, as emotions and emotional control can impact sport performance 
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(Valllerand & Blanchard, 2000; Botterill & Brown, 2002; Vast et al., 2010; Wagstaff, 2014 
and Campo et al., 2016). Given how the selection decisions were only for one game, it is 
possible that a coach may select the athlete for the next game and thus, would require the 
athlete to perform at their highest level for the next game. If a coach is cognisant of this, 
then denying athlete’s humanness in an emotional sense may impact the coach’s own goals 
with regard to the performance of the team. Thus if a coach is to dehumanise, animalistic 
dehumanisation is appropriate as it, in theory, goes some way to protect against possible 
negative performance impacts. This can also be linked back to literature suggesting high-
power individuals adopt a self-focus and prioritise their own needs (Fiske, 1993; Overbeck 
et al., 2006 and Rucker et al., 2011), as a coach may be viewed as considering how their 
treatment of the athletes will impact the athletes performance, and how this, in turn, may 
influence their success as a coach.   
 
Relatedness  
Hypothesis 4 suggested that as relatedness within coaches increased, there would be an 
increase in overall self-dehumanisation and a decrease in animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanisation. However, the findings of the study only partially supported this 
hypothesis in that higher relatedness was linked to a decrease in self-, animalistic and 
mechanistic dehumanisation. Thus, the hypothesis was supported with regard to animalistic 
and mechanistic dehumanisation but rejected in regard to self-dehumanisation.  
The implication of this is that if a coach has close relationships with their athletes, 
there may be a corresponding self-humanising effect. As noted, this rejects the hypothesis, 
but is also conflicting with Bastian et al.’s (2012) work which found self-dehumanisation 
occurs as a result of one’s mistreatment of others, the work on which hypothesis 4 was 
based. However, given that a key component of self-dehumanisation is the inability to 
justify one’s actions (Bastian et al., 2013), it is possible that the coaches did not self-
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dehumanise as a result of this. If coaches were able to justify their treatment of the athletes, 
on a selection day or on a normal day, they would be less likely to self-dehumanise.  
These findings also reinforce importance of relatedness as a fundamental human 
need (e.g. Ryan & Deci, 2000; Legate et al., 2013; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Reis et al., 
2018). For example, work by Baumeister and Leary (1995) suggested that self-
dehumanisation emerges among people who have been denied fundamental human needs, 
such as a connection with others, a defining characteristic of relatedness. Therefore, for 
coaches higher in relatedness, they haven’t been denied the need of a social connection, 
and thus have no requirement to self-dehumanise.  
 
Resilience  
Hypothesis 5 stated that coaches’ resilience would negatively predict both overall 
use, and increases when making a team selection, of all forms of dehumanisation. As 
noted, the changes in level of dehumanisation from a normal day to a selection day were 
negligible, however, the findings from the study broadly supported hypothesis 5, in that 
coaches high in resilience were less likely to engage in all three forms of overall 
dehumanisation.  
The theory behind this hypothesis regarding a change in dehumanisation on a 
selection day was centred on how resilient individuals were likely to possess qualities (e.g. 
adaptability, staying focused under pressure and an ability to handle unpleasant feelings; 
Gucciardi et al., 2011) that would buffer the negative impacts of stress, like that caused by 
a team selection decision. However, it is possible that resilience influences overall use of 
dehumanisation through the same mechanism.  
An additional explanation for this is linked to the observed negative relationship 
between dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. This implies that the act of dehumanisation 
may have maladaptive outcomes given lower mental wellbeing is associated with boredom, 
fatigue, dejection, dissatisfaction and sadness (Warr, 1990). Resilience may support 
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wellbeing (positive relationship in this study), reducing the need for protective engagement 
in dehumanisation.  
 
Emotional Intelligence 
Hypothesis 6 stated that emotional intelligence would be negatively related to all 
three forms of dehumanisation. This was based upon research that indicated emotional 
intelligence may be protective against the negative impacts of stress (e.g. Slaski & 
Cartwright, 2003; Bar-On, 1997), and that the act of a team selection decision would be 
stressful for a coach. The results from the study supported this hypothesis (three negative 
correlations between emotional intelligence and forms of dehumanisation (see Table 8) 
when reversals are accounted for), however, given the results surrounding a change in 
dehumanisation following a selection decision indicated negligible change, different 
explanations are plausible.  
In wider research on dehumanisation, those that have been dehumanised have 
reported feelings of shame, loss of status, numbness, confusion, anger and sadness (Haslam 
et al., 2013). This indicates that the experience of being dehumanised is a negative one. 
Considering that a characteristic of emotional intelligence is the ability to identify and 
understand others’ emotions (Mayer & Salovey, 1990), if dehumanisation is a negative 
emotional experience for another individual, emotionally intelligent coaches may be more 
likely to recognise its potential harmful effects and therefore less likely to use it. They 
might also be more cognisant of others’ emotions generally, making it more difficult to 
dehumanise individuals. This would explain why, as coaches’ emotional intelligence 
increased, dehumanisation decreased. 
Additionally, and similarly to resilience, these results may also be explained in light 
of the findings on mental wellbeing. Within this study, emotional intelligence had a 
significant positive relationship with mental wellbeing – as coaches’ emotional intelligence 
increased, so did mental wellbeing. Furthermore, increased overall dehumanisation (all 
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three forms) was negatively related to mental wellbeing. As a result, it can be argued that 
coaches with a higher emotional intelligence may, consciously or subconsciously, have a 
greater awareness of this relationship given that a key characteristic of emotional 
intelligence is the ability to identify, understand and regulate one’s own emotions (Mayer 
& Salovey, 1990). Therefore, they are less likely to engage in dehumanisation due to its 
negative outcomes for their own mental wellbeing, explaining the negative relationship 
between emotional intelligence and dehumanisation found in this study.  
Overall, emotional intelligence can be considered as another significant negative 
predictor of dehumanisation.   
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Part 4 - Key findings: Dehumanisation and mental wellbeing 
Hypothesis 9 stated that mechanistic and or animalistic dehumanisation would 
positively predict mental wellbeing, whereas self-dehumanisation would negatively predict 
mental wellbeing. The rationale was that dehumanising athletes may be adaptive in its 
function, protecting the coach from the stress of a team selection decision, with this 
protection against stress being demonstrated by better state wellbeing. However, the 
findings from this study found that all three forms of dehumanisation negatively predicted 
mental wellbeing. 
To start, the “adaptive” element of Bastian et al.’s (2013) definition of self-
dehumanisation can be rejected by this study on the basis that if self-dehumanisation 
negatively predicts mental wellbeing, it may not be adaptive. This is because a lower 
mental wellbeing can be considered undesirable given the aforementioned negative 
associations with boredom, fatigue, dejection, dissatisfaction and sadness (Warr, 1990). 
Thus, this indicates a requirement for an adapted definition of self-dehumanisation as this 
study suggests that self-dehumanisation is not universally adaptive in its function. 
With respect to the relationship between mental wellbeing and dehumanisation, 
causality was not tested within the study, therefore the direction of this relationship is 
currently unknown. Yet, it is predicted that the relationship between all three forms of 
dehumanisation and mental wellbeing is bi-directional, in that coaches with a lower mental 
wellbeing have an increased tendency to dehumanise, and that coaches who engage with 
dehumanisation are likely to have a lower mental wellbeing. So, in the knowledge that the 
results from this study indicated that as all three forms of dehumanisation increased, 
mental wellbeing decreased, one way to explain this finding is through how different forms 
of dehumanisation interact.  
 However, this was not supported by the findings from the study. Instead, the 
results were complex: following a team selection decision (table 6), change in all forms of 
dehumanisation were negatively related. For overall dehumanisation (Appendix H), self-
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dehumanisation was significantly negatively related to both animalistic and mechanistic 
dehumanisation. Overall animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation were positively 
related, although this was not a significant finding. Now, considering Bastian et al. (2013) 
defined self-dehumanisation to be an “adaptive response to cope with one’s own 
transgressions and the immoral treatment of others” (p. 157), these findings suggest that, in 
itself, the act of dehumanising athletes may be perceived as a transgression, or to be 
immoral. At this point, it is appropriate to digress somewhat, in order to explain how 
immoral acts can influence mental wellbeing. Without wishing to enter a debate over the 
definitions of, and what constitutes, moral actions, literature exploring a quintessential 
immoral act will be used; that of bullying, and specifically, cyberbullying.  
Research exploring the mental health of students who engaged in cyberbullying 
found that they reported higher scores on stress, depression and anxiety scales than those 
who were not involved in any bullying (Campbell et al., 2013). Moreover, research by 
Ybarra and Mitchell (2004) found that 16% of students who harassed others online were 
severely depressed. In addition, cyberbullying perpetration has been related to adolescents’ 
decreased levels of self-esteem (Patchin & Hinduja, 2010), decreased self-efficacy, a 
reduction in prosocial behaviour, a reduced perceived sense of belonging (Wong et al., 
2014), negative emotions such as anger, sadness, frustration, fear and embarrassment 
(Ybarra & Mitchell, 2007; Ybarra & Mitchell, 2004). It should be noted that the 
associations cited may be a reason as to why cyberbullies engage in cyberbullying, and not 
necessarily an outcome of it, yet the point is still valid given the breadth of evidence 
available. 
Returning to the case in point, research on cyberbullying suggests that perpetrators 
of cyberbullying suffer from concepts related to negative mental wellbeing. 
Conceptualising cyberbullying as an immoral act, or a transgression, in the same way as 
dehumanisation, may assist in explaining why coaches who engage in more 
dehumanisation of the athletes are more likely to have lower levels of mental wellbeing. 
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This is because immoral acts have been shown to negatively predict mental wellbeing, the 
acts of dehumanisation are immoral or a transgression, thus, explaining why all three forms 
of dehumanisation negatively predict mental wellbeing. 
An alternative explanation for the relationships between dehumanisation and 
mental wellbeing is in part explained, and underpinned, by the four personal factors 
predicting dehumanisation; resilience, relatedness, emotional intelligence and personal 
sense of power. The relationship between each of these factors, dehumanisation and 
wellbeing will be explored in turn. Following this, the interactions between different forms 
of dehumanisation will be provided.  
 
Power and mental wellbeing 
Power’s relationship with mental wellbeing can be explained by considering work 
that examines individuals’ autonomy. For the purposes of this study, power was defined as 
the ability to control resources, one’s own and others’ (Galinsky et al., 2003). Lammers et 
al. (2016) note that within this definition, power over others and power over oneself, are 
combined. Lammers et al. (2016) further explain that power over others’ outcomes can be 
considered a form of influence (Emerson, 1962; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld 
& Anderson, 2003) and power over one’s own outcomes can be conceptualised as 
autonomy (Heider, 1958; Ng, 1980; Overbeck and Park, 2001). Using Lammers et al.’s 
(2016) work further, they also note how Dépret and Fiske’s (1993) definition of power 
supports this influence-autonomy distinction. Dépret and Fiske (1993) defined power as 
asymmetrical control over others’ outcomes. The word asymmetrical suggests that power 
consists of a capacity to control others (influence) and a capacity to remain uncontrolled by 
others (autonomy). Moreover, Lammers et al. (2016) cite how Keltner and colleagues 
(2003) defined power as the relative capacity to modify others’ states, earning that power 
consists of a capacity to remain unmodified by others (autonomy). Taken together, this 
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implies that those who have a higher personal sense of power are more likely to have a 
higher sense of autonomy. 
This, therefore, links to autonomy’s relationship with mental wellbeing. Autonomy 
is the extent to which decisions and actions emanate from a person’s integrated self rather 
than being the product of external influence or coercion (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Multiple 
studies have found that autonomy is positively correlated to mental wellbeing (e.g. Reis et 
al., 2018; Sheldon et al., 1996; Csikszentmihalyi & Figurski 1982). This is because a lack 
of sense of being the author of one’s own behaviour, that is, having autonomy, may lead 
people to experience less satisfaction and more frustration with their lives (Deci & Ryan, 
1991; Ryan, 1995; Sheldon & Kasser, 1995). Therefore, the findings of a coaches’ 
personal sense of power positively predicting mental wellbeing can be explained as a result 
of power constituting autonomy, and autonomy itself being evidenced to positively predict 
mental wellbeing.  
 
Relatedness and mental wellbeing 
Relatedness was found to positively predict mental wellbeing in this study, a 
finding which corroborates ample previous research in, and beyond, sport. For example, 
Reis (2016) found that relatedness was significantly associated with wellbeing in a group 
of university students, King (2015) reported how school students’ sense of relatedness with 
parents, teachers and peers positively predicted wellbeing whilst Lopez-Walle et al. (2012) 
found relatedness to mediate the path from perceived coach autonomy support to 
psychological wellbeing in adolescent athletes. Supporting theory for these findings 
suggests that positive affect is greater when individuals are socialising (Watson & Clark, 
1994) and connected with others (intimacy theory; Reis & Shaver, 1988). Thus, when 
coaches have a greater sense of relatedness, this may occur due to their connections with 
their athletes, or other members of support staff, and the ongoing social interaction within 
the sporting environment. In sum, this suggests that coaches’ relatedness predicts positive 
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mental wellbeing as a result of the social connections coaches obtain with others in their 
sporting environment.  
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Emotional intelligence, resilience, and mental wellbeing 
Both emotional intelligence and resilience’s relationship with mental wellbeing can 
be explained through their relationship with stress. As noted by Por et al. (2011) in a study 
exploring nurses’ experience of managing stress, the author noted that those with greater 
emotional intelligence were more likely to be better at managing their emotions, thus 
experiencing lower amounts of perceived stress, lead to better overall mental wellbeing. 
Similarly for resilience, it has been reported that those with higher resilience reported less 
stress (Friborg et al., 2006) whilst increased job stress has been shown to increase the risk 
of depression symptoms (Clays et al., 2007). Taken together, this suggests that resilient 
individuals are better at dealing with stress, which, in turn, avoids symptoms of negative 
mental wellbeing, thus leading to greater mental wellbeing, as indicated in this study.  
  
147 
 
The role of situational factors in coaches’ engagement in dehumanisation 
Hypotheses 7 and 8 concerned two situational factors that may predict coaches’ use 
of dehumanisation. Specifically, hypothesis 7 stated that coaches who were a concordant 
gender with the athletes they work with will animalistically and mechanistically 
dehumanise more, and self-dehumanise less, than coaches who are discordant with the 
gender of the athletes they work with. t Hypothesis 8 predicted that the higher the level the 
coach had previously participated as an athlete, the more likely they would be to engage in 
animalistic and mechanistic forms of dehumanisation, and the less likely they would be to 
self-dehumanise. However, neither of these hypotheses were supported by the data, with 
no difference between concordant and non-concordant coach:athlete groups, or coaches 
with different level the highest previous participation level and dehumanisation. As such, 
gendered partnerships do not seem to be a predictive factor for dehumanisation’s use. Yet, 
as discussed, there were significant relationships between coaches’ relatedness, resilience, 
personal sense of power, emotional intelligence and dehumanisation. Therefore, based on 
the data from this study, this would suggest that personal factors predict dehumanisation 
and situational factors do not, meaning that dehumanisation occurs on an individual basis.   
 
Part 5 - Summary of Findings: An adapted model predicting dehumanisation in 
coaches 
Figure 2 (in literature review) showed the hypothesised relationships between the 
factors expected to predict coaches’ engagement with all three forms of dehumanisation, 
and dehumanisation’s subsequent relationship with mental wellbeing. Considering the 
findings from this study and the explanations provided for them, Figure 3 demonstrates an 
adapted model of the antecedents of dehumanisation and mental wellbeing. Given the 
negligible change in dehumanisation following a team selection decision, only overall 
dehumanisation is displayed on the model. 
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Figure 3: Updated model of the relationships between predictive factors, three forms of dehumanisation and mental wellbeing.  
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Part 6 – Summary: main theoretical contributions 
The first key theoretical contribution is support for a trait-like model of 
dehumanisation, as opposed to a context-specific one. Individual differences have been 
shown to differentiate dehumanisation use, specifically resilience, personal sense of power, 
relatedness and emotional intelligence. Second, the hypothesis regarding the adaptive use 
of dehumanisation is not supported – instead, findings reiterate the negative wellbeing 
associations of dehumanisation previously advocated in the literature. One way to explain 
this finding is through the perceived immorality of dehumanisation.  
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Methodological contributions 
This study represents, as far as we are aware, the first application of validated 
dehumanisation measures to a sporting population (i.e., Measure of Self-Humanity, Bastian 
et al., 2012, and a newly developed dehumanisation measure based on Haslam’s (2006) 
conceptualisations of humanness). In doing so, this study has provided some initial 
evidence of their validation with for this population. Specifically, evidence is provided for 
face validity (as indicated by the coaches’ ability to complete the measures) and predictive 
validity (in that the measures were related to other important concepts e.g. mental 
wellbeing). Support for the measures’ reliability was provided (see table 1). Furthermore, 
minor modifications to the wording of key measures in adaptations of previously validated 
scales which can be used in the future with the populations similar to that in this study. 
Moreover, the data makes a contribution to debates concerning whether self-
dehumanisation is a uni-dimensional or multi-dimensional concept. Previous work (e.g. 
Bastian et al., 2012) has calculated scores for overall self-humanity, indicating uni-
dimensionality, whereas other work (e.g. Bastian & Haslam, 2010) has calculated self-
humanity with respect to human nature and human uniqueness, indicating multi-
dimensionality. Additionally, both Bastian et al.’s (2012) and Bastian and Haslam’s (2010) 
work calculated mean scores for self-humanity, irrespective of uni- or multi-
dimensionality. However, this study totalled self-dehumanisation scores in order to account 
for outliers and did so with acceptable reliability. Thus, this indicates that self-
dehumanisation can be measured as a uni-dimensional concept.  
 Lastly, with respect to data collection, this study reinforces the utility of snowball 
and convenience sampling in studies focusing on specific sub-populations. Additionally, 
the importance and effectiveness of gatekeepers to access sporting populations is 
highlighted, due to the sizeable contribution to recruiting participants within this study.   
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Applied contributions 
The key applied recommendation to be taken from this study is for coach education 
programmes to develop an awareness of, and integrate training of, resilience, emotional 
intelligence and relatedness. The reason for this is twofold. First, these three factors are 
negatively correlated with dehumanisation and dehumanisation has been shown to 
negatively predict mental wellbeing. Second, these three factors were shown to positively 
predict mental wellbeing across a sample of sport coaches. Therefore, if there is a way of 
increasing the levels of these within coaches, these should be explored in order to protect 
against negative mental wellbeing. 
As outlined in the introduction to this study, coaches across all levels of sport, from 
participation to Olympic level, experience a range of stressors (Thelwell et al., 2010; 
Lundkvist et al., 2012; Didymus, 2017; Potts et al., 2019). An inability to cope with 
stressors has previously been shown to lead to burnout (Olusoga & Kenttä, 2017), whilst it 
can also be suggested that a lack of effective coping with stressors may contribute to the 
emergent findings of poor mental health amongst coaches (Edge Hill University, 2019; 
Fletcher & Scott, 2010). As such, this highlights the need for coach educators to formally 
understand these three factors, how they influence mental wellbeing and how they can be 
‘improved’ within coaches.  This process in itself may require future research, as to 
contextually define, operationalise and develop effective training programmes for these 
factors may be challenging.  
However, the more experienced and qualified a coach becomes, the less likely they 
are to attend the same amount of formal coach training. As such, it is important to develop 
an understanding of why and how these factors may also be effectively integrated in 
settings beyond coach education programmes. For example, there is ample research 
supporting the contention that social support contributes to resilience (e.g. Brown, 2008; 
Galli & Vealey, 2008; Fletcher & Sarkar, 2012, Morgan et al., 2013). Therefore, to take 
one example of a different sport setting by using that of an elite academy, resilience in 
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coaches may be fostered through encouraging a social support network. In turn, this may 
assist in building a sense of belonging amongst coaches such they feel a greater sense of 
relatedness. This social support network does not have to be exclusive to coaches and may 
include support staff (e.g. psychologists, strength and conditioning coaches etc.) or 
administrators in the environment. Moreover, additional work with a focus on the 
components of an effective social support network for sports coaches in order to develop 
resilience and relatedness may be a fruitful area for further research.  
Another applied recommendation to be made from this study is that 
dehumanisation should not be proposed as a potential coping method to deal with the stress 
of a team selection decision. Previous research has highlighted how coaches found the 
experience of a team selection decision stressful (Didymus, 2017; Thelwell et al., 2008; 
Olusoga et al., 2009; Coutrier, 2009 & Lundkvist et al., 2012) and the focus of this study 
was to explore whether or not dehumanisation could be a potential coping method used in 
order to relieve this stress. However, overall dehumanisation was found to be negatively 
correlated to mental wellbeing, and therefore indicates maladaptive outcomes of engaging 
with dehumanisation. As a result, this suggests dehumanisation is not an effective coping 
method for dealing with the stress of a team selection decision.  
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Part 7 - Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions 
Strengths 
The first strength of this study is the applied context in which dehumanisation was 
measured. Many previous studies exploring dehumanisation have not sought to explore it 
within applied settings, and instead examined it within experimental-based studies, without 
specific inclusion criteria for participants (e.g. Lammers & Stapel, 2010; Bastian & 
Haslam, 2010; Bastian et al., 2012; Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Haslam & Bain, 2007; 
Moller & Deci, 2009). As a result of specifically exploring sports coaches as a sample, a 
clearer understanding of how this population engage with forms of dehumanisation has 
been developed.  
Moreover, by setting broad inclusion criteria for coaches in the study, the findings 
attempt to achieve some level of generalisability for sports coaches. This responds to Potts 
et al.’s (2019) contention that empirical sports coaching literature has focused almost 
exclusively on the experiences of full-time paid male coaches, thus leading to a biased 
evidence base. Therefore, with wider inclusion criteria in respect to the sport, level, gender 
and experience of coaches that participated in the study, the generalisability of the findings 
was enhanced.  
The findings of the study are also a key strength. In part, this is because they 
contradict previous research and thus, as suggested, highlight a need for further research, 
but also because they may make a contribution to informing how we can potentially 
improve the mental health of sports coaches.  
 
Limitations and future research directions 
To start, despite broad inclusion criteria, the homogeneity within the sample of 
coaches highlights one limitation of this study. 86% of the sample were male, 93% were 
white British and 94% were football coaches, indicating a need for more diversity in future 
research, if greater generalizability within the findings is desirable. 
154 
 
One additional limitation of this study is that within Part 2 of the questionnaire 
(completed after a selection decision), the perceived stress of the selection decision was not 
measured. Dehumanisation was conceptualised as a potential coping method for this 
theorised stress, and without measuring how stressful the selection decision was for each 
coach, the ‘need to cope’ and thus, the ‘need to dehumanise’ could not be reported. As 
such, relationships between stress and dehumanisation, which may have been indicative of 
dehumanisation’s employment as a coping mechanism, were not explored. Therefore, it 
would be recommended that future research exploring dehumanisation as a potential 
coping method for the stress of a team selection decision includes a measure for this. Such 
research may also provide quantitative data on specific stressors experienced by coaches. 
With respect to the potential effectiveness of dehumanisation as a coping method, 
within Part 2 of the questionnaire it would have also been beneficial to measure coaches’ 
mental wellbeing. This would have provided greater insight into whether or not coaches’ 
mental wellbeing changed in accordance with their engagement with dehumanisation. 
Moreover, this would have facilitated a more detailed understanding of whether or not 
dehumanisation has adaptive properties, and could therefore be classed as an effective 
coping technique. As such, another future research direction includes the recommendation 
of assessing mental wellbeing pre and post events involving dehumanisation, as one way to 
assess the effectiveness of coping methods more broadly could be through changes in 
mental wellbeing.  
Concerning the measures used in this study, the measure for mechanistic 
dehumanisation was unreliable, limiting the interpretations from the findings relating to it. 
One of the reasons attributed to this lack of reliability was the wording of the questions 
included, for example “I consider the athletes as a means to an end.” Wording of questions 
like this was theorised to be socially undesirable, in that coaches completing questionnaires 
would not want to ‘admit’ to perceive athletes in this way, or even, coaches may not have 
been aware that they perceived athletes like this. Thus, it would be beneficial for future 
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research to adapt, or develop a new measure tailored to the subtleties of dehumanisation in 
sport, cognisant of the range of ways in which dehumanisation occur and the ways in 
which coaches feel they ‘should’ behave. 
Moreover, coaches were requested to fill out Part 2 of the questionnaire “within 24 
hours of making a team selection decision”, yet, there was not a procedure put in place to 
ensure this was done. As such, there is no guarantee that coaches responded with respect to 
how they felt within 24 hours of making a team selection decision. Therefore, future 
research exploring similar concepts may employ methods to ensure that participants 
complete questionnaires within a direct timeframe.  
One further limitation from this study concerns the lack of methods implemented to 
assess a causal relationship between dehumanisation, resilience, emotional intelligence, 
personal sense of power, relatedness and mental wellbeing. This study reported that there 
is a relationship between them and noted the strength and directions of the correlations, 
yet, to have stronger applied findings, knowledge of a causal relationship would have been 
beneficial. Thus, an additional area recommended for future research is an exploration into 
the cause and effect within the relationship between these concepts. However, it should be 
noted that an ethical challenge would be presented in trying to manipulate this 
experimentally, given the knowledge that there are negative outcomes. An investigation on 
this would provide stronger applied recommendations than this current study, as it would 
offer information on where coach education programmes should direct their focus. 
Specifically, knowledge surrounding how to increase relatedness, resilience and emotional 
intelligence would facilitate a greater understanding of how mental wellbeing can be 
enhanced.   
Linked to this is the recommendation that a review of current psychological content 
taught on coach education programmes would be beneficial. To be precise, knowledge of 
currently what and how psychological content, specifically to protect coach mental 
wellbeing, is delivered on coach education programmes would be fruitful to explore. This 
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is because it would facilitate more explicit knowledge on where the gaps may currently lie 
within these programmes and thus, how new information may be effectively integrated.   
Finally, investigations into who is dehumanised and how this dehumanisation takes 
place would be a recommended area for further research. This study explored what types of 
dehumanisation take place (e.g. animalistic and mechanistic dehumanisation of a group of 
athletes and self-dehumanisation from a coach). However, there is potential that individual 
athletes are dehumanised in different ways and therefore, why and how this occurs and 
what the associated impacts are, would be a potential area for future research. Here, we 
presented provisional data exploring gender effects. Other key areas, especially those 
linked with other-dehumanisation might include race, for example, alongside the 
contextual aspects that have been shown to constitute humanness from coaches’ 
perspectives, as outlined in this study. It is also recommended that exploration of how 
dehumanisation occurs in practice should not be exclusive to what aspects of humanness 
are denied, but also what this looks like in practice (e.g. specific uses of language and/or 
ostracising behaviour). Thus, given dehumanisation’s negative relationship with mental 
wellbeing, knowledge of how dehumanisation occurs in practice, specifically within 
sporting settings, could support coach education programmes in providing behavioural 
advice for coaches. This would enable coaches to ensure their coaching remains effective, 
in line with the adapted definition of coaching effectiveness outlined in the introduction to 
this study.  
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Concluding remarks 
This study set out to explore whether dehumanisation could be employed as an 
effective coping mechanism for sport coaches, in relieving the stress associated with a 
team selection decision. In doing so, factors predicted to influence a coach’s engagement 
with forms of dehumanisation were measured. The outcome of the hypotheses and 
associated findings indicated that dehumanisation does not significantly change following 
a team selection decision, yet personal factors did significantly influence coaches’ 
engagement with dehumanisation. The personal factors found to predict coaches’ 
engagement with dehumanisation included a coach’s personal sense of power, relatedness, 
resilience and emotional intelligence. Crucially, however, dehumanisation was found to 
negatively predict mental wellbeing, implying that it may not be an effective coping 
method and all three forms may not have adaptive properties. Moreover, this study also 
suggested one’s tendency to engage with dehumanisation is trait-driven rather than 
context-driven. Taken together, these findings offer implications beyond sport as the 
context in which dehumanisation occurs appears to have minimal influence, so given 
information about individuals specific traits, one would be able to predict their engagement 
with dehumanisation, and potentially their mental wellbeing. 
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Part 8 - Autobiographical reflections 
Prior to the Easter break of 2018, the trio that is the Slater family sat in a small 
restaurant in Vienna, discussing plans for what graduating from Durham University may 
entail. Upon consumption of a delightful meal served  by said restaurant, it was decided 
that the best option would be to remain in Durham a further year, for in my head, doing so 
would enable me one year’s additional coaching experience “and I get a masters.” 
To provide some context, at the time, to remain in Durham would afford me the 
opportunity to work with the Men’s Football Club 2nd XI, whilst keeping my fingers 
crossed for the chance to coach in the academy of a professional club in the same season. 
In an ideal world, this would then assist me in securing a job in the football industry when 
I’d finished my masters, preferably in a coaching capacity. But from my experiences, not 
much in football seemed to work out ideally, so my hopes weren’t exceedingly high. 
Therefore, upon completion of this thesis, it is time to admit that, disappointingly, 
and what has transpired to be somewhat embarrassingly, my reasons for starting were not 
entrenched in a quest for enhanced academic knowledge, or a desire to pursue an academic 
career. Doing a masters was a side note to further pursuing my dream of being a 
professional football coach.  
However, what a bloody side note it was. The intellectual challenge writing, and at 
times presenting, this thesis has provided me with has been a thoroughly enjoyable one to 
take on. My rate of learning with respect to my academic knowledge has far surpassed my 
rate of learning as a football coach this year, and has prompted an awareness of the extent 
to which I yearn for intellectual challenges. To enjoy ‘thinking’ and to get so much 
pleasure from writing has been a rewarding experience. 
The highlight of completing this masters was my presentation at the 7
th
 
International SDT Conference, in Amsterdam. Much to my amazement, an application to 
present a poster of my then data-less research, ended in doing a presentation in front of 
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sixty people. This is an experience I am extremely proud of, and will continue to subtlety 
brag about for years to come. 
More seriously however, this additional year in Durham has asked me the question 
of where do I fit? In coaching environments, I feel, and have anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that, I’m perceived as the southern spoken PhD student on course to be a lab-coat-donning 
professor. Yet in academic environments, I feel I’m the football coach who is “actually 
quite clever”, yet this is more of my own doing and the high regard with which I hold other 
academics’ intelligence. 
So why not embrace the difference between the two? Fully aware that I’m not the 
archetypal football coach with a playing career dotted around non-league clubs and 
contacts ranging up and down the football ladder, I requested advice from a well-regarded 
mentor. I was told not to be concerned and instead, to “have my niche.” To say that now I 
have “found” that niche would be disingenuous, but “stumbled closer to” is certainly more 
accurate. Within said coaching environments, being the bespectacled coach studying for a 
masters, at times perceived as the “intelligent one”, has provided me with this niche, and 
one that makes acceptance within an environment far easier – I definitely play on it at 
times, but who cares and also, who probably knows other than me?  
This is not in any sense a request for pity, I needed something to make me slightly 
different, to make me stand out from a crowd in the most networked industry of all. 
Undertaking this masters has provided me with a point of difference, not to mention far 
more than the additional line on a CV I was anticipating. It’s only a difference though, and 
I’m aware that more is needed to work my way up. 
But for now, I’ll miss the meetings with my supervisory team, and in a masochistic 
way, their incessant desire to constantly prod and provoke my thought process. As such, 
I’ll also miss the team effort it was to complete this study in tandem with my supervisors. 
I’ll miss the lightbulb moments when I’ve had an idea that could work well. And I’ll miss 
the challenge of it all.  
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But I won’t miss all of that too much, because as I make the final edits to this 
thesis, I am grateful, and feel privileged, to be employed full-time as Durham University’s 
Head Football Coach and part-time as Sunderland Academy’s U11s coach.    
Somehow, this has worked out pretty close to ideal. 
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Appendix A – Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet – 20th November 2018 
 
You are invited to take part in a research project. Before you decide if you would like to take part, 
please read this information sheet carefully. You can also ask the lead researcher, Mike Slater, if 
you have any questions (please see contact details at the end of this sheet). 
 
 
Title of Project: The psychology behind selecting a team.  
 
What is the purpose of the research? 
The purpose of the research is to assess the psychological processes involved in a coach’s team 
selection decisions. This will involve gathering information about the coach’s personal sporting 
experience in addition to examining a range of factors to see if they affect how coaches feel and 
act when making difficult decisions. 
 
Why have I been invited to take part? 
You have been invited to take part in this study because you are aged 18 and over and a sport 
coach currently working with a team. 
 
Do I have to take part?  
The decision to take part is entirely at your discretion. If you decide to take part, you are free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. If you wish to do so, please contact the researcher 
using the contact details provided on this sheet. 
 
What will be involved if I decide to take part in the research? 
Taking part in this research will involve the completion of a series of questionnaires. The 
questionnaires will focus on your playing and coaching experience, how you perceive your 
athletes and assess the psychological impacts of making a selection decision. Three parts of the 
questionnaire can be completed at any time, and one part of the questionnaire must be 
completed within 24 hours of making a team selection decision. 
 
How will confidentiality be assured? 
All data submitted will be anonymous and will be stored in a password protected computer file. 
Should you require further information on confidentiality, please refer to the ‘Privacy Notice’. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research? 
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The results from the research will be used as part of a Masters by Research thesis, which may go 
on to be presented at a conference or published in an academic journal. We hope that the results 
will also inform the development of improved training and support for coaches and managers. 
 
Should you wish to see a summary of the project’s findings, please contact the lead researcher 
and you will be sent, via e-mail, a summary document. 
 
If you have any questions related to the project, please contact the lead researcher: 
Name: Mike Slater 
Email address: michael.j.slater@durham.ac.uk 
 
Please only take part in the research project if you are aged over 18 and are currently 
responsible for team selection decisions (solely or jointly). 
 
If you would like to take part, please complete and sign the enclosed Informed Consent Form.  
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Appendix B – Consent Form 
 
Consent Form 
Project title: The psychology behind selecting a team.  
Researcher(s): Mike Slater 
Department: Department of Sport and Exercise Sciences 
Contact details: michael.j.slater@durham.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor name: Dr Emily Oliver 
Supervisor contact details: emily.oliver@durham.ac.uk 
This form is to confirm that you understand what the purposes of the project are, what is involved 
and that you are happy to take part. Please initial each box to indicate your agreement: 
I confirm that I have read and understand the Information Sheet dated 
[20/11/2018] and the Privacy Notice for the above project. 
 
I have had sufficient time to consider the information and ask any questions I 
might have, and I am satisfied with the answers I have been given. 
 
I understand who will have access to personal data provided, how the data will be 
stored and what will happen to the data at the end of the project. 
 
I agree to take part in the above project.  
I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving a reason. 
 
 
 
Participant’s Signature_____________________________ Date_____________ 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS)________________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s Signature____________________________ Date_____________ 
 
(NAME IN BLOCK LETTERS)_________________________________________ 
 
 
Please now refer to the questionnaire instruction sheet.  
   
166 
 
Appendix C – Privacy Notice 
 
 
Privacy Notice 
This notice provides you with the privacy information that you need to know before you give any 
personal data for the particular purpose(s) stated below.  Additional information about the 
University’s responsibilities for data protection and your rights in relation to personal data can be 
found in the University’s generic privacy notice, available at 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/research.innovation/governance/privacynotice/generic/. 
 
 
Title of Project: The psychology behind selecting a team.  
 
Type(s) of personal data collected and held by the Researcher and method of collection: 
Your e-mail address will be collected as the research requires you to complete one questionnaire 
at a different point in time to the other three. As such, your e-mail address may be used to send 
you a reminder to complete the final part of the questionnaire. This will be the only use for your 
e-mail address. 
 
The only other form of personal data collected will be your answers to a series of questionnaires. 
These questionnaires include information on your coaching experience, psychological well-being 
and relationships with your athletes. Your personal data will be anonymised exactly one week 
after you have completed and submitted all four parts of the study. This information will be 
gathered by either paper or online questionnaires. 
 
Lawful Basis: 
Your data will be processed in accordance with the consent you give for the use of your data, 
should you agree to participate in the project. 
 
How personal data is stored: 
You will be allocated an anonymous number for data collection which will not be connected to 
your name or identity. All personal data in electronic form will be stored on a password protected 
computer, and any hardcopies will be kept in locked storage. Data will not be available to anyone 
outside the research team. 
 
How personal data is processed: 
The responses submitted via questionnaires will be entered into a database for analysis. From the 
point of entry into the database (which will be one week after you complete all four parts of the 
questionnaire), the data will be anonymous.  
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Withdrawal of data 
You can request withdrawal of your data until it has been fully anonymised (one week from 
completion and submission).  Once this has happened it will not be possible to identify you from 
any of the data we hold. 
 
Who the Researcher shares personal data with: 
The personal data will be shared only amongst the research team. Once the data has been made 
anonymous, the data may be used within the project output submitted to third parties.  
 
How long personal data is held for: 
The personal data will be held for one week before being put into a database, after which it be 
anonymised. The anonymised data and the signed consent form will be held for up to two years. 
 
How to object to the processing of your personal data: 
If you have any concerns regarding the processing of your personal data, or you wish to withdraw 
your data from the project, please contact Mike Slater using the information below. 
 
If you require further information please contact: 
Researcher: Mike Slater 
Email: michael.j.slater@durham.ac.uk 
 
Supervisor: Dr Emily Oliver 
Address: 42 Old Elvet, Durham, DH1 3HN 
Email: emily.oliver@durham.ac.uk 
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Appendix D – Questionnaire Part 1 
 
Questionnaire instruction sheet: The 
psychology behind selecting a team. 
 
 
Instructions: 
To take part in this research, you must: 
- Be aged over 18, 
- currently be responsible (solely or jointly) for team selection decisions 
- and coach within the UK. 
 
Part 1 of the questionnaire takes approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
Please answer all the questions, and please note the pages are double-
sided. 
 
Once you have completed Part 1, you will be e-mailed Part 2 of the 
questionnaire. This must be completed up to 24 hours after you have made a 
selection decision for your team. Part 2 takes less than 5 minutes. 
 
Please refer to the participant information sheet should you require any 
further information, or have any questions about what to do. 
 
 
 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. 
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PART A – GENERAL INFORMATION AND SPORT EXPERIENCE 
This section contains some basic questions about your experiences as a coach.  
 
E-mail 
address*: 
 
*As stated in the privacy notice, your e-mail address will only be used to send you Part 2 of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Section 1: General Information. 
1. Age: 
 
 
2. Gender (please circle):   
 
Male   Female   Non-binary 
 
3. Please choose one option that best describes your ethnic group or background. 
 Tick () 
English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish/British  
Irish  
Gypsy or Irish Traveller  
White and Black Caribbean  
White and Black African  
White and Asian  
Pakistani  
Indian  
Bangladeshi  
Chinese  
African  
Caribbean  
Arab  
Other  
 
Section 2: Playing Experience. 
4. Please select the sport that you currently coach. Following this, please answer all the 
questions in relation to this sport. 
 Tick () 
Football  
Hockey  
Rugby Union   
Rugby League  
Basketball  
Cricket  
Rowing  
Netball  
Other  
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5. For how many years have you/did you play this sport?  
 
 
years 
 
6. What is the highest level at which you have played the sport you selected in question 4? 
(Select one) 
Level of league/competition Tick () 
International  
National  
Regional  
Local  
University  
Have never played the sport  
 
7. For how many years did you play at this level?  
(Enter '0' if you answered 'Have never played the sport' to the previous question) 
 
 
years 
 
Section 3: Coaching Experience. 
8. Please select your highest coaching qualification to date. (Please select equivalent if your 
sport does not adopt these levels) 
Qualification (or equivalent) Tick () 
Level 5  
Level 4  
Level 3  
Level 2  
Level 1  
No current coaching qualifications  
 
9. Throughout your career, what is the highest level of competition in which you have coached a 
team? (Select one) 
Level of league/competition Tick () 
International  
National  
Regional  
Local  
University  
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We recognise that some coaches may currently work with more than one team, so please answer 
questions 8, 9 and 10 in relation to the team you predominantly work with. Then, when 
completing the remaining parts of the questionnaire, please do so in relation to the same team. 
 
10. Do you currently coach a men’s, women’s or mixed team? (Please tick one) 
 Tick () 
Men  
Women  
Mixed  
 
11. What is the age range of the team you currently coach? (Please tick one) 
 Tick () 
Adult (19+)  
Youth (12-18)  
Children (11 and younger)  
 
 
12. At what level of competition does the team you currently coach participate? (Please tick one) 
Level of league/competition Tick () 
International  
National  
Regional  
Local  
University  
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PART B – Coach relationships and behaviour. 
This part of the questionnaire contains four different sections focusing on your relationship with 
your athletes and specific behaviours you exhibit as a coach. 
 
Section 1. 
Please circle your response for each item below. 
 
In my relationship with the athletes I coach… 
 
  Disagree 
strongly 
Disagree Disagree 
a little 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Agree 
a little 
Agree Agree 
strongly 
1. I can get them to 
listen to what I say. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. My wishes do not 
carry much weight. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I can get them to 
do what I want. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Even if I voice 
them, my views 
have little sway. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I think I have a 
great deal of 
power. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. My ideas and 
opinions are often 
ignored. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Even when I try, I 
am not able to get 
my way. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. If I want to, I get to 
make the decisions. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Section 2. 
Each of the following items asks you about how you manage emotions.  
 
After deciding whether a statement is generally true for you, use the 5-point scale to respond to 
the statement.  
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please give the response that best describes you. 
 
    
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
1 
I know when to speak about my 
personal problems to others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
When I am faced with obstacles, I 
remember times I faced similar 
obstacles and overcame them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
I expect that I will do well on most 
things I try.  
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
Other people find it easy to 
confide in me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
5 
I find it hard to understand the 
non-verbal messages of other 
people.  
1 2 3 4 5 
6 
Some of the major events of my 
life have led me to re-evaluate 
what is important and not 
important.  
1 2 3 4 5 
7 
When my mood changes, I see 
new possibilities.  
1 2 3 4 5 
8 
Emotions are one of the things 
that make my life worth living.  
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
I am aware of my emotions as I 
experience them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
10 I expect good things to happen.  1 2 3 4 5 
11 
I like to share my emotions with 
others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
12 
When I experience a positive 
emotion, I know how to make it 
last. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
13 I arrange events others enjoy.  1 2 3 4 5 
14 
I seek out activities that make me 
happy.  
1 2 3 4 5 
15 
I am aware of the non-verbal 
messages I send to others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
16 
I present myself in a way that 
makes a good impression on 
others.  
1 2 3 4 5 
17 
When I am in a positive mood, 
solving problems is easy for me.  
1 2 3 4 5 
18 
By looking at their facial 
expressions, I recognize the 
emotions people are experiencing.  
1 2 3 4 5 
19 I know why my emotions change.  1 2 3 4 5 
20 
When I am in a positive mood, I 
am able to come up with new 
ideas.  
1 2 3 4 5 
21 I have control over my emotions.  1 2 3 4 5 
22 
I easily recognize my emotions as I 
experience them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
23 
I motivate myself by imagining a 
good outcome to tasks I take on.  
1 2 3 4 5 
24 
I compliment others when they 
have done something well.  
1 2 3 4 5 
25 
I am aware of the non-verbal 
messages other people send.  
1 2 3 4 5 
26 
When another person tells me 
about an important event in his or 
her life, I almost feel as though I 
experienced this event myself.  
1 2 3 4 5 
27 
When I feel a change in emotions, 
I tend to come up with new ideas.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither 
agree 
nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
28 
When I am faced with a challenge, 
I give up because I believe I will 
fail. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29 
I know what other people are 
feeling just by looking at them.  
1 2 3 4 5 
30 
I help other people feel better 
when they are down.  
1 2 3 4 5 
31 
I use good moods to help myself 
keep trying in the face of 
obstacles.  
1 2 3 4 5 
32 
I can tell how people are feeling by 
listening to the tone of their voice.  
1 2 3 4 5 
33 
It is difficult for me to understand 
why people feel the way they do.  
1 2 3 4 5 
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Section 3.  
 
For each item, please place a tick in the box that best indicates how much you agree with the 
following statements as they apply to you over the last month.  
If a particular situation has not occurred recently, answer according to how you think you would 
have felt. 
 
  
Not 
true at 
all 
(0) 
Rarely 
true 
(1) 
Sometimes 
true 
(2) 
Often 
true 
(3) 
True 
nearly 
all the 
time 
(4) 
1 
I am able to adapt when changes 
occur           
2 
I can deal with whatever comes my 
way           
3 
I try to see the humorous side of 
things when I am faced with 
problems           
4 
Having to cope with stress can make 
me stronger           
5 
I tend to bounce back after illness, 
injury or other hardships           
6 
I believe I can achieve my goals, even 
if there are obstacles           
7 
Under pressure, I stay focused and 
think clearly           
8 I am not easily discouraged by failure 
          
9 
I think of myself as a strong person 
when dealing with life's challenges 
and difficulties           
10 
I am able to handle unpleasant or 
painful feelings like sadness, fear and 
anger           
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Section 4.  
 
Below are some statements about how you think and feel. 
 
Please circle the box that best describes your experience of each over the last 2 weeks. 
 
  Statements 
None of 
the time 
Rarely 
Some of 
the time 
Often 
All of 
the time 
1 
I've been feeling optimistic 
about the future 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 I've been feeling useful 1 2 3 4 5 
3 I've been feeling relaxed 1 2 3 4 5 
4 
I've been feeling interested in 
other people 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 I've had energy to spare 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
I've been dealing with problems 
well 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I've been thinking clearly 1 2 3 4 5 
8 
I've been feeling good about 
myself 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
I've been feeling close to other 
people 
1 2 3 4 5 
10 I've been feeling confident 1 2 3 4 5 
11 
I've been able to make up my 
own mind about things 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 I've been feeling loved 1 2 3 4 5 
13 
I've been interested in new 
things 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 I've been feeling cheerful 1 2 3 4 5 
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Section 5.  
 
Please respond to the items below with regard to your feelings and experiences in the sport you 
predominantly coach. 
1. In my sport, I feel close to the athletes I work with. 
Not true at all          Very true 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
2. I show concern for the athletes I work with. 
Not true at all          Very true 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
3. The athletes I work with care about me. 
Not true at all          Very true 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
4. I trust the athletes I work with. 
Not true at all          Very true 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
5. I have close relationships with the athletes I work with. 
Not true at all          Very true 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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PART C – Coach’s perception of their athletes and themselves. 
This section contains a series of questionnaires as to how a coach perceives their athletes and 
their ‘self.’ 
 
Section 1.  
Please tick one box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between 
‘athletes’ and ‘machines’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2. 
Please tick one box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between 
‘athletes’ and ‘animals’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Tick () 
Athletes Animals 
Athletes Animals 
 
Athletes Animals 
 
Athletes Animals 
Athletes Animals 
 
Athletes Animals 
Athletes Animals 
Tick () 
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Section 3.  
Please tick one box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between 
your view of ‘yourself’ and ‘animals’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4. 
Please tick one box which you think most accurately represents the degree of overlap between 
your view of ‘yourself’ and ‘machines’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Me Animals 
Me 
 
Animals 
 
Me 
 
Animals 
 
Me 
 
Animals 
Me Animals 
 
Me Animals 
Me Animals 
Me Machines 
Me 
 
Machines 
 
Me 
 
Machines 
Me 
 
Machines 
Me Machines 
Me Machines 
Me Machines 
Tick () 
Tick () 
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Section 5.  
Please circle the number you think is most appropriate to you. 
 
When thinking about the athletes I work with… 
 
1. I deem the athletes to be mature for their age. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
2. I consider the athletes to be able to think logically. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
3. I feel that the athletes act morally. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
4. I see the athletes as refined individuals. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
5. I consider the athletes to be cultured. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
 7 
 
6. I consider the athletes to be replaceable.  
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
 7 
 
7. I ignore the emotional responses of the athletes. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
 7 
 
8. The thoughts of the athletes are at the forefront of my mind. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
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1   2  3  4  5  6 
 7 
 
9. I consider the athletes as a means to an end. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 
 7 
 
10. The way in which the athlete treats other people is important to me. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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Section 6. 
Please circle the number you think is most appropriate to you. 
 
When thinking about how I feel when working with the athletes I coach… 
 
1. I feel like I am open minded, like I can think clearly about things.  
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
2. I feel like I am emotional, responsive and warm. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
3. I feel superficial, like I have no depth.  
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
 
 
4. I feel like I am mechanical and cold, like a robot. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
5. I feel like I am refined and cultured. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
6. I feel like I am rational and logical, like I am intelligent.  
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
7. I feel like I lack self-restraint, like an animal. 
Not at all          Very 
much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
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8. I feel like I am unsophisticated. 
Not at all         Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
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Appendix E – Questionnaire Part 2 
PART 2 – Coach’s perception of their athletes and themselves following a selection decision. 
This section must be completed within 24 hours of making a team selection decision. 
 
Please answer these questions with respect to how you feel right now. 
 
Section 1. 
Having made your selection decision, please tick one box which you think most accurately 
represents the degree of overlap between ‘athletes’ and ‘machines’.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 2. 
Having made your selection decision, please tick one box which you think most accurately 
represents the degree of overlap between ‘athletes’ and ‘animals’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 3. 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Athletes Machines 
Tic
Athletes Animals 
Athletes Animals 
 
Athletes Animals 
 
Athletes Animals 
Athletes Animals 
 
Athletes Animals 
Athletes Animals 
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Having made your selection decision, please tick one box which you think most accurately 
represents the degree of overlap between your view of ‘yourself’ and ‘animals’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4. 
Having made your selection decision, please tick one box which you think most accurately 
represents the degree of overlap between your view of ‘yourself’ and ‘machines’: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Me Animals 
Me 
 
Animals 
 
Me 
 
Animals 
 
Me 
 
Animals 
Me Animals 
 
Me Animals 
Me Animals 
Me Machines 
Me 
 
Machines 
 
Me 
 
Machines 
Me 
 
Machines 
Me Machines 
Me Machines 
Me Machines 
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Section 5. 
Right now, having made my selection decision… 
 
1. I deem the athletes to be mature for their age. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
2. I consider the athletes to be able to think logically. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
3. I feel that the athletes act morally. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
4. I see the athletes as refined individuals. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
5. I consider the athletes to be cultured. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
6. I consider the athletes to be replaceable.  
Not at all        Very much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
7. I ignore the emotional responses of the athletes. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
8. The thoughts of the athletes are at the forefront of my mind. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
9. I consider the athletes as a means to an end. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
10. The way in which the athlete treats other people is important to me. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
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Section 6. 
Right now, having made my selection decision… 
 
9. I feel like I am open minded, like I can think clearly about things.  
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
10. I feel like I am emotional, responsive and warm. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
11. I feel superficial, like I have no depth.  
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
12. I feel like I am mechanical and cold, like a robot. 
Not at all        Very much so 
2   2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
13. I feel like I am refined and cultured. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
14. I feel like I am rational and logical, like I am intelligent.  
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
15. I feel like I lack self-restraint, like an animal. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
 
 
16. I feel like I am unsophisticated. 
Not at all        Very much so 
1  2  3  4  5  6 7 
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Appendix F - Item-wise breakdown of variance and range for mechanistic 
dehumanisation scale. 
 
  Pre-selection Post-selection 
Item Item wording 
Mean** 
(SD) 
Range Variance 
Mean** 
(SD) 
Range Variance 
DH6 
I consider the 
athletes to be 
replaceable. 
3.67 
(1.57) 
6 2.46 
3.63 
(1.66) 
6 2.75 
DH7 
I ignore the 
emotional 
responses of the 
athletes. 
2.05 
(1.18) 
6 1.39 
1.98 
(1.30) 
5 1.7 
DH8* 
The thoughts of 
the athletes are at 
the forefront of 
my mind. 
2.86 
(1.33) 
5 1.78 
2.82 
(1.57) 
6 2.47 
DH9 
I consider the 
athletes as a 
means to an end. 
2.34 
(1.6) 
6 2.56 
2.02 
(1.37) 
5 1.89 
DH10* 
The way in 
which the athlete 
treats other 
people is 
important to me. 
1.86 
(1) 
6 0.99 
1.74 
(1.10) 
6 1.21 
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Appendix G – Differences in dehumanisation between three gender groups. 
 
 Sig 
Change in Animalistic dehumanisation .745 
Change in Mechanistic Dehumanisation .446 
Change in Self-Dehumanisation .620 
Overall Animalistic Dehumanisation .787 
Overall Mechanistic Dehumanisation .192 
Overall Self-Dehumanisation .300 
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Appendix H - Correlations between forms of dehumanisation. 
 
 Correlation (Pearson’s r) 
 
Animalistic DH 
(n) 
Mechanistic DH 
(n) 
Animalistic DH - - 
Mechanistic DH 
.089 
(185) 
- 
Self DH*** 
-.208** 
(184) 
-.530** 
(181) 
*p values ≤ 0.05. 
**p values ≤ 0.01. 
***Higher scores = less self-dehumanisation. 
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